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INTRODUCTION 
The credit derivatives instrument market is like a new continent 
with boundless opportunity.1  Financial institutions, as well as individual 
investors, are mobilizing all of their resources as they jump into this 
frontier head-on.2  Opportunity overflows in the financial market, but 
the competition is becoming increasingly fierce.3  Cutting edge financial 
products are introduced every day.4  Credit derivatives lead the way. 
The credit derivatives market is somewhat akin to the middle age 
practice of alchemy, by which practitioners attempted to convert lead 
into gold.5  The goal of each is to create new value.  Although the 
alchemists failed, “financial engineering”6 of the present era succeeds in 
creating new value through the highest levels of statistical analysis,7 in 
many ways actually creating something from nothing.  Derivative 
 1. See ANTULIO N. BOMFIM, UNDERSTANDING CREDIT DERIVATIVES AND RELATED 
INSTRUMENTS 291 (2005) (referring to the credit derivatives market as “still a relatively 
young marketplace”). 
 2. See Mark Parsley, Credit Derivatives Get Cracking, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1996, 
at 28. 
There are hundreds of possible [credit derivatives] applications: 1. for commercial 
banks that want to change the risk profile of their loan books, 2. for investment bank 
managing huge bond and derivatives portfolios, 3. for manufacturing companies over-
exposed to a single customer, 4. for equity investors in project finance deals with 
unacceptable sovereign risk, 5. for institutional investors that have unusual risk 
appetites [or just want to speculate], and 6. for employees worried about the safety of 
their deferred remuneration. 
Id. 
 3. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 4. See ROBERT E. WHALEY, DERIVATIVES: MARKETS, VALUATION, AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT 11-18 (2006) (describing the evolution of derivatives markets and tools). 
 5. But see STANDARD & POOR’S, GLOBAL CASH FLOW AND SYNTHETIC CDO 
CRITERIA 14 (2002), http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/cdo_crite 
ria2002_FINALTOC.pdf (“This is not alchemy or turning straw into gold, but rather the 
implementation of structured finance to create different investment risk profiles, based 
on the structuring of credit support.”). 
 6. See ROBERT M. MCLAUGHLIN, OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES PRODUCTS: 
A GUIDE TO BUSINESS AND LEGAL RISK MANAGEMENT AND DOCUMENTATION 1 (1998) 
(introducing uses of the term “financial engineering”). 
 7. See id. at 14. But see Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and 
Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1042 (2007) (“Although the 
mathematic techniques of [derivatives] technology are sophisticated, they are subject to 
the limitations of ‘garbage in, garbage out.’”). 
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dealers and financial engineers are indeed the alchemists of the modern 
era. 
Is a credit derivatives instrument transaction a financial transaction?  
Or is it gambling?  The use of credit derivatives instruments greatly 
increased once the deregulation of the 1980s spurred greater movement 
of capital internationally.8  As they became a recognized means of 
hedging risk, derivative transactions based on the buying and selling of 
future risks increased in frequency and value.9  Initially, derivative 
transactions developed to manage the various types of financial risk10 
that companies typically face.11  Credit derivatives instruments satisfied 
the needs of investors who wanted to reduce asset risk in volatile 
markets.12  In addition, investors used diverse investment tools through 
derivative transactions, such as “legging arbitrage,”13 which takes 
 8. See WHALEY, supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining how credit 
derivatives instrument transactions were developed because U.S. financial institutions 
made loans to the emerging markets, and have held lots of bonds issued by them since 
the early 1990s). 
 9. Generally, the motive of investor participation in derivatives transactions is to 
reduce or remove risk, if possible, by hedging their portfolios value. See Bank One 
Corp. v. Comm’r, 120 T.C. 174, 206-07 (2003).
In the early days of the swaps market, dealers employed simple hedging strategies. 
Transactions designed to meet a customer’s requirements were immediately hedged 
by entering into an offsetting transaction, such as a matched swap.  In the later years, 
many dealers . . . adopted more sophisticated portfolio strategies for hedging market 
risks.  Under this approach, all of the dealer’s transactions were broken down into 
their component cashflows to yield a measure of the net (residual) market exposures 
arising from all of the dealer’s positions.  The residual market exposures were then 
hedged in various ways such as by taking positions in the cash market (e.g., holding or 
selling short U.S. Treasury securities), by using interest-rate futures (which are traded 
on public exchanges), or by entering into swaps. 
Id. 
 10. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 11.  One practicing attorney uses the term 
financial risk in a unique manner.  His literature “uses the term financial risk in the 
economic or statistical sense of uncertainty of outcome, meaning simply that more than 
one outcome of varying degrees of desirability is possible for any given decision.” Id. 
 11. See DAVID A. DUBOFSKY & THOMAS W. MILLER, JR., DERIVATIVES: 
VALUATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT 23 (2003). 
 12. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 15-16 (“[R]isk management [applying 
derivatives] reduces a firm or portfolio’s risks by enabling it to (1) transfer, sell, or 
hedge the source of the unwanted risk, (2) diversify the unwanted risk, or (3) insure 
against any losses that might arise from the unwanted risk.”). 
 13. See Brandon Becker et al., Restrictions and Obligations of Broker-Dealers 
Engaged in Proprietary Trading, SL047 ALI-ABA 115, 148 (2006) (noting that legging 
arbitrage is a derivatives transaction skill, “[w]here a market professional introduces an 
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advantage of the difference between spot price and the price of futures, 
and synthetic transactions between swaps and futures.14
An interesting paradox arose, however, as credit derivatives 
instruments, developed initially for risk management, continued to grow 
and become more sophisticated with the help of financial engineering—
the tail began wagging the dog.15  In becoming a medium for speculative 
transactions, credit derivatives increased, rather than alleviated, risk. 
This Article explores interpretation of the term “credit event,”16 an 
important element of “settlement”17 in the credit derivatives instrument 
transaction.  In fact, the definition of a credit event is at the very core of 
all swap transactions, including the Credit Default Swap (“CDS”).18  
Part I introduces similar derivatives that were historically used by 
financial institutions and mentions the development process of the 
derivative financial market.  Part II provides a brief explanation of the 
various financial products that are used in the credit derivatives 
instrument market.  Part III addresses the legal mechanism of a credit 
derivatives swap, the most frequent type of transaction in the market 
today.  Part IV discusses general issues related to the credit event.  Part 
V reviews pertinent cases that have been litigated in federal court.  In 
particular, as the interpretation of “credit event” faces fierce dispute, the 
International Swap and Derivatives Association’s (“ISDA”) definition of 
intentional delay (up to one day, or even two days) between the transactions in an effort 
to profit from short-term price movement”).
 14. See Peter Tufano, Financial Innovation, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS 
OF FINANCE 307, 320 (G.M. Constantinides, M. Harris & R. M. Stulz eds. 2003), 
available at http://www.dklevine.com/archive/fininnov_tufano_june2002.pdf (noting 
that the unique characteristics of modern financial engineering are innovative 
structuring of financial instruments and designing vehicles under investor’s specific 
financial goals). 
 15. See generally Jongho Kim, Can Risks be Reduced in the Derivatives Market? 
Lessons from the Deal Structure Analysis of Modern Financial Engineering Debacles, 6 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 29 (forthcoming 2008) (detailing a variety of collapsed 
derivative transaction cases). 
 16. CREDIT DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS § 4.1 (Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n 
1999) [hereinafter 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS] (“‘Credit Event’ means, with respect to a 
Credit Derivatives Transaction, one or more of Bankruptcy, Failure to Pay, Obligation 
Acceleration, Obligation Default, Repudiation/Moratorium or Restructuring, as 
specified in the related Confirmation.”). 
 17. See id. § 3.11; see also infra Part IV.F. 
 18. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 289-90. 
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sovereign debt restructuring has become increasingly important.19  The 
discussion focuses on which interpretation is proper under given 
circumstances.  The conclusion includes an assessment of the courts’ 
interpretation of “credit event” and some recommendations. 
I.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE DERIVATIVES MARKETS 
Credit derivatives instrument transactions originated in 1993 with 
the buying and selling of notes of specific transactions by Bankers Trust 
and Credit Suisse Financial Products of Japan, who linked these notes 
with the specific risk of default.20  Although it is true that the phrase 
“credit derivatives instrument transaction” is now common in the 
financial industry, the notion of linking “credit risk”21 existed in the past 
with concepts such as “loan participation,”22 “risk participation,”23 and 
“repo transaction.”24  These transactions can be referred to as traditional 
credit risk linked transactions, since they all transfer counterparty credit 
risk to a third party. 
Of course, it might be rather far-fetched to claim that these 
transactions are basically of the same format, since there are some 
differences in terms of the background, framework and structure of each.  
In addition, the basic transactional flows—recently referred to as both 
credit derivatives instrument transactions and transactions of traditional 
financial products—differ.  In particular, risk participation transactions 
share many similarities with the CDS transactions that are often 
 19. See Joseph P. Collins & Pamela J. Sackmann, Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, 
LLP, A Structured Finance Trio: Assessing the Legal and Regulatory Environment for 
Credit Derivatives, SECTION NEWSLETTER (Am. Bar Ass’n/ Section of Bus. Law, 
Commercial Fin. Servs. Forum, San Francisco, Cal.), Aug. 11, 2003, at 20, 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/newsletter/0017/materials/trio.pdf. 
 20. See Parsley, supra note 2, at 28. 
 21. See generally DUBOFSKY & MILLER, supra note 11, at 318-20; see also Norman 
Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-The-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 677, 689 (2002) (“Credit risk is exposure to the possibility that a counterparty will 
default on its obligations when due because of insolvency.”). 
 22. See generally ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE 
SECURITIES LAWS § 9:110 (2005) (describing the loan participation mechanism).
 23. See generally Risk-based Capital Credit-risk Weight Categories, 12 C.F.R. § 
567.6 (b)(6)(i)-(ii) (2003) (providing an example of risk participation regulations). 
 24. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 624 (discussing repurchase agreements). 
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regarded as typical credit derivatives today.25  Even when the transaction 
is one that deals with a credit derivative of a new format, there are 
indeed many instances in which the intentions of those engaging in the 
transactions are, in fact, very similar to the traditional credit risk linked 
transaction.26
Focus should not be placed merely on credit derivatives of the so-
called “new” format when considered from the perspective of managing 
banks’ credit risk.  Instead, it is essential to examine which elements of 
the same transaction are linked to credit risk and how the funding 
participation, risk participation, and repo transactions are conducted and 
in which format.  This Article next examines funding participation and 
risk participation transactions. 
A.  Yesterday 
Funding participation27 is conducted mostly by linking a traditional 
loan transaction with a funding participation agreement.28  For example, 
when Bank A deals with Company B for a typical loan, Bank A signs a 
separate funding participation agreement with Bank C.  The key to the 
funding participation transaction is that Bank C, referred to as the 
participant, supplies part or all of the capital for the loan that Bank A 
provides to Company B.  Bank A, in turn, loans the capital in its name to 
Company B by adding the capital provided by Bank C to its own.  The 
most important aspect of the funding participation transaction is that if 
Company B does not pay back the loan, then Bank A has no obligation to 
return the capital provided by Bank C.  Otherwise, Bank A assumes the 
obligation to return the capital to Bank C when the loan is paid back by 
Company B.29  There are instances, however, when Bank A agrees on the 
 25. See Huntington Bank, Risk Participation Agreement, 
https://www.huntington.com/bas/Risk_Participation_Agreement.htm (last visited Feb. 
28, 2008) (illustrating a risk participation agreement and customer hedges floating-rate 
loan as an essential business tool). 
 26. COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS., CREDIT RISK TRANSFER, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS 4 (2003) [hereinafter CGFS]. 
 27. See JACOBS, supra note 22. 
 28. See CGFS, supra note 26, at 37. 
 29. See E. Carolan Berkley, Multiple Lender/Multiple Borrower Transactions, in 
ASSET BASED FINANCING 2007, at 333, 335 (2007).  In the funding participation 
transaction, Company B and Bank C negotiate the terms of the loan directly depending 
on the relationship between the parties.  However, there are instances in which a loan is 
obtained by having Bank A act as the fronting bank with the specific goal of cutting 
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funding participation transaction with Bank C after providing the loan to 
Company B, but prior to the loan’s maturity.  At this time, Company B 
might not know that Bank A signed an agreement for funding 
participation separately with Bank C.30  If such is the case, the funding 
participation transaction may be considered one that transfers credit risk 
to a third party.  Therefore, this type of transaction has the 
characteristics of a credit derivative.31
Risk participation transactions have been used in financial markets 
for a long time.32  While “risk” in the risk participation transaction refers 
to the parties’ credit risk, facets of the underlying transaction may be the 
actual source of the risk.33  For example, if Bank A lends capital to 
Company B, Bank A may sign an agreement for a risk participation 
transaction with Bank C in order to transfer the credit risk of Company 
B.  The main details are summarized in the following two ways.  First, 
Bank A pays a participation fee to Bank C in exchange for Bank C’s 
assumption of Company B’s credit risk, either in part or in its entirety, 
during the lending period. 
The transaction process is as follows: (1) Bank A provides a loan to 
Company B; (2) Bank A then transfers the credit risk to Bank C.  Bank C 
also pays a participation fee as financial compensation if Company B 
fails to pay back the loan, a burden which would otherwise be borne by 
Bank A.  Absent such a failure, Company B still bears a loan obligation 
to Bank A.  If Company B cannot pay back its debt for whatever reason, 
Bank C pays Bank A as agreed.  This could consist of either a part of or 
the total amount that Company B defaulted.  The gain for Bank A is the 
transfer of the risk that Company B will default to Bank C. 
Second, the risk participation transaction may also be used if Bank 
A issues a “performance bond” to yet another company, Company D, at 
Company B’s request.  In short, Bank A signs the agreement for a risk 
taxes or bypassing the loan limit by not having Company B get the loan directly from 
Bank C.  In this case, funding participation transaction essentially becomes different 
than the credit risk linked transaction and more similar to a syndicate loan. 
 30. See id. at 337. 
 31. See DUBOFSKY & MILLER, supra note 11, at 17 (“Derivatives allow the user to 
transfer . . . risks to other parties who are willing and able to accept them”). 
 32. See Blaise Gadanecz, The Syndicated Loan Market: Structure, Development 
and Implications, 2004 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS Q. REV. 75, 75, available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0412g.pdf. 
 33. See SATYAJIT DAS, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: TRADING & MANAGEMENT OF CREDIT 
& DEFAULT RISK 146 (1998). 
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participation transaction with Bank C after issuing a performance bond 
to Company D, thus transferring all or part of Company B’s credit risk.34  
If Company B does not fulfill its obligation to Company D, Bank A must 
pay compensatory damages to Company D.  These damages substitute 
for performance protection.  Meanwhile, if Company B does not fulfill 
its commitment despite the claim to compensate Bank A’s loss, Bank C 
must compensate all or part of Bank A’s loss, according to the risk 
participation agreement.  Of course, Bank A pays part of the 
participation fee received by Bank C from Company B during the 
duration of the risk participation agreement.  In the end, Bank A has 
transferred the credit risk of its investment in Company B to Bank C 
through the risk participation transaction, in a similar manner to deals 
involving credit derivatives.35
B.  Today 
Since the 1980s, the international financial markets have 
experienced global integration,36 with liberalization,37 deregulation,38 
 34. (1) Assumption of obligation by Company B to Company D, (2) Company B 
promises to supply Bank A’s guarantee to the Company D, (3) Company B asks Bank A 
to issue a guarantee for Company D, (4) Bank A’s promise to perform for Company B, 
(5) Bank A issues guarantee for Company D, (6) Bank A’s right to indemnity for 
Company B, (7) Bank A transfers credit risk on Company B to Bank C in addition to the 
participation fee payment, (8) Bank A performs guarantee to Company D if Company B 
fails to pay obligation for Company D, (9) Bank A asks Bank C for compensation for the 
loss incurred by the performance of guarantee for Company D, (10) Bank C assumes the 
risk in case of default. 
 35. See Berkley, supra note 29, at 336-37 (explaining various reasons for multiple 
lender agreements). 
 36. See Rosa Giovanna Barresi, The Impact of Monetary Union and the EURO on 
European Capital Markets: What May be Achieved in Capital Market Integration, 28 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1257, 1303 (2005) (noting how this trend influences markets of 
individual nations around the world as well, which in turn means that the liberalization 
of the financial markets within regions is also gaining momentum every day).  With the 
adoption of “Bancassurance,” the different sectors of the financial industry became 
fully integrated. Id.; see also CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS, U.S. BANK DEREGULATION IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 334 (2000) (identifying the integration between regions and 
markets as one of the key characteristics of the current financial market); Lawrence 
L.C. Lee, Integration of International Banking Supervisory Standards: A Blueprint for 
the Taiwanese Banking System, 19 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 455, 536 (2000) (“The 
globalization of the international banking sector stimulates the functioning of national 
financial systems and accelerates and broadens the process of financial liberalization 
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and securitization39 occurring simultaneously.  Meanwhile, efficiency40 
benefits have improved capital liquidity.41  Moreover, new financial 
and deregulation. Through liberalization and deregulation, the international banking 
industry becomes a more competitive and efficient market.”) (citation omitted). 
 37. See generally GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE 
HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS 77 (2004) (discussing the expansion of banking power); 
see also Larry A. Frieder, Legislating for Interstate Bank Expansion: Financial 
Deregulation and Public Policy, 9 J. CORP. L. 673, 728 (1984) (discussing how 
financial business liberalization increases competition among financial institutions in 
the non-banking sector such as insurance and trust and securities that are now 
competing with banks).  Increased profit results from increased effectiveness and 
expansion of the banks’ traditional service offerings.  For example, securities 
companies in the U.S. that handle Money Market Mutual Funds (“MMMF”) can 
establish Point-of-Sale (“POS”) or Customer-Bank Communications Terminals 
(“CBCT”) for the end users. Id. However, securities companies can also use customer 
networks along with the traditional securities related work.  Thus, actual cost for the 
amortization assumed by the securities companies for the installation of EFT may not 
be that high. 
 38. It is important to note, however that “[d]eregulation has both benefits and 
costs.” John J. Merrick Jr. & Anthony Saunders, Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy, 
17 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 691, 692 (1985).  “An essential point sometimes 
overlooked by critics of bank deregulation is that activity deregulation may provide as 
much opportunity for banks to explore new approaches to managing current risks as it 
does to assume new ones.” Id. at 695 (emphasis omitted). See, e.g., Extensions of Credit 
by Federal Reserve Banks, 12 C.F.R. §205.3 (2007) (permitting the link to Fed Wire 
that can provide Electronic Fund Transfer (“EFT”) payment service without using a 
bank account by using POS or CBCT).  It was against this backdrop that investors 
demanded regulation of the interest on deposits.  Accordingly, banks have sought to 
bypass interest rate regulations through financial innovation, or through the very 
deregulation that sought to alleviate banking restrictions, both of which may account for 
the introduction of credit risk.  Moreover, rapid advances in electronic banking could 
result in systematic risk as parties become tied to highly sophisticated information and 
communication systems.  Increases in these types of risks may mean higher costs for 
financial institutions and the entire financial system.  Professors Merrick and Saunders 
indicate that “some off-balance-sheet items –in particular, forward, futures, and options 
contracts–can serve to explicitly decrease banking sector risk if used properly.” Id. 
(emphasis omitted).  It is not clear whether all the risks that are faced by the financial 
institutions in the wake of deregulation will lead to decreased profitability of the 
financial institutions.  Increased price competition tends to remove inefficiency within 
the banking system.  Thus, deregulation can contribute to cutting cost and increasing 
profit. Diane P. Wood et al., Acquisitions and Mergers, in 30TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST 
LAW INSTITUTE, at 225, 311 n.12 (1989). 
 39. See Anshu S. K. Pasricha, On Financial Sector Reform in Emerging Markets: 
Enhancing Creditors’ Rights and Securitizing Non-Performing Loans in the Indian 
Banking Sector—An Elephant’s Tale, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 357-58 (2007); see also 
714 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XIII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
products and financial engineering techniques are constantly developed 
in line with advances in information technology.42  Likewise, diverse 
financial services are provided to satisfy customer needs.43  Credit risk is 
increasing, however, which some consider a necessary evil.44
The financial institutions that assume this type of credit risk may 
collect the applicable loan obligation earlier simply by selling the 
Joseph A. Smith, Jr., Financial Literacy, Regulation and Consumer Welfare, 8 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 77, 79 (2004) (noting that products such as Asset Backed Securities or 
Credit Linked Notes can be considered part of the securitization trends of the financial 
industry). 
 40. See DON M. CHANCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES 11 (4th ed. 1998). 
[E]fficiency is the characteristic of a market in which the prices of the instruments 
trading therein reflect their true economic values to the investors.  In an efficient 
market, prices fluctuate randomly and investors cannot consistently earn returns above 
those that would compensate them for the level of risk they assume. 
Id. 
 41. See David M. Jones, Fed Policy, Financial Market Efficiency, and Capital 
Flows, 54 J. FIN. 1501, 1505 (1999) (noting the existence of massive global capital 
flows). 
 42. See Niels Hermes & Robert Lensink, Does Financial Liberalization Influence 
Saving, Investment and Economic Growth? Evidence from 25 Emerging Market 
Economies, 1973-96 4 (UNU/WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2005/69, 2005); see also 
MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 6.  Drastic decreases in the cost of amortization resulting 
from technological innovation increases the cost needed to enforce regulations when it 
comes to the work domain.  This can, in turn, speed the process toward alleviation or 
elimination of regulations. See id. at 5.  When the cost for the amortization decreases to 
a point that it can be forgotten altogether, the banking industry could then be considered 
an industry that enables competition and plays a definite role in the continued 
participation of the market participants concerning organizational level efficiency.  
Formation of a market where competition in the banking industry is enabled can 
increase banks’ ability to increase profit.  Moreover, this would be a confirmation of the 
decreases in marginal cost which can result from diversifying the banking industry. Id. 
 43. See Hermes & Lensink, supra note 42, at 3.  Deregulation brought about drastic 
expansion and deepening of the open markets such as the stock exchange.  As a result, 
traditional capital sourcing through banks decreased while the share of capital raised 
through the open market increased. See id. at 3-6 (noting that the portion of the banks’ 
profit that was earned through traditional banking decreased significantly, while the 
portion from investments and participation fees increased).  Accordingly, banks began 
to sell deposits that pay market interest so that the deposits would not leak out of the 
banking system.  They also began to raise the capital that they needed from the short-
term market.  As the level of reliance on the capital that is closely linked to market 
interest rates increases, banks have more exposure to the risk that follows a change in 
interest rates. Id.; see also id. at 8 (noting how financial liberalization has also increased 
the liquidity risk of banks). 
 44. See id. at 4. 
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obligation at a discount.45  While this may indeed eliminate credit risk 
easily, it may also mean relinquishing the opportunity to earn profit.  
Given that the assumption of credit risk is the foundation for a bank’s 
profit creation, the taking on of credit risk is, to a certain degree, 
essential.  Credit risk is not a new concept by any means.  Considering 
that management of credit risk has long been a part of the banking 
industry, why is it that its importance is so strongly emphasized today? 
First, the potential for default or possibility of bankruptcy is 
increasing due to greater competition among companies.46  Advances in 
information technology, along with foreign countries’ increased market 
liberalization,47 result in global competition.  Accordingly, domestic 
competition is fiercer, as seen in the rise in bankruptcy rates.48
Second, capital market advancement creates a winner’s curse.49  As 
capital markets develop, young and small venture companies with high 
risk can now raise capital more easily.50  Consequently, managing and 
transferring these companies’ risk has become an important issue for 
financial institutions.51
 45. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 37. 
 46. See Will Skowronski, Business Bankruptcy Rate Will Rise, Report Predicts, 
WASH. BUS. J., Aug. 23, 2007, available at http://washington.bizjournals.com/washingt 
on/stories/2007/08/20/daily27.html (“The U.S. Bankruptcy Courts reported that 6,705 
businesses declared bankruptcy in the quarter ended June 30, [2007], up from 4,858 
during the same period last year [2006].”). 
 47. See Lee, supra note 36, at 455 n.3 (defining liberalization of the banking 
sector). 
 48. See Skowronski, supra note 46; see also Business Bankruptcy Rates Continue 
to Rise in 2007, PR NEWSWIRE, (Aug. 21. 2007), http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-
bin/stories.pl?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/story/08-21-2007/0004649151&EDATE=. 
 49. See PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE 
RESTRUCTURINGS 149 (3d ed. 2002) (“[T]he ironic hypothesis . . . states that bidders 
who over-estimate the value of a target will most likely win a contest.”). 
 50. See generally Jeffrey E. Sohl, The US Angel and Venture Capital Market: 
Recent Trends and Developments, 6 J. PRIVATE EQUITY 7 (2003) (describing the 
evolution of venture capital markets). 
 51. Id. 
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Third, there is more competition among financial institutions.52  As 
a result of the abolition of the Glass-Steagall Act,53 financial institutions 
today compete on a geographic scale beyond their home region.54  
Because profit margin decreases with time in the traditional business 
domain, a business will inevitably target investments with the highest 
return.  Since this type of investment always comes with a high level of 
risk,55 effective management of risk is critical.  Against this backdrop, 
credit derivatives instruments have continued to grow since the 1990s in 
order to block excessive exposure to and hedge against credit risk.56
Fourth, the value of collateral, including real estate, is uncertain,57 
as the 1997 financial crisis in Asia demonstrated.58  This is a significant 
limitation on lenders’ ability to manage credit risk. 
 52. See Switzerland as a Financial Centre: Top-Quality Performance and 
Impressive Dimensions, No. 21 FDF NEWSLETTER (Fed. Dep’t of Fin., Bern, Switz.), 
June 2002, at 2, available at http://www.efd.admin.ch/dokumentation/00737/00759/007 
68/index.html?lang=en (reporting that financial markets are undergoing rapid change as 
a result of the worldwide deregulation of capital transfers, technological progress and 
financial innovation).  As a consequence, the pressure of international competition in 
the intensive value-add financial sector has increased considerably. Against this 
backdrop, it is possible that further global centers for various types of financial services 
will establish themselves. Id. 
 53. See Reem Heakal, What was the Glass-Steagall Act?, INVESTOPEDIA, July 16, 
2003, available at http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/071603.asp (“[I]n 
November of 1999 Congress repealed the [Glass-Steagal Act (“GSA”)] with the 
establishment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which eliminated the GSA restrictions 
against affiliations between commercial and investment banks.  Furthermore, the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act allows banking institutions to provide a broader range of 
services, including underwriting and other dealing activities.”); see also JOHN SPIEGEL, 
ALAN GART & STEVEN GART, BANKING REDEFINED: HOW SUPERREGIONAL 
POWERHOUSES ARE RESHAPING FINANCIAL SERVICES 57 (1996) (“[R]epeal of the act 
should reduce the risks of most banks by providing the opportunity for further 
diversification.”) (citation omitted). 
 54. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 55. See Parsley, supra note 2, at 31-32. 
 56. See MOORAD CHOUDHRY, STRUCTURED CREDIT PRODUCTS: CREDIT 
DERIVATIVES AND SYNTHETIC SECURITIZATION 5-10 (2004) (illustrating the background 
of the emerging Credit Derivative instruments); see also MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6 
and accompanying text. 
 57. See, e.g., Appeals of Material Supervisory Determinations: Guidelines & 
Decisions, SARC-97-01 at *1-2 (FDIC Sept. 15, 1997), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations 
/laws/sarc/sarcappeals/sarc9701.html; see also Technical Memorandum from H. Carl 
McCall, Off. of the State Deputy Comptroller for the City of New York, The East Asian 
Economic Crisis: A Background Report on the Implications for New York City 14 
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Fifth, “floor deal type OTC products” and off-balance sheet 
transactions have grown significantly in popularity.59  As financial 
institutions began to handle large volumes of OTC deals, which 
increased their off-balance sheet transactions, the counterparty risk of 
each increased dramatically.60  In addition, counterparty risk can 
substantially increase with unfavorable fluctuations in exchange rates, 
interest rates, or index futures.61  Furthermore, there is a greater chance 
that the large scale speculative transaction may become useful since the 
limitation on it is less than that on spot transactions, and it is 
comparatively easy to execute.62  This has the potential to cause large 
scale financial crises. 
Most of the credit derivatives instrument transactions require 
merely a small monetary deposit, known as a margin, which equals the 
specific percentage of the transacted product’s face value.63  Therefore, 
it offers a greater “leverage effect”64 over the gain/loss fluctuation rate 
of transactions compared to that of the market price.  Accordingly, 
(Apr. 27, 1998), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/reports/nyc/economic/tm199/tm199.htm 
(“[C]apital outflows drove down the prices of real estate and domestic equities, which 
banks held as collateral.”).  “One of the biggest challenges for Japan is to restructure its 
financial system following stagnation throughout the 1990s brought on by the bursting 
of a tremendously speculative real estate bubble.” Id. at 27. 
 58. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Council on 
Foreign Relations Financial Crisis Conference *2 (July 12, 2000), http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2000/20000712.htm. 
 59. See CHRIS FRANCIS, ATISH KAKODKAR & BARNABY MARTIN, MERRILL LYNCH, 
CREDIT DERIVATIVE HANDBOOK 2003: A GUIDE TO PRODUCTS, VALUATION, 
STRATEGIES AND RISKS 4-6 (2003) (describing market size and market structure); see 
also WHALEY, supra note 4, at 18-19. 
 60. See generally WHALEY, supra note 4, at 15-19 (describing the nature and 
amount of risk assumed by the parties involved in a number of OTC transactions). 
 61. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 109 (“This risk reflects the potential 
failure by the counterparty to make a payment when it is due.”). 
 62. See ALFRED STEINHERR, DERIVATIVES: THE WILD BEAST OF FINANCE 189-90 
(2000). 
 63. See, e.g., Michael D. Dayan & Glen A. Rae, OTC Equity Derivatives: Hedging 
Transactions and Equity Swaps Outline, in SWAPS & OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 2006, at 
560-61 (2006) (“SEC determined that total return swap was a disguised financing that 
violated the margin regulations.”). 
 64. See CHANCE, supra note 40, at 18 (defining leverage effect as “small price 
changes can lead to large gains and losses”). 
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policies regulating financial viability now emphasize credit risk even 
more than in the past.65
C.  Tomorrow 
The growth rate of credit derivatives going forward might be 
forecasted by answering the following question: what exactly is the 
basic usefulness of credit derivatives instruments?  Motives and 
objectives for engaging in credit derivatives transactions vary in 
connection with the working-level financial transaction.66  These 
objectives do not always manifest in the same way.67  Moreover, they 
vary with the individual products related to the specific transaction.  The 
reality is that there are credit derivatives transactions motivated solely 
by the transfer of credit risk.68  Likewise, even though buyers and sellers 
gain different utilities from transferring credit risk, each specific 
transaction remains valuable to each participant. 
The transaction of credit derivatives can become a means for 
hedging credit risk.69  A CDS70 or Total Return Swap (“TRS”)71 enables 
banks to transfer a customer’s credit risk.  For this reason, “banks will 
gradually become more willing to actively trade credit risks.”72  If the 
possibility of a borrower’s default increases due to a change in 
circumstances, it is possible for the bank to separate itself from the 
 65. See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2(d), (g) (2006).  Even though 
OTC derivatives markets are beyond the scope of the SEC’s CFTC jurisdiction, there 
are certain transactions that may fall within the agency’s jurisdiction.  Federal banking 
regulators oversee bank activities except specific OTC derivatives transactions. 
 66. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 9 (introducing bank’s transaction 
objectives which mitigate risk in loan portfolios and generate greater returns). 
 67. See Willa E. Gibson, Investors, Look Before You Leap: The Suitability Doctrine 
Is Not Suitable For OTC Derivatives Dealers, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 527, 540-42 (1998) 
(identifying three derivative market participants, all of whom have different transaction 
motives).  Hedgers attempt to offset risks that they hold in underlying portfolios; 
speculators take unhedged risk in the pursuit of profits; and arbitrageurs, who seek 
return without risk, take the opposite position in mispriced derivatives vehicles. Id. 
 68. See generally LILLIAN CHEW, MANAGING DERIVATIVE RISKS: THE USE AND 
ABUSE OF LEVERAGE 126-27 (1996) (detailing the credit risk implications of derivative 
instrument transactions). 
 69. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 41. 
 70. See infra Part II.B. 
 71. See infra Part II.C. 
 72. See JANET M. TAVAKOLI, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: A GUIDE TO INSTRUMENTS AND 
APPLICATIONS 242 (1998). 
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credit risk by transferring the default risk of a loan obligation to another 
party.73  This type of transfer (assignment) should be communicated to 
the borrower, and he or she should pay back the loan to the assignee (the 
transferee or risk buyer) after the transfer.74  Thus, some aspects of this 
transaction make it difficult for the bank to choose this route.  
Nevertheless, in certain cases, a CDS or TRS can be an appropriate 
alternative for hedging credit risk. 
Conventional wisdom holds that a borrower’s financial situation 
will deteriorate significantly after the loan is granted.75  If the 
borrower’s financial situation is expected to improve, however, the bank 
can target a specific time period in which to hedge against the credit 
risk.  The bank can also choose to either not use the CDS until the 
principal obligation has matured, or to buy a credit option in order to 
hedge risk for a specific period of time. 
Credit derivatives transactions can be a useful tool for solving the 
“credit paradox.”76  When the credit risk on a specific borrower is too 
high, a host of regulations could be implicated.77  Limitations on the 
loans to the same party are the most typical restrictions under statutory 
 73. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 680. 
 74. See SHERREE DECOVNY, SWAPS 29 (2d ed. 1998) (“Usually at the outset of a 
swap transaction, the two counterparties agree that each has the right to assign the 
contract subject to other’s approval, and this should be written into the 
documentation.”). 
 75. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 41. 
 76. See Krishna Guha, World Economy Confronted by Liquidity Paradox, FIN. 
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2007, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1c481a66-51a5-11dc-
8779-0000779fd2ac.html (reporting on the liquidity paradox in the world economy); see 
also Martin Wolf, The Paradox of Thrift: Excess Savings are Storing up Trouble for the 
World Economy, FIN. TIMES, June 13, 2007, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/00b05180-dba8-11d9-913a-00000e2511c8.html (noting that 
the term “paradox” is used in various situations).  Sometimes “what is good for 
individuals can be bad for an economy.” Id.; see also Prime Movers - Beware the 
Fragile Relationship Between Prime Brokers and Hedge Funds, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 
9, 2007, available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/9641175/c_2984411/?f=archives 
(reporting a paradox at the heart of the financial markets); infra note 78 and 
accompanying text. But see CARBON360, INC., IMPACT OF INCLUSION OF CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE ARBITRAGE & OTHER CREDIT STRATEGIES ON HEDGE FUND OPERATIONS 26 
(2005) (arguing the negative impression of transacting of CDSs due to the so called 
“Credit Paradox”). 
 77. See Smith, supra note 39, at 89-90 (citing North Carolina’s predatory lending 
statute which prohibits various loans). 
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banking regulations,78 but banks will also often have these types of 
restrictions as part of their internal policy.79  If a bank’s lending line for 
a certain client exceeds either the statutory limit or the internal standard, 
the bank will find it difficult to issue a new loan.  The clash between the 
interests of the bank’s loan officer, who is interested in creating new 
loans, and the credit risk manager, who seeks to manage the credit risk 
portfolio, is known as the “credit paradox”80
The bank may inform the client that new loans cannot be granted 
because the credit limit has been reached.  Denying a new loan creates 
the risk of jeopardizing the relationship with an existing client, which 
can result in a client’s defection.  A lender also faces difficulty denying 
the loan when the borrower exceeds only the bank’s internal standard.  
In this situation, a bank would likely provide a long-standing customer 
with a loan and transfer the credit risk by way of a credit derivative.81  
Even when there is almost no profit gained, the bank might hope to 
strengthen its ties with the client through this type of transaction, while 
not exceeding its credit limits.  This process is similar to the 
aforementioned “credit risk hedging method” in that they both transfer 
the credit risk; however, the motives differ.82  In using a credit risk 
 78. See Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220 (2002); see also Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. § 
221 (2002). 
 79. See DAS, supra note 33, at 135, 147. 
 80. Supra note 76 and accompanying text.  The traditional method with which the 
banks manage credit risk is diversification of the parties loaned.  While diversifying 
parties loaned for credit risk management, it is difficult to effectively execute the 
monitoring of the companies, which is a reason for the existence of banks.  Monitoring 
of the companies is still conducted, yet in-depth and specialized monitoring is possible 
only when monitoring very few companies.  This creates a contradictory relationship 
between efficient monitoring and efficient risk sharing, which is another example of a 
credit paradox. 
 81. See, e.g., Robert D. Aicher, Deborah L. Cotton & T.K. Khan, Credit 
Enhancement: Letters of Credit, Guaranties, Insurance and Swaps (The Clash of 
Cultures), 59 BUS. LAW 897, 956 (2004). 
A credit default swap can be used as a form of credit enhancement in a variety of 
contexts in substitution for other types of credit enhancement.  For example, a lender 
to a borrower, instead of taking the guaranty of a guarantor, could enter into a credit 
default swap with such guarantor in respect of the borrower’s obligations to the 
lender. 
Id. 
 82. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 117. 
The goal of the hedge is to freeze the value of the asset or liability. . . .  The purpose 
of a hedge is to make the cashflows of the derivative and the hedged instrument 
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hedging method, credit risk is transferred for the purpose of hedging, 
and is based on the determination that credit risk exists.83  With a 
derivative instrument, the bank is simply complying with a statute or 
internal policy regardless of potential credit risk. 
A credit derivatives transaction is also a “market risk”84 hedging 
method.85  In general, credit derivatives instrument transactions are 
perceived as being conducted in relation to credit risk, not market risk.86  
There is no question that the overall characteristics of a credit 
derivatives instrument are based on credit risk.  Market risks, however, 
arising from the interest rate,87 FOREX exchange rate, and stock price88 
can exist depending on the structure and terms of the transaction of the 
credit derivatives instrument.89
For example, assume that the stock price of Company B is $10 on 
the day of the TRS agreement signing, and Bank A has one million 
shares of the stock.  If Bank A predicts that the stock price of Company 
B will change frequently within a year, Bank A can dispose of applicable 
stocks and recuperate the invested amount to eliminate the stock price 
risk.  Bank A, however, can hedge the stock price volatility through a 
TRS transaction if there is a possibility that the stock price may fall due 
to the sudden sale of a large volume of shares, or if the sale of Company 
B’s stock is not desired from a long-term perspective.  In other words, 
symmetrical, so that losses and gains will cancel each other out both as an accounting 
matter and in terms of the timing of actual cashflows. 
Id. 
 83. See CGFS, supra note 26, at 4. 
Innovations in credit risk transfer have widened the options available to credit risk 
managers and have allowed banks to think about shaping their risk profile 
independently of their origination business.  In the first instance, this has often meant 
seeking to reduce concentrations of credit risk to particular borrowers or market 
segments. 
Id. 
 84. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 33 (“Market risk . . . is the net exposure to 
interest rates, foreign exchange rates, commodity prices, and equity prices.”). 
 85. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 16-17 (noting that market risk can be 
measured by using the Value-at-Risk methodology). 
 86. See CHEW, supra note 68, at 126-27. 
 87. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 51 (“The interest rate risk element of the 
bond can be removed by combining the bond with an interest rate swap . . . .”). 
 88. In an equity default swap, “the triggering event is the point when the reference 
stock hits a specified low barrier” rather than a specified credit event. Id. at 68. 
 89. See, e.g., Feder, supra note 21, at 705 (introducing interest rate swap and 
currency swap). 
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the objective is realized when Bank A collects a specific amount of 
interest on the market capitalization of $10 million from Bank C, and by 
giving or taking the amount following a stock price change.  For 
example, if the stock price increases to $15, Bank A pays $5 million (a 
$5 increase multiplied by one million shares).  On the contrary, if the 
price per stock decreases by $3, Bank C pays $3 million (a $3 decrease 
multiplied by one million shares) to Bank A.  Accordingly, Bank A 
collects interest on the $10 million capital obligation (as there is a 
market capitalization of one million shares).  In return, it transfers the 
gain or loss resulting from the increase or decrease of the stock price to 
Bank C in its entirety, thereby hedging any stock price risk.  This type of 
TRS transaction is not very different from the structure and effect of a 
typical “equity swap” transaction.90
The transaction of credit derivatives instruments is one medium for 
the creation of new profit.  By taking over the credit risk, the assuming 
party can realize a substantial income without investing its own capital 
for the underlying asset.  The “credit option,” whereby the option seller 
receives a premium, is just such an example.91  In the case of a TRS or 
CDS, the party who assumes the credit risk benefits from the ensuing 
compensation. 
For example, Bank A agrees to an interest rate at LIBOR92+80 basis 
points (“bp”) while providing a $1 million loan to Company B with the 
expectation that the financial situation of Company B will deteriorate.  
Bank A then signs the TRS agreement that requires Bank C to pay the 
promised interest (LIBOR+30bp) and principal ($1 million) to Bank A 
upon agreement that any income resulting from the underlying asset 
(i.e., the loan provided to Company B) will be transferred to Bank C.  A 
one-time exchange takes place if the principal is paid in its entirety 
within the maturity period.  An exchange of interest takes place 
 90. See, e.g., id. at 706 (introducing equity swaps). 
 91. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 78. 
Credit options are . . . bilateral OTC financial contracts.  A credit option is a contract 
designed to meet specific hedging or speculative requirements of an entity, which may 
purchase or sell the option to meet its objectives. . . . By purchasing credit options, 
banks and other [financial] institutions can take a view on credit spread movements 
for the cost of the option premium only, without recourse to actual loans issued by an 
obligor.  The writer of credit options seeks to earn premium income. 
Id. 
 92. LIBOR refers to the London Interbank Offered Rate. See BBA, BBA LIBOR – 
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.bba.org.uk/bba/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=225&a=14 
16 (last visited Mar. 11, 2008)); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 937 (8th ed. 2004). 
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whenever interest is paid, so long as such interest is paid at a regular 
interval, generally either quarterly or semi-annually.  The principal is 
then exchanged at the time of maturity.  If Company B pays the interest 
that corresponds to the LIBOR+80bp rate each time interest is paid, 
Bank C will gain the income resulting from the 50bp difference every 
time.  This is equivalent to Bank C’s collection of the participation fee of 
50bp for guaranteeing the performance of Company B’s loan obligation 
to Bank A. 
One might question whether Bank C’s assumption of risk creates a 
new transaction.  TRS transactions, guarantees,93 and suretyships94 
should be considered independent financial techniques for profit creation 
for several reasons.  First, in the case of a guarantee or suretyship, it is 
customary for Company B to pay the participation fee while requesting 
from Bank C the issuance of the certificate of guarantee.  If Company B 
defaults on the loan, Bank C, the obligor in the guarantee agreement, 
pays the obligation on behalf of Company B and at the request of Bank 
A, and so acquires the right of indemnity for Company B.  Of course, 
Bank C may issue a certificate of guarantee for Bank A absent Company 
B’s request.  Issuance of a certificate of guarantee by a bank without the 
request of the principal debtor is referred to as “the guarantee not asked 
for.”95  One advantage of a TRS, however, is that it is possible to 
produce the same effect as when a guarantee is obtained from Bank C 
with Bank A’s independent business judgment, regardless of Company 
B’s involvement.96
Second, Bank C’s secured obligation becomes void when Bank A’s 
loan for Company B is determined void, for whatever reason, even when 
Bank C provided protection to Bank A with the intent to guarantee 
performance.  This is referred to as the secured obligation’s “appendant 
 93. See infra note 656 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 689-91 and 
accompanying text. 
 94. See infra Part V.C.2. 
 95. See Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 910-11.  This is a rare case.  Generally, 
[a] guaranty is a promise made by a guarantor to answer for the debt or obligation (the 
“underlying debt”) of an obligor (the “principal”) that is owed to a creditor or other 
obligee (the “underlying creditor” or “lender”).  A guaranty is, therefore, a collateral 
promise by the guarantor to pay the debt or obligation of the underlying obligor for 
the benefit of the lender. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 96. Id. 
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nature.”97  However, the general rule is that Bank A’s collection on the 
claim should be recognized since a TRS should not be considered a form 
of guarantee, even though the legal standards may differ depending on 
the specific conditions of the transaction.  In this respect, a TRS has an 
independent reason for existing.98
Third, a TRS can be used other than as a guarantee.99  Bank C can 
create the same effect it would through stock investment merely by 
paying interest on short-term investments and without putting in its own 
capital.  Therefore, a TRS is a new profit creation scheme that affords 
the realization of various economic effects that could not be obtained 
with the existing financial devices alone.100
Additionally, products such as Credit Linked Notes (“CLN”)101 can 
be viewed as financial securitizations that are consolidating their 
position in the worldwide market.  Asset Backed Securitization 
(“ABS”),102 which has the effect of transferring credit risk to investors 
by leveraging loan assets retained by financial institutions, or CLN’s, 
which factor in credit risk, show that credit derivatives instrument 
 97. When the claim secured by a mortgage becomes extinct by completion of 
prescription or for any other reason, the mortgage shall also lapse with it. See infra Part 
V.C.2. 
 98. Whether a TRS is applicable to the rule of guarantee was a hidden-issue in the 
litigation between Daehan Investment Trust Management and JP Morgan in the 
Southern District of New York. See Complaint at 6, Daehan Inv. Trust Mgmt. Co. v. 
J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. 02 Civ. 1379 (CSH) at *6.1379, 2003 WL 21297304 
[hereinafter DITM Complaint]. 
 99. See DAS, supra note 33, at 11-12. 
 100. See, e.g., id. at 140-45. 
 101. See infra Part II.D. 
 102. In general, an ABS does not seem to be classified as a credit derivatives 
instrument.  However, ABS complies with the principle of non-recourse financing to 
exchange/repay financial resources.  The bonds are transferred to a company 
specializing in securitization, with the transferring party of the asset not assuming any 
obligation to pay back the principal to the investor. See George P. Miller, Regulatory 
Developments in Securitization, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIZATION 2002, at 
733, 760, 876-77 (2002).  From this perspective, ABS, too, may be considered a cutting 
edge financial method used to transfer credit risk, the essence of a credit derivatives 
instrument transaction.  However, it is also true that it is used to raise capital since it 
uses methods such as taking over the subordinated notes by the asset transferring party 
as a method for reinforcing credit. See id. at 760.  However, if the asset transferring 
party can completely cast away the credit risk by using methods such as appointing a 
third party as guarantor to reinforce credit, the characteristics of the credit derivatives 
instrument transaction will be altered accordingly. See id. 
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transactions serve as catalysts for the financial securitization 
phenomenon.103
So long as the market continues to function properly, no one can 
accurately forecast the limit on the growth of the new derivative 
financial market.104  It is conceivable that this market segment could 
exceed the mainstream financial market in the near future.105
II.  DERIVATIVES SWAP MARKET TOOLS 
Credit derivatives instruments are financial products derived from 
the transaction of underlying assets such as foreign currencies, deposits, 
bonds, and stocks.106  This concept includes all transactions, whereby 
underlying financial assets or the future value of liabilities are sold or 
bought as they fluctuate according to FOREX exchange rates, interest 
rates, or stock prices.107  Derivatives are, as the term indicates, derived 
from the original product.  These derivatives are off-balance sheet 
transactions, and do not generate asset or liability fluctuation or capital 
settlement at the time of the transaction.108  This type of transaction was 
often used as a means to circumvent restrictions related to assets and 
liabilities or spot transactions.109  In general, they are classified as 
futures,110 forwards,111 options,112 and swap transactions.  The 
 103. See Smith, supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 104. See Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 958 (“Obviously, no one knows exactly 
what the future holds for credit default swaps.  It does seem probable, however, that 
their attractiveness is only likely to increase.”). 
 105. On April 18, 2007, the ISDA market survey reported that total “notional 
amount outstanding” credit derivatives was $327.4 trillion with a “gross credit exposure 
before netting estimated to be $8.8 trillion” as of December 31, 2006. Press Release, 
ISDA, ISDA Publishes Year-End 2006 Market Survey (Apr. 18, 2007), 
http://www.isda.org/press/press041807ms2006.html. 
 106. See DAS, supra note 33, at 9. 
 107. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 679-80. 
 108. See CHEW, supra note 68, at 62. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See DUBOFSKY & MILLER, supra note 11, at 126-28.  Futures are products that 
are traded on an exchange.  In a futures transaction, a signed trading agreement 
establishes a currency, interest, or stock price index with the product deliverable at the 
preset price after the stated period of time.  This is the opposed to the spot transaction 
whereby product delivery and payment are both conducted when the transaction 
agreement is signed.  It is also different from the forward transaction where there is a 
promise among the parties to deliver and assume products at a specified point in the 
future.  Futures transactions take place in standardized exchange. Id. 
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transaction of financial derivatives was initially used to hedge the risk of 
fluctuating asset value due to varying economic climates.  They have 
developed, however, into “high risk, high return” investments due to the 
advanced financial engineering utilizing computer technologies.113  The 
risk of asset value fluctuation is more widely assumed because of highly 
sophisticated, cutting edge financial methods.114
 111. See generally Feder, supra note 21, at 698-701 (explaining the procedure and 
operation of forwards transactions).  Forwards refer to the products that are transacted 
outside of exchanges, where the target product is to be delivered and assumed at a 
specific period in the future at the promised price.  The forward exchange, which is a 
type of forwards agreement, is the most traditional derivative.  It is a transaction where 
the sale or purchase of the currency occurs at a specific FOREX exchange rate and at a 
specific time in the future.  Both futures and forward transaction differ from the spot 
transaction in that the transaction agreement for both futures and forwards is signed at 
one point, but payment is not made until some future point.  They are similar in the 
sense that they are used to hedge risk that comes from price fluctuation.  However, 
forward transactions, unlike futures transactions, have no official exchange or 
standardized production.  All of these transactions entail delivery of a product, payment 
at the point of settlement, and an exchange guarantee that is not part of the performance 
on the transaction.  Thus, this is a transaction that may be accomplished by the average 
person, because it does not require warrant of money. Id. 
 112. See generally id. at 692-98 (explaining the procedure and operation of options 
transactions).  An option is a transaction in which one buys or sells the right to purchase 
specific assets such as products or securities at a set price or within a specified period of 
time.  The right is sold or bought at and for the present.  Options transfer the risk from 
the buyer to the seller, with the option seller receiving a premium in return for assuming 
risk.  Within this type of transaction, there are both put options and call options. In the 
case of a futures purchase, profit is generated when the price of the basic asset 
increases, and loss results when the price goes down.  In other words, the profit and loss 
parallel price fluctuation.  In the case of an option purchase, on the other hand, profits 
are realized when the price of the underlying asset increases.  Even when the price goes 
down, however, no loss may exceed the premium.  Therefore, the gain or loss is not 
parallel with price fluctuation, because the exercise of the option is, in fact, optional. 
The route that is more favorable to the option buyer is the one that will be utilized. In 
exchange, a premium for the right is paid to the option seller. Id. 
 113. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 1. 
 114. See STEINHERR, supra note 62, at 17-25. 
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A.  Swap Generally 
Swaps115 are classified into two categories: “commodity swaps” 
and “financial swaps.”  Commodity swaps involve the targeted 
swapping of crude oil,116 grains, or other products.117  “This swap 
involve[s] the periodic payments by the first counterparty to the second 
based on a fixed price of a specified amount of some commodity.”118  
Financial swaps refer to the exchange of products such as foreign 
currencies, bonds, stocks, and other financial assets and liabilities.119  
Financial swaps are then sub-classified as either “foreign currency 
swaps,” “interest rate swaps,” or “equity swaps.”120  Foreign currency 
swaps include the composite buying and selling of foreign currency, as 
in the purchase of a forward exchange at the same time that a spot 
exchange is sold, or vice versa.121  An interest rate swap involves 
exchanging the flow of interest between two bonds with different 
interest payment methods or with the same currency indicated.122  It is 
the so-called off-balance sheet transaction that does not accompany the 
exchange of principal.123  In particular, interest rate swaps are popular 
because they involve bond issuance or mid- to long-term financing.124  It 
is customary for these transactions to be tied together, as opposed to 
keeping them as independent proprietary transactions.  Exchange of the 
principal does not actually take place.125  Instead, “[t]he amount of each 
payment is calculated on the basis of a hypothetical, or ‘notional’ 
 115. With regard to the swap, “[t]he terminology is further complicated by the U.S. 
market’s use of the word ‘swap’ to refer to an exchange of one bond for another . . . and 
the U.K. market’s use of the term ‘switch’ for the same transaction.” TAVAKOLI, supra 
note 72, at 63. 
 116. See, e.g., Willa E. Gibson, Are Swap Agreements Securities or Futures?: The 
Inadequacies of Applying the Traditional Regulatory Approach to OTC Derivatives 
Transactions, 24 J. CORP. L. 379, 386 (1999). 
 117. See, e.g., DUBOFSKY & MILLER, supra note 11, at 317. 
 118. Gibson, supra note 116, at 384. 
 119. See CHANCE, supra note 40, at 560-64, 575-84, 627-31. 
 120. See id. at 627 (“In equity swaps one counterparty pays according to the 
performance of a stock index. A typical equity swap would involve one side paying 
interest according to LIBOR while the other side makes a payment based on the return 
on the S&P 500 times the notional principal.”). 
 121. See, e.g., id. at 560-62. 
 122. See Gibson, supra note 116, at 384. 
 123. See CHANCE, supra note 40, at 575-84. 
 124. See Gibson, supra note 116, at 384-85. 
 125. See CHANCE, supra note 40, at 579. 
728 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XIII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
principal amount . . . .”126  Meanwhile, an exchange of principal may 
occur in a currency swap where a bond obligation with different 
currencies is exchanged.127  An interest rate swap, which is a mix of the 
two, refers to a transaction that entails the exchange of an obligation or 
assets.128
As interest on credit risk increased beginning in the mid 1990s, 
credit derivatives instruments related to credit risk began to appear en 
masse with regard to the CDS.129  CDS’s and TRS’s sold by JP Morgan, 
a pivotal player in the financial derivatives arena, are noteworthy.130  A 
credit swap transaction applies the general interest swap technique to a 
credit risk transaction in order to hedge risk following a change in 
credit.131  Cash flows change accordingly, depending on the change in 
credit level.  A credit swap entails dispersing credit risk among the 
parties to a transaction according to a prearranged formula.132
The assumption of an obligation is not part of a swap.133  From a 
legal standpoint, a swap transaction does not affect the relationship 
between the obligee and obligor because it does not implicate the 
assumption of any obligation, but rather merely creates an agreement “to 
exchange cash flows.”134  A swap does not entail a dischargeable or 
duplicable assumption that involves undertaking the obligation of the 
other party.  Rather, only the specific cash flows of the obligation are 
exchanged at some future date.135  While the original obligor must repay 
the obligee, the counterparty of the swap agreement still does not 
assume the underlying obligation.  Specifically, a swap transaction is not 
 126. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 43. 
 127. See CHANCE, supra note 40, at 560; WHALEY, supra note 4, at 18; cf. CHEW, 
supra note 68, at 7. 
 128. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 18. (“The cash flows of the two legs of a swap 
can be linked to virtually any reference rate, asset price, or index level.”). 
 129. See DUBOFSKY & MILLER, supra note 11, at 320; see also CHOUDHRY, supra 
note 56, at 5. 
 130. See Gibson, supra note 116, at 387-88 (citation omitted) (“Banks typically 
purchase credit swaps to insure payment of a loan made to a client upon the client’s 
default.”); see also MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 18. 
 131. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 54-58. 
 132. See DUBOFSKY & MILLER, supra note 11, at 8. 
 133. See CHANCE, supra note 40, at 560-64, 575-84, 627-31. 
 134.  See DUBOFSKY & MILLER, supra note 11, at 7. 
 135. See id. at 8. 
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a trade that involves the obligee.  Instead, it is an internal issue that 
occurs between the obligation and the counterparty of the swap.136
Generally, markets classify credit derivatives into single-name 
derivatives and multi-name derivatives, which are classified depending 
on either the reference asset-issuing institution or the number of the 
reference entities.137  Single-name credit derivatives issued by an 
institution that has a reference asset include single-name CDS and TRS, 
each having a relatively standardized product structure.138  Multi-name 
credit derivatives are issued by many reference entities, and they target 
bond or loan assets.  These derivatives include basket default swaps 
(“BDS”), portfolio default swaps (“PDS”) and synthetic collateralized 
debt obligations (“CDO”).  On the other hand, a CLN may involve many 
reference entities that are the target of credit risk.139
This Article next examines the basic structure of popular single-
name credit derivatives such as CDS’s and TRS’s, and prevalent multi-
name credit derivatives such as CLN’s, BDS’s, PDS’s, and synthetic 
CDO’s. 
B.  Credit Default Swap 
Generally, “[c]redit default swaps began as instruments for 
managing credit risk.”140  A single-name CDS is a mutual agreement 
whereby the protection buyer (the credit risk seller), pays either a one-
time premium to the protection seller (the credit risk buyer or the 
investor), or, if a credit event occurs in the reference entity, makes 
periodic payments in exchange for all or part of the loss.141  If an agreed-
upon credit event such as bankruptcy or default occurs, the protection 
seller must compensate for the value of the lost reference asset.142  This 
can be achieved through the payment of cash (i.e., cash settlement), or 
by purchasing the reference asset at face value, despite the applicable 
reference asset’s decline in value (i.e., physical settlement).143
 136. See Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 955 (comparing credit default swap with 
guaranties and insurance). 
 137. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 681. 
 138. Id. at 681-85 (describing credit products market by pie chart). 
 139. See, e.g., infra Part II.D. 
 140. See Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 954. 
 141. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 6, 68. 
 142. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 47. 
 143. See id. at 69. 
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In a CDS, the agreed-upon principal (i.e., the amount of protection 
against loss), is not paid when the transaction is signed.144  Thus, a CDS 
is an unfunded structure that is not accompanied by capital-raising.145  A 
CDS is different from a TRS, which will be examined below, in the 
sense that the protection seller merely assumes the credit risk and does 
not assume the market risk, the price risk of the reference asset.146  The 
CDS is the most fundamental structure of the swap, and hence is also 
referred to as a “vanilla” CDS.147
Like other credit derivatives, a credit event for a CDS triggers the 
protection seller’s obligation to repay the reference asset to the 
protection buyer in exchange for a premium.148  Therefore, a credit event 
plays an important role in the CDS agreement.149  A standard CDS 
transaction typically complies with the categories of credit events that 
are defined by the ISDA.150
A premium is the price of a credit derivative, and is determined by 
a floating interest rate used to hedge the interest fluctuation risk.151  
Premiums are determined by factors such as the reference entity, the 
protection seller’s credit risk, the expected “recovery rate”152 of the 
principal if a credit event occurs, and conditions in the financial 
 144. See id. at 54 (explaining that the protection buyer agrees to make periodic 
payments over a predetermined number of years (the maturity of the CDS) to the 
protection seller). 
 145. See DOMINIC O’KANE ET AL., LEHMAN BROS., THE LEHMAN BROTHERS GUIDE 
TO EXOTIC CREDIT DERIVATIVES 7 (2003). 
 146. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 61. 
 147. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 68. 
 148. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 54-55. 
 149. See Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 954-55 (“In a credit default swap, two 
parties agree that the protection seller will pay to the protection buyer certain amounts 
upon the occurrence of a credit event with respect to a reference entity and satisfaction 
of the relevant conditions to payment or . . . settlement.”) (citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
 150. See id. at 954 (“Credit default swaps are often documented using ISDA form 
agreements and by incorporation of standard definitions applicable to credit default 
swaps published by ISDA.”). 
 151. See Jorge A. Chan-Lau, Anticipating Credit Events Using Credit Default 
Swaps, with an Application to Sovereign Debt Crises (IMF, Working Paper No. 
WP/03/106, 2003). 
 152. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 15 (“The percentage of the original loan that 
is received back [when a corporation enters into liquidation, winding-up or dissolution] 
is known as the recovery rate, which is defined as the percentage of par value that is 
returned to the creditor.”) (emphasis omitted). 
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markets.153  The protection seller’s credit risk refers to the concern that 
the agreement will not be performed because of bankruptcy or other 
event.154  This is often referred to as the counterparty risk.155
An increase in the credit risk of the reference entity, a decrease in 
the protection seller’s credit risk, and a reduced recovery rate for the 
underlying asset when the credit event occurs may increase premiums.156  
Curtailing the reference entity’s moral hazard and monitoring the 
management situation may lower premiums.157  For example, premiums 
decrease when there are special clauses, such as covenants, prohibiting 
management activities that might decrease financial viability, or 
requirements that the reference entity provide management information 
such as a corporate bond.158
Overall, a CDS is the medium for transferring the protection 
buyer’s credit risk position to the protection seller.159  A reference asset 
holder signs the CDS agreement as a way to replace the reference 
entity’s credit risk with the protection seller’s credit risk, i.e. the 
counterparty risk, for a specific period of time, by paying a fixed 
premium to the protection seller.160  For example, banks use CDS’s to 
sell only the credit spread, which means that they sell the credit risk 
without selling the retained asset.161
In order for a bank to adjust its degree of exposure to credit risk, it 
must notify the original counterparty in advance to obtain consent.162  
This can result in considerable harm to customer relations and risk 
management.  When a CDS merely separates the credit risk of the 
reference entity, however, there is no duty to notify the original 
 153. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 73. (“[T]he higher the credit risk associated with 
the entity, the higher the price of protection.”). 
 154. See id. at 71-72. 
 155. See id. at 15. 
 156. See id. at 78-80. 
 157. See id. at 136 (“One manifestation of the moral hazard problem is the concern 
that the bank may make riskier loans than otherwise if it knows that it can then transfer 
all of the associated credit risk to CDO investors.”). 
 158. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 101-02 (discussing the factors that determine 
value of premium). 
 159. See O’KANE ET AL., supra note 145, at 4. 
 160. See id. at 4-5; BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 54-55. 
 161. See O’KANE ET AL., supra note 145, at 4-5; BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 54-55. 
 162. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 58.  In rolling maturity swaps and constant 
maturity swaps, the contract party can freely and periodically reset the maturity date 
and swap the premium at each roll date. Id. 
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counterparty.  Therefore, it is possible for a bank to adjust its degree of 
exposure to the credit risk while still avoiding a customer relations 
problem.163  From the bank’s perspective, it is possible to separate 
customer relationship and risk management, since the outcome allows 
for securitization of the credit asset without removing it from the 
balance sheet.164
C.  Total Return Swap 
A Total Return Swap is a bilateral financial agreement whereby one 
party of an agreement (the total return payer or beneficiary) promises to 
deliver whole numbers of specific cash flow (LIBOR + spread) derived 
from the reference asset (securities with bank loan or credit risk) to the 
counterparty (total return receiver or investor) in return for assuming the 
risk related to the investor’s financial assets.165  Accordingly, a TRS 
provides the means for managing risk by transferring the market and 
credit risk of the reference asset to the investor.  From the investor’s 
point of view, a TRS provides the means for collecting cash flow 
without buying the reference asset in person.166  Thus, it is possible to 
create the effect of a direct investment on the reference asset.  Because 
the investor receives return from the reference asset, the economic effect 
is the same as possessing the reference asset without owning it.167  
Therefore, a TRS has the legal characteristics of a synthetic long 
position in a loan or security.168
The agreement terminates when the credit event fails to occur prior 
to the maturity of the TRS.169  If a credit event occurs prior to maturity, 
however, the investor must either settle the loss resulting from the credit 
event with cash or buy the reference asset, thereby undertaking a 
physical settlement at that agreed-upon amount, known as the “nominal 
 163. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 41 (“Credit derivatives allow investors to 
manage the credit risk exposure of their portfolios or asset holdings, essentially by 
providing insurance against a deterioration in credit quality of the borrowing entity.”). 
 164. See id. at 45. 
 165. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 82; see also TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 20. 
 166. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 20 (“The total rate of return payer is the legal 
owner of the reference asset . . .  [and] holds the reference asset on its balance sheet.”). 
 167. See JANET TAVAKOLI, INTRODUCTION TO CREDIT DERIVATIVES TOTAL RETURN 
SWAPS-TRS, 2-3 (2001), available at http://www.tavakolistructuredfinance.com/TRS.p 
df [hereinafter “TAVAKOLI, TRS”]. 
 168. See id. at 3. 
 169. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 92. 
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amount”.170  Compared to the CDS, in which the payment to offset a 
loss is made only when the credit event occurs, a TRS factors in the 
reference asset’s market value during a normal circumstance.  This 
allows for the generation of cash flow between beneficiary and investor 
regardless of whether the credit event occurs.  Put more precisely, a TRS 
and CDS are different in the sense that the investor pays “LIBOR + 
spread” to the payer of total return in exchange for undertaking the total 
return.  Therefore, market risk, here the price risk of the reference asset, 
is taken on in addition to credit risk.171
The payer of total return who buys protection through a TRS can be 
protected from the credit and market risks even when the reference asset 
is not sold during a specific period of time.  As one author explains, 
“[t]he payer in a TRS creates a hedge for both price risk and default risk 
of the reference asset, although the payer in the TRS is a legal owner of 
the reference asset.”172  If a credit event occurs prior to the maturity of 
the TRS, the payer of total return is compensated by the receiver of total 
return for the loss in the form of a cash settlement or physical settlement 
in an amount previously agreed upon.173  If a credit event fails to occur 
prior to the maturity of the TRS, an amount equal to the change in the 
reference asset’s market value is paid either (a) to the receiver of total 
return from the payer of total return, or (b) from the total return receiver 
to the total return payer.174  A TRS, then, helps to remove the reference 
asset from the total return payer’s balance sheet during the period of the 
agreement.175
The payer of total return, such as a bank with a high credit rating, 
uses the capital raised with LIBOR interest to obtain balance sheet assets 
like loan securities.176  The bank then receives LIBOR + spread in 
exchange for transferring the resulting return to the investor.177  
Therefore, it is possible to generate non-risk profit up to the level of the 
 170. See id. at 92-94. 
 171. See Feder, supra note 21, at 712. 
 172. TAVAKOLI, TRS, supra note 167, at 4. 
 173. See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, at art. III, §§ 3.1-3.10 for the 
whole process of the settlement. 
 174. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 20. 
 175. See id. at 21 (“The [TRS] . . . is an off-balance sheet transaction, and the 
reference asset does not appear on the balance sheet of the receiver.”). 
 176. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 71-74. 
 177. See id. 
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spread.178  The LIBOR + spread that the investor pays to the payer of 
total return is the capital raised with LIBOR interest by the payer of total 
return.  Thus, it can be taken for the premium paid in exchange for 
buying the reference asset on behalf of the investor.  With a TRS, 
therefore, an investor can benefit from the return generated from the 
reference asset without actually raising the capital to buy the reference 
asset.179  Moreover, the relatively short-term maturity of the TRS is 
more beneficial than the long-term maturity of the reference asset, 
allowing investors to raise capital for the short-term with low interest 
and continue to use it over the long-term with high interest. 
D.  Credit Linked Notes 
In a CLN transaction, the protection buyer signs a CDS agreement 
with the dealer, known as the CLN issuer or special purpose vehicle 
(“SPV”), based on a reference asset such as a retained loan.180  A CLN is 
issued to the investor who, in essence, is the protection seller.181  The 
CLN issuer will then pay a fixed interest or floating coupon up to the 
protection fee.182
In the CDS, only the protection premium is given and received 
without the burden of raising capital for the principal.183  With a CLN, 
the investor pays for the principal of the first bond issued.184  Thus, a 
CLN has a structure that is accompanied by raising capital.185  The 
principal paid by the investor to the dealer plays the role of securing the 
performance of protection.  Therefore, if a credit event occurs, the CLN 
investor receives the remaining balance after deducting compensation 
for the loss in the middle of the contract period (cash settlement) or 
 178. See TAVAKOLI, TRS, supra note 167, at 3. 
In a very [strict] . . . sense, TRS are not credit derivatives. TRS, considered in their 
most basic form, are funding cost arbitrages.  TRS are applied in a variety of ways: 
balance sheet management, portfolio management, hedge fund leverage, and asset 
swap maturity manipulation.  While the overall effect of a TRS may have very 
important credit implications for both the payer and receiver of the total rate of return 
swap, the use is primarily that of a financing. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 179. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 20. 
 180. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 116. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. at 115. 
 183. See id. at 55. 
 184. See id. at 115. 
 185. See O’KANE ET AL., supra note 145, at 7. 
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acquiring the underlying asset at face value (physical settlement).186  If a 
credit event does not occur, the total principal is paid back.187  Basically, 
a CLN is a more structured product than the CDS.  The use of the SPV 
makes it possible to eliminate counterparty risk and indirect investment 
in the credit risk, allowing investors who were previously restricted by 
regulations or transaction costs to do so directly using a CDS.188
Meanwhile, institutions that issue CLNs are not restricted by 
specific regulations.189  Rather, the structure issued by the SPV is typical 
in the financial market, where the SPV secures credit risk via the 
underlying asset of the CLN and enters into a CDS agreement with the 
reference asset owner.190  Accordingly, a CLN can be considered a type 
of financing device linked to a secured CDS or CDS.191
In sum, the CLN issuer uses a CLN as a means for hedging credit 
risk and provides protections to the protection buyer through the CDS 
transaction.192  On the other hand, the investor puts money in to gain the 
higher interest rate of the CLN.193  In general, the coupon rate of the 
CLN is higher than that of the regular bond issued by the dealer or SPV, 
the CLN issuer.194  Since it is issued at a discounted rate,195 the CLN can 
be an attractive investment for investors who seek a higher return from 
their investment strategy.196
 186. See Feder, supra note 21, at 715 (“If the arrangement is cash-settled, the note 
issuer will deduct a stipulated credit-default amount from the principal. If the 
arrangement is physically-settled, the note issuer will deliver the reference asset to the 
note holder, instead of redeeming with cash.”). 
 187. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 115 (stating that a value less than par, 
however, will be paid to the investor). 
 188. Id. at 121 (“The majority of CLNs are issued directly by banks and corporates 
[sic] in the same way as conventional bonds.”). 
 189. See id. at 116 n.2. 
 190. See id. at 118. 
 191. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 694. 
 192. See Feder, supra note 21, at 716 (“As in the case of a credit default swap, 
credit-linked debt transfers only credit risk.”). 
 193. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 116 (“The [CLNs] are often used by 
borrowers to hedge against credit risk, and by investors to enhance the yield received on 
their holdings.”). 
 194. See id. at 121. 
 195. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 695. 
 196. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 46-47 (arguing the advantages and 
disadvantages of CLNs). 
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E.  Basket Default Swap 
Unlike single-name CDS’s that target one single-reference asset, 
the Basket Default Swap is a form of CDS that creates a pool of many-
reference assets.197  According to the likely order in which credit events 
will occur, these risks are classified into categories such as “first-to-
default basket” swaps, “second-to-default basket” swaps, and so on.198  
In a sense, it is the same as the CDS because the protection buyer pays a 
specific premium to the protection seller and the protection seller 
compensates the protection buyer for the loss if a credit event occurs.199  
It differs from a CDS, however, in the sense that there is not only one 
reference entity that issues the reference asset, but rather may include 
five, ten, twenty or more reference entities.200
The protection seller of a BDS transaction compensates for losses 
only for the credit events in the order (e.g., first, second, third, etc.) 
agreed upon in advance, and then the agreement is terminated.201  For 
example, the protection seller of the “first-to-default basket” swap 
transaction is responsible for the compensation of the credit risk only for 
the first credit event, even if more than one credit event occurs within 
the basket.202  In other words, the protection seller pays the protection 
buyer for the applicable loss when the first credit event occurs that 
satisfies the agreed-upon terms, and then the agreement is terminated.  
Likewise, in the case of a “second-to-default basket” swap, the 
protection buyer is protected by the protection seller only for the 
occurrence of the second credit event among the reference entities in the 
basket.203  Calculation of the premium for the BDS is significantly 
 197. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 99. 
 198. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 59, 62-66 (illustrating a basket credit default 
swap). 
 199. See id. 
 200. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 158 (“Basket structures are generally best 
suited for investment-grade credits with low correlations and low covariance.”). 
 201. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 126-29. 
 202. See O’KANE ET AL., supra note 145, at 8 (“The advantage of a FTD basket 
[swap] is that it enables an investor to earn a higher yield than any of the credits in the 
basket.”) 
 203. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 160-61 (“The [ ] protection seller will make a 
payment on only one of the credits, not on all [reference asset], so the protection seller 
is compensated for only one default plus the increased likelihood of a defaulting 
occurring.”).  Generally, “a first-to-default basket (n=1) is riskier than a second-to-
default basket.” See O’KANE ET AL., supra note 145, at 9. 
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influenced by the CDS’s average premium that targets the individual 
issuing institution, the number of institutions issuing reference assets,204 
and the correlation of credit risk between the reference asset issuing 
institutions.205  In addition, “[a]ny theoretical model of pricing basket 
swaps would include the following key inputs: . . . probability of default 
of reference entities and protection seller . . . [and] maturity of swap and 
expected recovery value of the reference entities.”206  Deciding on the 
premium rate of a certain default basket is a very complex task.  A great 
deal of research is currently being conducted in this area.207
F.  Portfolio Default Swap 
The Portfolio Default Swap is a structured financial product similar 
to the BDS.208  The number of institutions that issue reference assets is 
considerably higher (between forty and one hundred), and the limit for 
the compensation is not based on the order in which the credit events 
occur.  Rather, the limit for the compensation is determined by a ratio in 
the portfolio that is an amount agreed upon in advance.209  For example, 
an agreed upon credit risk of the protection seller may be 10%.  
Therefore, the PDS transaction insulates the protection buyer from a loss 
of up to 10% of the portfolio assets that results from credit events 
occurring on the reference portfolio.  Any loss exceeding this percentage 
would not be covered.210
Likewise, assume there is a “second-loss piece” PDS transaction 
that is signed to guarantee loss from a credit event that exceeds 10% of 
the portfolio asset.  In this case, the protection seller is not responsible 
for the loss within the agreed-upon 10% that results from credit events, 
but protects the protection buyer for any portion that exceeds 10%.  
Accordingly, a PDS can be structured into various tiers with different 
risk profiles.  This is similar to the way an ABS is issued for various 
 204. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 101. 
 205. See id. at 102. 
 206. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 86. 
 207. See id. at 89. 
 208. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 107. 
 209. See id. at 107-10. 
 210. See id. at 107-08. 
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tranches,211 such as senior, mezzanine, and equity—each with a different 
risk profile.212
Like a BDS, a PDS’s premium rate is influenced significantly by 
the “correlation of credit risk”213 among the reference assets.  From the 
investor’s point of view, a PDS restricts the actual assumption of loss 
because the maximum loss is agreed upon in advance.  Leverage is 
provided to the investment in credit risk and provides the means for a 
high return.214  From the protection buyer’s point of view, a PDS 
provides the medium for transferring considerable credit risk to the 
protection seller with relative ease.215  In other words, it is more 
convenient for the protection buyer to use a PDS transaction instead of 
individual CDS transactions with the protection seller of the reference 
asset that is in the portfolio.  Moreover, if the protection buyer wants 
partial protection on the entire portfolio, a PDS provides a relatively 
cost-effective means. 
G.  Synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligation 
A Synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligation is a structured financial 
product216 which generates cash flow.  It is similar to the traditional cash 
CDO because it uses the transaction of a credit derivative, such as a 
credit swap, to transfer the credit risk inherent in reference assets, such 
as a majority of the loan obligations and regular corporate bonds, to the 
separately established SPV.217  This intermediary218 issues securities 
 211. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 695 n.13. 
 212. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 135-36. 
 213. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 20 (“Correlation is a measure of the degree to 
which a value of one variable is related to the value of another. . . . It is particularly 
important in the measurement of the variance (hence volatility) of a portfolio.”). 
 214. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 110. 
 215. See id. 
 216. O’KANE ET AL., supra note 145, at 12 (“[S]ynthetic CDOs . . . were conceived 
in 1997 as a flexible and low-cost mechanism for transferring credit risk off bank 
balance sheets.”). 
 217. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 95 (“The critical difference between this 
structure and a traditional CDO is that, unlike a typical CDO, a synthetic securitization 
does not purchase underlying assets like bonds or loans, but rather references them by 
way of credit default swaps.”) (quotation marks omitted).  Generally, SPVs are 
incorporated as a form of paper company in tax and regulatory havens such as Cayman 
Island and Bermuda. See id. at 47. 
 218. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 695. 
2008 VANILLA SWAPS TO EXOTIC CREDIT DERIVATIVES 739 
 
with different credit levels that are linked with the credit risk to sell to 
the investors.219  Namely, synthetic CDO’s can broadly be defined as the 
transfer of credit risk plus a cash CDO, consisting of tranches.220
From the perspective of the reference asset holder, a synthetic CDO 
differs from the traditional cash CDO because actual cash inflow does 
not occur as it does for the traditional cash CDO.221  The reference 
asset’s credit risk shifts to the investor, however, who realizes the goal 
of securitization—the conversion of reference assets into a cash 
equivalent asset.  This is called synthetic securitization.222
A traditional, non-synthetic cash CDO is issued when the SPV 
assigns the loan obligation itself from the asset holder.223  On the other 
hand, a synthetic CDO does not entail an actual transfer of the loan 
obligation to the SPV by the asset holder.  Instead, credit derivatives 
such as a credit swap, CLN, or TRS are used to separate out the credit 
risk of the loan obligation to transfer to the SPV.  In other words, a 
synthetic CDO merely transfers the credit risk of the reference asset to 
the SPV and an investor, without transferring the legal ownership of the 
reference asset to the SPV.224
Meanwhile, the synthetic CDO is used mainly as a “balance sheet 
CDO” and “arbitrage synthetic CDO.”225  These two types of CDO’s 
essentially share the same structure.  The major difference between them 
is the identity of the participants to the transaction and the purpose of the 
transaction.  Typically, banks or other single financial companies that 
own reference assets sponsor balance sheet synthetic CDO’s, and they 
issue synthetic CDO’s for hedging purposes.226  On the other hand, 
sponsors of the arbitrage synthetic CDO are one of several asset 
 219. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 133. 
 220. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 695-97. 
 221. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 133-37. 
 222. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 95 (“Investors purchasing one of the 
various risks can tailor their risk exposure to this large and diversified credit portfolio 
through tranches of a synthetic securitization.”). 
 223. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 7, at 1028. 
 224. See MARK J. P. ANSON ET AL., CREDIT DERIVATIVES: INSTRUMENTS, 
APPLICATIONS, AND PRICING 140 (2004). 
 225. See STANDARD & POOR’S, GLOBAL CASH FLOW AND SYNTHETIC CDO CRITERIA 
6 (2002). 
 226. BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 136.  According to one expert, “banks’ desire to free 
up regulatory capital through balance-sheet CDOs was an important driver of CDO 
market activity in the 1990s.” Id. 
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management companies that may or may not own reference assets.227  
The goal of the arbitrage synthetic CDO essentially is to gain the 
difference228 that results from the price discrepancy between the regular 
bond market and credit derivatives market.229
The balance sheet synthetic CDO is classified into funded and 
unfunded structures depending on each investor’s position.230  The 
funded structure, accompanied by raising capital, exists if the investors 
purchase CDO bonds in cash.231  The SPV then uses the capital to 
purchase swap collateral.  In contrast, unfunded structures are not 
accompanied by capital-raising, do not involve the acquisition of swap 
collateral, and have a structure whereby investors assume the loss that 
results from a credit event in the reference asset.232
The most likely motive for issuing a synthetic CDO is that the 
financial institutions that own reference assets can remove the credit risk 
for the reference assets without notifying or obtaining consent from the 
counterparty.233  This is done by attaching credit derivatives within the 
CDO structure.  A traditional balance sheet CDO requires notification 
and approval from the debtor before the loan obligation can be 
transferred to the SPV.234  On the other hand, the process of notifying or 
obtaining approval from the debtor is not necessary for the synthetic 
CDO transaction, since there is no actual transfer of the reference 
asset.235
The synthetic CDO was initially invented to accommodate the 
balance sheets of European banks because of the traditional belief that 
selling a customer’s loan obligation would have a negative effect on 
 227. Id. at 137. 
 228. See ANSON ET AL., supra note 224, at 133. 
 229. See id. 
 230. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 136.  Banks use this transaction tool in order to 
remove assets from their balance sheets. WHALEY, supra note 4, at 696. 
 231. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 134 (“To fund the purchase of the loan portfolio, 
the issuer sells debt obligations (notes) to investors.”); see also WHALEY, supra note 4, 
at 696 (“The sponsor of the CDO usually sets the size of the senior class so that it can 
attain a triple-A rating.”). 
 232. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 36. 
 233. See STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 225, at 5, 13 (arguing sponsoring 
institution’s motivation of synthetic CDO). 
 234. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 137 (It is because “many bank loans are 
inherently illiquid.”). 
 235. See ANSON ET AL., supra note 224, at 140. 
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customer relations.236  Today, some nations are demanding fuller 
disclosure of the reference asset portfolio as a way to protect investors 
against synthetic CDOs, as well as narrowly defining the scope of the 
credit event.237  Compared to the first synthetic CDO transactions, there 
is now better protection for investors because of the improvements that 
have been made.238
For the asset holder, another advantage of synthetic CDOs is the 
potential to curtail the unnecessary raising of funds.  When an unfunded 
structure is used that is not accompanied by formal capital raising, the 
asset holder benefits from the mitigation of regulated capital while 
transferring only the credit risk on the reference asset.  Besides the BIS 
ratio,239 transfer of the loan asset waives both the mandatory procedure 
of satisfying the countermeasure and the cost, prevents the leaking of 
customers’ confidential information, and might also eliminate the 
burden of exercising the right of the mortgage.240
In addition, a CDO issued by the SPV in connection with the 
synthetic CDO offers a favorable term to the investor since the coupon 
rate is high compared to the interest rate of the AAA-rated regular 
floated rate note241 as long as a credit event does not occur.  This high 
return, however, is only compensation for payment protection.  Thus, the 
investor needs to remember that credit risk management is the key to 
investment.242  As for the basic issuance structure of the synthetic CDO, 
it is comprised of three classes that are different in terms of the degree of 
 236. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 139. 
 237. See CGFS, supra note 26, at 2, 25-29. 
 238. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 7, at 1027-31.  Professors Partnoy and Skeel, 
however, warned that “[t]he transaction costs associated with CDOs are very high, and 
there is reason to believe that the potential benefits of CDOs . . . are not real.” Id. at 
1040-41. 
 239. The BIS ratio gives an indication of the solvency of a bank.  It gives the ratio 
between the risk-bearing capital and the risk-weighted assets. See BizTerms.net, 
http://www.bizterms.net/term/BIS-ratio.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2008). 
 240. See id. at 1027-31 (arguing the benefits of CDOs).
 241. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 7, at 1028-29. 
 242. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 8.  Sometimes, the synthetic CDO is called an 
investor-driven product.  Market experts believe “[t]he advantage of CDOs is that by 
changing the details of the tranche in terms of its attachment point (this is the amount of 
subordination below the tranche) and width, it is possible to customize the risk profile 
of a tranche to the investor’s specific profile.” O’KANE ET AL., supra note 145, at 13. Of 
course, “[a] synthetic CDO offers further diversification by enabling investors to invest 
in a diversified portfolio of credit default swaps.” Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 7, at 
1031. 
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exposure to the credit risk.243  That is, a synthetic CDO has a structure 
whereby the loss-generating risk of the reference asset is applied 
sequentially depending on the seniority of each tier.244 If the company 
loan included in the reference asset portfolio defaults due to bankruptcy, 
the loss is first assumed by the equity investor,245 followed by the 
mezzanine investor, the owner of the mezzanine tranche, and finally, the 
senior investor, the owner of the senior tranche.246
III.  OPERATING MECHANISMS OF CREDIT DERIVATIVE SWAPS 
A swap refers to a transaction whereby specific products, financial 
assets, or liabilities are exchanged with the counterparty’s products, 
assets, or liabilities on a specific day or during a specific period in the 
future.247  A swap transaction is the dealing of future assets and 
liabilities, and is a type of forward transaction.  In addition, the 
transaction is an over-the-counter transaction rather than an officially 
recognized exchange.248  Originally, a swap was the product of financial 
engineering, first occurring between different currencies.  Subsequently, 
interest swaps developed, eventually followed by the implementation of 
commodity swaps.249
Recently, the use of swaps expanded to the stock markets.250  A 
company or financial institution undertakes a swap transaction because 
it seeks a “comparative advantage” in terms of lending.  This 
comparative advantage is characterized as the difference between 
lending costs and investment gains that exist among the foreign currency 
market, short-term financial markets, long-term capital markets, and the 
various financial markets existing within the same region or between 
 243. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 135. 
 244. See id. 
 245. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 696.  When an equity investor in the synthetic 
CDO assumes high default risk, it is sometimes called “toxic waste.” Id. 
 246. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 135-36. 
 247. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 679-85. 
 248. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 36-41; see also GEOFFERY POITRAS, RISK 
MANAGEMENT, SPECULATION, AND DERIVATIVE SECURITIES 10 (2002). 
 249. See generally BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 53-58 (for asset swaps), at 67-73 (for 
credit default swaps), at 83-87 (for total return swaps), at 99-101 (for basket default 
swaps), at 107-10 (for portfolio default swaps); see also CHEW, supra note 68, at 10; 
WHALEY, supra note 4, at 637-38, 648-53. 
 250. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 17-25; see also WHALEY, supra note 4, at 11-19. 
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multiple regions.251  As swap transactions become more prominent, the 
differences between these markets tend to decrease.  Thus, in the end, 
swap transactions play a role in integrating international financial 
markets.252
A CDS is the standardized financial agreement that transfers credit 
risk among the parties of a transaction.253  It is the most important and 
popular tool used in the credit derivatives instrument market.254  
Essentially, the CDS is the device that transfers credit risk from one 
party to a specified counter-party within the parameters of a bilateral 
OTC agreement entered into by the parties.255  A CDS thus has an effect 
similar to a guaranty of payment. 
As examined above, companies and financial institutions today are 
exposed to uncertain business factors.256  In particular, exposure to the 
counterparty’s credit risk is increasing.257  This phenomenon is a reality 
from which companies simply cannot escape.  Therefore, companies or 
financial institutions should focus not on escaping credit risk, but rather 
on effectively managing this inevitable credit risk.  The following sub-
section examines the legal characteristics of the transaction of a credit 
derivatives instrument, particularly the CDS. 
A.  Bilateral Agreements 
A credit derivatives instrument transaction is an agreement by 
which all or part of the third party’s (the original obligor’s) credit risk 
 251. See DECOVNY, supra note 74, at 2. 
 252. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 679-85.  One writer emphasizes that: 
The key to [derivatives] investment management is to minimize risk while 
maximizing return.  In theory, for every risk appetite there is an “efficient frontier” of 
returns.  This is sort of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) of investment management.  
Below the DMZ one is safe-too safe to win the war against [fluctuation of value]. . . . 
Credit derivatives are a tool to help move the DMZ farther into risky territory without 
taking more casualties.  Specifically, credit derivatives can help diversity the credit 
risk of a portfolio to dampen the volatility of potential returns. 
TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 8. 
 253. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 687-90. 
 254. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 67. 
 255. See id. at 67-70. 
 256. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 1. 
 257. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 33 (“Counterparty risk . . . is the mark-to-
market exposure for the credit derivative due to the possibility that the counterparty 
may default on their obligation or potential obligation under the terms of the credit 
derivative transaction.”). 
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inherent in the underlying asset is transferred from the third party to the 
party that actually assumes the credit risk.258  This risk is encompassed 
in financial transactions such as loans or investments in securities.  In 
other words, a credit derivatives instrument is a device for transferring 
credit risk between two parties through a bilateral agreement.  That is, it 
refers to a counter-agreement that transfers specific credit risk resulting 
from a financial transaction to the other entity under specific conditions. 
From an economic point of view, a credit derivatives transaction 
can be referred to as a means of buying and selling the quantified 
economic value of the credit risk.  An agreement can be reached on the 
combination of various risks to use, including collateralized debt 
obligations or on a single risk.  Accordingly, credit derivatives 
instruments are based on financial assets or cash flow.259  If default 
occurs, the asset value is offset up to the maturity of the applicable 
reference asset.260  Alternatively, cash flow is performed on behalf of the 
counterparty of the applicable transaction. 
While its function appears to be similar to that of a suretyship or 
guaranty, a credit derivatives transaction is legally defined as a non-
specific atypical agreement, and thus is not regulated by statute.  This 
characteristic offsets loss through built-in conditions that can be met 
through the occurrence of a credit event.261  Generally, the 1999 ISDA 
definitions prescribe the designation of this agreement in credit 
derivatives instruments and ISDA swap documents.262
B.  OTC Transactions 
Credit derivatives instruments developed through four techniques 
known as forwards,263 futures,264 options,265 and swaps.266  These 
generally can be classified into two categories, depending on the type of 
transaction: “exchange-traded products” transacted within the 
 258. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 679. 
 259. See DAS, supra note 33, at 7-12; see also BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 123. 
 260. See DAS, supra note 33, at 14. 
 261. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 679. 
 262. See infra Part III.I. 
 263. See supra text accompanying note 111. 
 264. See supra text accompanying note 110. 
 265. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
 266. See supra Part II.A. 
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exchanges267 and “over-the-counter products” transacted one-to-one 
between parties without use of an exchange.268  Among the OTC 
transactions, the options include the “floor deal type OTC products,”269 
which have a relatively simple format, and “structured OTC 
products,”270 which are transacted by developing complex structures 
depending on the situation.  According to this classification, stock price 
index futures and stock price index options that are traded at the 
securities exchange can be classified as the financial products that derive 
from an exchange.271  The forward exchange agreement or interest swap 
agreement, transacted with a one-to-one agreement between the parties, 
is a regular “floor deal type OTC product.”272
Credit derivatives instrument agreements may be executed as OTC 
transactions depending on special needs, but many such agreements 
comply with standardized methods.273  Credit derivatives instruments 
are generally transacted as off-balance sheet transactions,274 but there are 
also balance-sheet transactions that are conducted using CLNs.275  The 
parties can ensure significant flexibility for leverage due to the nature of 
the off-balance sheet transaction.276  That is, as the investment is made 
on the credit itself, it is possible to set the degree of leverage that the 
investor wants.  Traditionally, hedge fund or non-bank financial 
institutions faced obstacles while attempting to invest in loan obligations 
due to the absence of the repo market and high cost of managing the 
loan obligations.277  Today, they can invest in loan obligations by using 
credit derivatives instruments such as over-the-counter TRSs. 
 267. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 27-33. 
 268. See id. at 16. 
 269. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 36-41 (introducing G-30’s derivatives 
contracts). 
 270. See STEINHERR, supra note 62, at 83-85 (introducing structured notes and 
Tesobono swaps); see also MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 6, at 59-62. 
 271. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 27, 31, 33. 
 272. See CHANCE, supra note 40, at 572-81. 
 273. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 7, at 25 (“The rapid standardization of credit 
default swaps may benefit existing market makers by increasing the volume of their 
credit default swaps practice, for instance, but the reduction in transaction costs also 
benefits other parties.”). 
 274. See CHEW, supra note 68, at 62. 
 275. See supra note 176 and accompanying text; see also Bomfim, supra note 1, at 
8. 
 276. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 46. 
 277. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 23, 57. 
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C.  Diverse Reference Entity 
Economic or reference entities that become subject to credit risk 
vary widely, as they might include financial institutions, public entities, 
the government, and general companies.278  In the case of banks, if a 
loan is granted to a specific company, it is possible to use a credit 
derivatives instrument to disperse the company’s risk of bankruptcy or 
default.  A bank can then assume the risk and still have the power to 
make profit by dealing the product between the parties through a credit 
derivatives instrument.  If a certain nation or company is considered to 
have a high credit risk, it is possible for worldwide investors to hedge 
risk by leveraging credit derivatives instruments.279  Credit derivatives 
instruments aim to hedge the default risk of a specific economic entity, 
but sometimes can be used to hedge the risk of non-performance of a 
specific duty. 
D.  Separation of Notes and Risk 
The most prominent characteristic of the credit derivatives 
instrument is the separation of the capital raising method and the credit 
risk.280  The parties to an agreement can change their degree of credit 
risk exposure by using a credit derivatives instrument without actually 
buying or selling a bond in the financial markets.281  From a securities 
structuring point of view, this is closely related to the distribution of 
cash flow, risk, and management power.  Moreover, a credit derivatives 
instrument is a financial product that can transfer risk and still retain an 
 278. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 3; see also supra text accompanying note 
2; WHALEY, supra note 4, at 684 tbl.19.1 (citing top 25 reference entities appearing in 
credit derivative contracts in 2003 by gross dollars sold and gross dollars purchased). 
 279. See ROMAIN G. RANCIERE, CREDIT DERIVATIVES IN EMERGING MARKETS 8 
(2001).  The foreign investors who invested in the bonds issued by the Korean 
Development Bank during the end of 1997, when the Korean economy was in a crisis, 
hedged the sovereign risk of Korea through the credit derivatives instrument 
transaction.  Generally, “[b]roker dealers, which provide the market with liquidity, are 
mainly the major investment banks involved in the emerging bond market (Deutsche 
Bank, JP Morgan-Chase, Salomon-CitiBank, etc.).” Id.  By participating in market, 
“[t]hey provide also added-value services by structuring and distributing portfolios of 
credit risk.” Id. 
 280. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 41. 
 281. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 3. 
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ownership right.282  In particular, it is able to separate the credit risk 
from the other risks of the transaction.  When examined from this 
perspective, credit derivatives instruments are the opposite of 
securitization.  In short, when a bond undergoes securitization, the asset 
is removed from the balance sheet, but the bank continues to assume the 
remaining credit risk.283  In contrast, credit derivatives instruments retain 
the asset while eliminating risk because the risk itself, not the asset, is 
sold in the market.284  CDSs are developing into standardized devices for 
transferring credit risk among the various credit derivatives 
instruments.285
E.  Protection Buyer and Protection Seller 
Credit risk is an inevitable element of the banking business.  The 
concept of credit risk protection lies at the core of a CDS.  Most of the 
transactions in the market are conducted by selling or buying 
protection.286  Here, the protection buyer (the party who is actually 
selling its risk) transfers credit risk in exchange for payment of a 
premium.287  The protection seller, on the other hand, receives a 
premium in return for assuming the counterparty’s credit risk.288
Accordingly, the payer of a fixed amount in a swap transaction 
agreement is the protection buyer, or risk seller, while the payer of a 
floating amount is the protection seller, or risk buyer.289  The protection 
buyer pays a fixed cash flow through the CDS and receives the cash 
flow contingent upon a credit event.290  The diagram below illustrates 
the parties’ relationship. 
 282. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 690. 
 283. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 136-37. 
 284. See ANSON ET AL., supra note 224, at 105. 
 285. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 687-90. 
 286. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 690. 
 287. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 109.  “The only risk faced by the 
protection seller is that the protection buyer fails to pay the premium for whatever 
reason.” Id. 
 288. See id. 
The protection buyer faces two key risks: 1. The reference entity defaults and the 
protection seller is unable to pay the notional amount due to the protection buyer on 
delivery of the appropriate obligation. 2. The reference entity does not default but the 
protection seller files for bankruptcy thus rendering its protection worthless. 
Id. 
 289. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 24-25, 70-71. 
 290. See id. 
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Relationship of the Parties in the CDS Market291
 
Credit Default Swap 
Market 
Swap payment Underlying credit position 
Protection buyer Fixed Short position (selling a bond)  
Protection seller Floating Long Position (buying a bond)  
F.  Underlying Assets and Reference Assets 
Generally, the concepts of underlying assets and reference assets 
are interchangeable.  Credit derivatives instruments target specific 
obligations such as loans or bonds to repay the original obligor.  In this 
case the credit risk seller usually holds the applicable loan obligation or 
bond.292  There is not necessarily a need for the credit risk seller to hold 
the asset, however.  If various types of loan obligations or bonds are 
held in hand, the credit risk seller could not only engage in a credit 
derivatives transaction that covers specific assets individually, but also 
could choose comprehensive transactions for credit risk hedging by 
targeting bonds that show the original obligor’s credit standing. 
Firstly, a “reference entity” is a specific company that has credit 
risk, which serves as the underlying asset of the transaction.293  
“Reference obligation” refers to the specific corporate bond issued by 
the reference entity,294 designated by the credit derivatives agreement or 
loan of the reference entity.295  The reference entity can be interpreted as 
a reference asset as well, referring to the underlying asset to which one 
transfers credit risk.296  Meanwhile, “reference obligation” refers to a 
special obligation such as large scale bond issuance, which is issued or 
guaranteed by a reference asset or reference entity.297  The reference 
obligation is effectively linked to the default swap in terms of the 
reference entity’s capital structure.298  Accordingly, if a credit event 
 
 291. MERRILL LYNCH, CREDIT DERIVATIVE HANDBOOK 2003, at 10 (2003). 
 292. See id. 
 293. See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 2.1. 
 294. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 691 n.9; 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, 
§ 2.3. 
 295. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 289. 
 296. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 681; see also CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 49. 
 297. See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 2.3. 
 298. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 65. 
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occurs while the reference asset is the senior priority of the unsecured 
obligation, then the protection buyer can transfer the obligation or duty 
of the same priority as the reference asset.299
Although it is difficult to clearly distinguish the concepts, the term 
“underlying asset” is commonly used when a fixed third asset targeted 
by a credit derivatives transaction is specified or when the credit risk 
seller holds on to the particular asset.300  On the other hand, there is a 
tendency to use the term “reference asset” more frequently when it is 
difficult to specify an original obligation such as the third party’s credit 
rating or the credit risk seller’s decision not to retain the asset that is the 
target of the transaction.  The business world tends to use the two terms 
interchangeably without clearly distinguishing them. 
G.  Fixed Fee Payment and Escaping Credit Risk 
Trading strategies in the CDS include fixing fee payments and 
escaping credit risk.  A CDS mandates that the protection buyer pay a 
premium to the protection seller for each fixed term in exchange for 
protection from credit events relating to the reference entity.301  Like 
other swap transactions, a transaction of the original asset itself does not 
take place prior to the occurrence of a credit event.302  The fixed fee is 
generally referred to as a premium and is indicated as “bp,” which is 
paid quarterly.303  This is the manner in which credit risk in the reference 
entity is hedged. 
The specific premium amount paid by the protection buyer to the 
protection seller is set at the beginning of the transaction.304  Several 
factors affect the premium that the protection seller receives.  One 
influential factor is the maturity of the transaction.305  When the 
 299. See id. 
 300. See DAS, supra note 33, at 127-28. 
 301. See supra Part II.B. 
 302. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 47. 
 303. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 291. 
 304. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 50. 
 305. See N.Y. BD. OF TRADE, UNDERSTANDING FUTURES & OPTIONS 22 (2004), 
available at http://www.iepstein.com/CD_Brochure/pdfs/nybot12.pdf. 
Time and intrinsic value are reflected in the option premium in much the 
same way that an insurance premium reflects the calculated risk that the 
coverage in the policy will be utilized.  The greater the volatility and the 
longer the time until expiration, the higher the option premium will be. 
Id. 
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transaction has matured for a longer period of time, the protection seller 
must assume a higher risk that becomes increasingly difficult to 
measure.306  A second factor that increases the premium is the higher 
possibility of default.307  Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s credit rating is 
the typical index that shows the possibility of default.308
The credit rating of a CDS counterparty also influences the 
premium.309  For example, from the point of view of the protection 
buyer, who has a credit rating of “A” and is trying to transfer credit risk 
to the reference asset, there is no point in signing an agreement with a 
counterparty whose credit rating is “BB” because that counterparty has a 
high risk of defaulting before it can perform the agreement.  
Accordingly, higher premiums must be paid when signing an agreement 
with a protection seller who has a high credit rating.310 In addition, the 
premium increases when the correlation between the credit of the 
reference asset and the credit of the counterparty is lower.311  If the 
correlation between the two parties is higher, there is a higher possibility 
that the counterparty will default if the reference asset is facing 
default.312  When the counterparty faces default, a protection buyer is 
unable to hedge the credit risk through a CDS. 
 306. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 688-95. 
 307. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 7, at 1042-43 (listing S&P default rate 
assumptions for CDOs). 
 308. See id. at 1026. “Importantly, the [credit rating] agencies rate bonds within a 
particular rating category, say AAA, even though market prices imply different 
probabilities of default.” Id. at 1043. 
 309. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 688-90. 
 310. See id. at 1043.  It is because “the ratings of CDO tranches should be sensitive 
to the correlation of the underlying assets.” Id. 
 311. See J.P. MORGAN, THE J.P. MORGAN GUIDE TO CREDIT DERIVATIVES 41, 
available at http://www.investinginbonds.com/assets/files/Intro_to_Credit_Derivatives 
.pdf. 
Counterparty risk consequently affects the pricing of credit derivative transactions.  
Protection bought from higher-rated-counterparties will command a higher premium.  
Furthermore, a higher credit quality premium; protection purchased from a 
counterparty against a Reference Entity is less valuable if a simultaneous default on 
the two names has a higher probability. 
Id. 
 312. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 35. 
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The “recovery rate”313 of the reference asset also influences the 
premium.  The loss incurred by the protection buyer determines the 
amount that the protection seller must pay to the protection buyer during 
a credit event.314  The loss is calculated by deducting the value of 
recovery from the reference asset’s face value.315  The premium 
decreases as the asset’s recovery rate increases.316  Realistically, 
however, the recovery rate of the reference asset can change drastically 
depending on the protection seller’s capacity to manage a 
nonperforming loan or bad asset.317  Likewise, a protection seller with 
outstanding management capacity over such an asset can increase the 
recovery rate compared to other protection sellers who have a lower 
management capacity on that asset.  Protection sellers with better 
management capacities give incentive to sign a CDS at a lower-than-
average premium.  This is the reason why investment banks with an 
outstanding ability to restructure failing companies can actively leverage 
a CDS.  If default does not occur during the period of swap agreement, 
the premium that the protection buyer paid to the protection seller 
simply becomes cash flow. 
H.  Balance Sheet Rent and the Leverage Effect 
The party who assumes a credit risk with regard to the TRS 
transaction does not need to raise capital to invest in the underlying 
asset.  Looking back to the example in Part I.C, the party that provided 
the capital for Company B is Bank A, the credit risk seller, not Bank C, 
the party assuming the credit risk.  Bank A signed the loan agreement 
with Company B to provide a $1 million loan.  According to the loan 
 313. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 22. 
In the bond market, . . . the Recovery Rate of a defaultable obligation [is defined] as 
the percentage of par claim of the obligation recovered by investors following default.  
Recovery rates depend not only on the actual recovery rate post default but also the 
time taken for the recovery rate to be realised. . . . In the CDS market, recovery [rate] 
is defined as the market price of the delivered obligation in the default swap contract 
following a credit event. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 314. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 7, 15-16. 
 315. See id. 
 316. See id. at 16. 
 317. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 7, at 1042-43 (“Recovery rates . . . for assets vary 
depending on the nature of the asset, particularly its seniority.”).  Furthermore, “[t]his is 
far from an exact science . . . and there rarely is historical evidence of default rates for 
particular assets . . . .” Id. 
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agreement, Bank A is the lender and the loan obligation for Company B 
is left on Bank A’s balance sheet since Bank A retains the status as a 
lender in accordance with the loan agreement.  This is the case even 
when Bank A carries out a TRS transaction with Bank C using said loan 
obligation as the underlying asset. 
At this time, the LIBOR+30 bp that Bank C paid Bank A is the 
same or very similar to the interest that is applied when Bank C lent 
money from Bank A.  Applying the same or similar interest rate is 
logical since this is similar to Bank C borrowing $1 million from Bank A 
in order to lend it to Company B.  The loan for Company B is then 
recorded on Bank A’s balance sheet while Bank C enjoys the same 
position as if it had actually lent the money directly to Company B, 
ostensibly allowing  Bank C to hold Bank A’s balance sheet.318  Products 
that factor in the “leverage effect”319 by including more than the margin 
of value fluctuation of the underlying asset to the terms, however, are 
becoming more prevalent. 
I.  ISDA Swap Documents 
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association’s320 efforts to 
standardize swap agreements have been integral in advancing the use of 
credit derivatives instruments, particularly in the areas of standardization 
of interest and currency swaps.321  Above all, ISDA contributed greatly 
to preventing disputes and reducing transaction costs by standardizing 
the swap agreement.322  Specifically, a general swap transaction is made 
 318. See ANSON ET AL., supra note 224, at 105-09 (2004) (illustrating the TRS 
mechanism as applied in the bank loan market). 
 319. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 320. See ISDA, http://www.isda.org (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).  The International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (known commonly as “ISDA”) was 
incorporated in 1985 in New York by the banks that participate in swap transactions.  
The participating banks needed to discuss the key topics of interest in the industry, and 
to help the general public understand swap transactions.  They also hoped to establish 
transaction practices, and define transaction standards in order to advance the swap 
market. Id. 
 321. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 285-91. 
 322. See Feder, supra note 21, at 736-41; see also Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 7, at 
39. 
ISDA currently has a monopoly on credit derivatives documentation, and market 
participants must pay fees for documents.  ISDA suggests that it has copyrights to 
these documents and that it will enforce its intellectual property rights.  It should 
2008 VANILLA SWAPS TO EXOTIC CREDIT DERIVATIVES 753 
 
based on the ISDA “Master Agreement”323 and “Credit Derivatives 
Definitions.”324  An agreement for a detailed transaction tends to modify 
parts of the matter related to the credit event or restructuring with the 
“Supplement,” which includes the “Schedule” and “Confirmation”.325
The “Confirmation” lays out the transaction conditions such as 
swap principal, amount of payment, interest, and payment method.326  
“Supplement” relates to the organization of specific parties, transaction, 
cross-default, restructuring, and other default.  It also pertains to the 
application of a “Master Agreement” clause, as well as assumption of 
withholding tax, notification method, and applicable law.327  These three 
documents comprise a single agreement; if there is disagreement 
between the parties, the validity follows the order of “Confirmation” that 
abandon those positions and practices.  ISDA should make all credit derivatives 
documentation available for free on the Internet. 
Id. 
 323. See ISDA Master Agreement and Bridge, http://www.isda.org/publications/isda 
masteragrmnt.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).  The ISDA Master Agreement was 
drafted in 1992 and has since been superseded by the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement.
 324. See 1999 Credit Derivatives Definitions, Supplements and Commentaries, 
http://www.isda.org/publications/isdacredit-deri-def-sup-comm.html (last visited Feb. 
28, 2008).  The ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions are composed with main text and 
various supplements: 
The 2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions (the “2003 Definitions”) are intended 
for use in confirmations of individual transactions governed by agreements such as the 
2002 ISDA Master Agreement or the 1992 ISDA Master Agreements published by 
ISDA.  The 2003 Definitions update the 1999 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions 
and offer the basic framework for the documentation of privately negotiated credit 
derivative transactions.  The 2003 Definitions update provisions in the 1999 ISDA 
Credit Derivatives Definitions relating to Successor and several Credit Events.  In 
addition, the 2003 Definitions offer new provisions relating to guarantees, Sovereign 
credit default swaps, novation of credit derivative transactions and alternative 
procedures in the event the Bond or Loan specified in the Notice of Physical 
Settlement is not Delivered. 
Id. 
 325. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 286-87. 
 326. See id. at 287; see also Donald A. Bendernagel, Richard Ostrander and Brian 
D. Rance, Credit Derivatives: Usage, Practice and Issues, 1559 PLI/CORP. 713, 939-55 
(2006). 
 327. See Collins & Sackmann, supra note 19, at 19.  Those items have caused 
explosive growth of the market and “substantially reduced negotiation time and costs.” 
Id. 
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regulates special matters: “Supplement,” “Master Agreement,” and 
“Credit Derivatives Definitions.”328
On May 11, 2001, ISDA issued a Restructuring Supplement to the 
1999 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions (“Mod-R”).329  Mod-R 
requires that at least three bondholders and two-thirds of the total 
number of holders must agree to the readjustment concerning the 
restructuring event.330  Mod-R explains in detail how and when 
subordination can be considered a restructuring event.331  Mod-R also 
outlines what can be delivered in order to satisfy the physical settlement 
that follows a credit event.332  Additional matters concerning 
restructuring are adopted only with the approval of the parties to the 
agreement.333  The practice in the U.S. derivatives market is based on 
Mod-R,334 but this practice does not appear to be increasing in use in the 
European Union.335
IV.  CREDIT EVENTS 
Credit derivatives instruments, CDSs in particular, depend on the 
cash flow and performance of the agreement between the parties based 
on a specific credit risk related event.  Thus, the core concern is which 
event is defined as a credit risk related event or default event.336  The 
“credit event” becomes the standard for triggering the performance of 
the contract terms previously agreed upon by the parties.337  In general, 
 328. See MASTER AGREEMENT § 1(b) (Int’l Swap Dealers Ass’n 1992) 1992 ISDA 
Master Agreement [hereinafter 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT]. 
 329. See Press Release, ISDA, ISDA Publishes Credit Derivatives Restructuring 
Supplement (May 11, 2001), available at http://www.isda.org/press/index.html. 
 330. See RESTRUCTURING SUPPLEMENT TO THE 1999 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES 
DEFINITIONS § 4.10(b) (2001) [hereinafter 2001 RESTRUCTURING SUPPLEMENT]. 
 331. See id. § 2.30(b). 
 332. See id. § 2.29. 
 333. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 47. 
 334. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 70. 
 335. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 48. 
 336. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 289-92. 
 337. Emily R. Pollack, Assessing the Usage and Effect of Credit Derivatives, at 42 
(Harvard Law School Int’l Fin. Seminar, Apr. 28, 2003). 
What if Restructuring Was Not Included as a Credit Event? . . . When the 
Restructuring Credit Event is included, banks that are asked to restructure loans are 
put in an enviable position.  These banks are given the opportunity to grant an 
extension, presumably collect fees for providing this service, and then still have the 
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something is recognized as a credit event only when a minimum set of 
terms outlined in the agreement has been satisfied.338  In the past two 
decades, however, “[a] variety of new swap[] [techniques] have 
appeared to meet the risk management needs of the capital markets.”339
A credit event refers to the credit risk connected event that becomes 
the standard for triggering performance of the agreement for cash or 
physical settlement as performance upon the credit derivatives 
instrument.340  A credit event can be defined in a number of ways 
depending on the purpose of the transaction, which includes a “failure to 
pay” principal or interest, “bankruptcy” of borrower companies, “work-
out” or “restructuring,” “decrease or increase” of credit rating above or 
below a certain level, and so forth.341  Thus, the procedures used to 
determine whether a credit event has occurred and the events that will 
actually create an obligation on the part of the counter-party need to be 
specified in the agreement in a way that will minimize ambiguity. 
In general, assessment of a credit event is verified with information 
that can be obtained publicly in order to ensure objectivity.  When the 
materiality threshold342 is met and the set of terms outlined in the 
agreement has been satisfied, the credit event prerequisite has occurred.  
For instance, in the case of a simple performance delay, the market value 
of the reference asset has to have decreased 10% relative to the face 
value.343  With the understanding that there may be a dispute about 
whether a credit event has occurred or on the timing of the credit event, 
it is customary to include a clause in the agreement that the parties agree 
occurrence of the Restructuring Credit Event if they have bought protection through a 
credit default swap. 
. . . . 
Yet, if Restructuring was eliminated as a Credit Event, banks would also be put in a 
difficult position.  If the creditworthiness and financial condition of a Reference 
Entity had deteriorated significantly, banks might be placed in the uncomfortable 
position of having to force default in orders to obtain protection through the triggering 
of a Credit Event such as Bankruptcy or Failure to Pay. 
Id. 
 338. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 49. 
 339. See Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 953. 
 340. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 47. 
 341. See id. 
 342. See infra Part IV.C. 
 343. Such a materiality clause was included in the 1998 ISDA document labeled, 
“Confirmation of OTC Credit Swap Transaction Single Reference Entity–Non-
Sovereign.” It was “too vague and subjective.” See Pollack, supra note 337, at 8.  
However it is very useful in the application of BDS and PDS transactions. 
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to abide by the decision of a neutral third party who is knowledgeable of 
the market situation. 
A.  Classifications 
In 1999, ISDA drafted the “Definitions” of “Credit Derivatives,” 
and specified the situations that are classified as credit events.  With this 
set of definitions, ISDA concluded that a credit event takes place amidst 
at least one of these situations: bankruptcy,344 obligation acceleration,345 
obligation default,346 failure to pay,347 repudiation/moratorium,348 and 
restructuring.349
Meanwhile, the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement defines default, 
which may result in relation to obligation, as one of following eight 
events: failure to pay or deliver,350 breach of agreement,351 credit support 
default,352 misrepresentation,353 default under specified transaction,354 
cross default,355 bankruptcy,356 and merger without assumption.357
According to the definitions specified by section 4.7(a) of the 1999 
ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions: 
Restructuring means that, with respect to one or more Obligation, 
including as a result of an Obligation Exchange, and in relation to 
aggregate amount of not less than the Default Requirement, any one 
or more of the following events occurs, is agreed between the 
Reference Entity or a Governmental Authority and the holder or 
holders of such Obligation or is announced (or otherwise decreed) by 
a Reference Entity or a Governmental Authority in a form that is 
binding upon a Reference Entity, and such event is not provided for 
under the terms of such Obligation in effect as of the later of the 
 344. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.2. 
 345. Id. § 4.3. 
 346. Id. § 4.4. 
 347. Id. § 4.5. 
 348. Id. § 4.6. 
 349. Id. § 4.7. 
 350. 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 328, §5 (a)(i). 
 351. Id. §5 (a)(ii). 
 352. Id. § 5(a)(iii). 
 353. Id. § 5(a)(iv). 
 354. Id. § 5(a)(v). 
 355. Id. §5 (a)(vi). 
 356. Id. § 5(a)(vii). 
 357. Id. § 5(a)(viii). 
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Trade Date and the date as of which such obligation is issued or 
incurred: 
(i) a reduction in the rate or amount of interest payable or the 
amount of scheduled interest accruals; (ii) a reduction in the 
amount of principal or premium payable at maturity or at 
scheduled redemption dates; (iii) a postponement or other 
deferral of a date or dates for either (A) the payment or accrual 
of interest or (B) the payment of principal or premium; (iv) a 
change in the ranking and priority of payment of any 
Obligation, causing the subordination of such Obligation; or 
(v) any change in the currency or composition of any payment 
of interest or principal.358
Restructuring also includes the result of bond/obligation 
exchange,359 which requires that the result is greater than the standards 
of minimum “default requirement” in accordance to the “materiality 
clause.”360  The declaration of unredeemed, moratorium or maintenance 
of the status quo is included as well.361
This credit event is often outlined in the agreement between related 
parties.  When creating a CDS agreement, a detailed rule is laid out by 
which a credit event triggers transfer of risk on the business transaction 
level. 
[I]f an occurrence would otherwise constitute a Credit Event, such 
occurrence will constitute a Credit Event whether or not such 
occurrence arises directly or indirectly from: (a) any lack or alleged 
lack of authority or capacity of a Reference Entity to enter into any 
Obligation, (b) any actual or alleged unenforceability, illegality, 
impossibility or invalidity with respect to any Obligation, however 
described, (c) any applicable law, order, regulation, decree or notice, 
however described, or the promulgation of, or any change in, the 
interpretation by any court, tribunal, regulatory authority or similar 
administrative or judicial body with competent or apparent 
jurisdiction of any applicable law, order, regulation, decree or notice, 
however described, or (d) the imposition of, or any change in, any 
exchange controls, capital restrictions or any other similar 
 358. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.7(a); see also BOMFIM, supra note 
1, at 293. 
 359. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.9. 
 360. Id. § 4.8(a). 
 361. See STEINHERR, supra note 62, at 167. 
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restrictions imposed by any monetary or other authority, however 
described.362
Regarding ISDA’s definitions of the credit derivatives instrument, 
“certainty and objectivity” are important standards concerning the 
definition of the credit event.363  When interpreting a credit event, the 
text should be interpreted narrowly, and any analogical interpretation 
following the situation should be limited. 
1.  Tendency to Downplay the Scope of Credit Events 
The scope of a credit event is significantly narrower than the 
general scope of the default concept.  If the concept of a credit event is 
interpreted broadly enough to include simple delay or even minor factual 
elements of default for technical reasons, the protection seller would 
face the risk that settlement may be triggered before the credit of the 
reference entity reaches the critical point.  In particular, a significant part 
of the risk relating to the CDS transaction results from the moral hazard 
of the intermediary financial institutions.364
The fact that the intermediary financial institutions decide on the 
timing of the credit event and the amount of loss incurred gives rise to 
frequent conflicts due to the difference of opinion on a specific event 
and any contradictory terms that could be inherent in the transaction 
agreement.  Investors will want to use a broad definition with regard to 
the scope of a credit events and default events.365  A CDS might be 
 
 362. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.1. 
 363. See Collins & Sackmann, supra note 19, at 23. 
Under the 1999 Definitions, [a] sovereign [may] conducted [restructuring] while its 
credit rating was being downgraded, a Restructuring would occur even though the 
sovereign may be financially sound.  Hence, sovereign default swaps could be 
triggered before there has been a material change in the creditworthiness of the 
sovereign.  In effect, users of sovereign default swaps may obtain a higher probability 
of receiving a payout than standard default swap users.  Due to this enhanced risk, 
[swap] dealers are reluctant to provide sovereign default swaps that include a 
Restructuring credit event until the ambiguity over what constitutes a Restructuring is 
resolved. 
Id. 
 364. This is the same for the TRS as well as other credit products. See, e.g., 
TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 10-12. 
 365. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 224 (“Buyer of credit default protection will 
attempt to put as many trigger events as possible in to the credit default protection 
language.”). 
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different, however, because the agreement ends with the delivery of the 
asset. 
In a broad interpretation scenario, the protection buyer would not be 
compensated for the even more serious future credit event that decreases 
the value of the buyer’s reference obligation.366  Protection under the 
CDS agreement is a swap agreement, not an option agreement.367  Most 
of the credit derivatives instruments settlement processes can be 
triggered by both the protection buyer and protection seller.368  As a 
result, many efforts were made to simplify the permissible scope of the 
credit event.369  Unlike the U.S., where rescheduling of debt, 
acceleration, and default are excluded from the scope of credit events 
under swap agreements with non-sovereign debt, the E.U. “market 
participants . . . argue that any restructuring, regardless of its purpose, 
should be deemed a Credit Event for the [derivatives transaction.]”370
2.  Definition from International Credit Rating Agency 
of Failure to Pay 
The concept of the credit event used with the credit derivatives 
instrument is broader than that of default used by the credit rating 
agencies.371  Credit derivatives instruments are an over-the-counter 
transaction between the protection buyer and protection seller.372  
Accordingly, the concept of a credit event is one that is outside the 
traditional scope of interest for the credit rating agencies, since it is not 
typically linked with the capital funding agreement of the primary 
market. 
Moody’s, the international credit rating agency, identified in its 
structured finance special report the difference between the credit event 
 
 366. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 7, 92-94. 
 367. See TAVAKOLI, TRS, supra note 167; see also BOMFIM, supra note 1. 
 368. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 7, 92-94. 
 369. Language such as “downgrade,” “currency convertibility,” “governmental 
action including war, hostilities, and confiscation,” and “market disruption” are 
removed from definitions list. See, e.g., TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 225. 
 370. See Collins & Sackmann, supra note 19, at 21. 
 371. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 11.  In the international financial 
marketplace, various players are using the credit rating obtained from the U.S. 
headquarters of two influential credit rating agencies. Id. 
 372. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 679. 
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and Moody’s own definition of default.373  Moody’s definition was 
partially adopted by the market, playing a role in narrowing the scope of 
the concept of a credit event.  According to the report, Moody’s has 
rated numerous structured transactions, focusing on the analysis of the 
cash settlement market.374
Interestingly, the cash settlement is used mostly for the evaluation 
of synthetic CDOs or CLNs, but is almost never used in the CDS 
market.375  Moody’s report targeted synthetic CDO or CLN investors, 
who seek additional risk with which to expose the sellers of 
protection.376  Furthermore, this report viewed the credit derivatives 
instrument as a tool for hedging credit risk for both the protection buyer 
and the protection seller.377  Accordingly, some elements that Moody’s 
considers additional risk related to a CDS agreement can be viewed as 
devices for mitigating risk of the protection buyer.378
A swap is a clear means to hedge the state of default or mandatory 
exchange that decreases the value of an investor’s bond.  Moody’s 
establishes three means for default: 
Any missed delayed disbursement of interest, and/or principal; 
bankruptcy or receivership; and Distressed exchange where (i) the 
borrower offers debt-holders a new security or package of securities 
that amount to diminished financial obligation (such as preferred or 
common stock, or debt with a lower coupon or par amount) or (ii) 
the exchange that has the apparent purpose of helping the borrower 
avoid default.379
Moody’s factors for setting a credit rating relate not only to the 
possibility of defaulting, but also to the recovery value after the default, 
as mentioned above.380  Moody’s evaluates the market value of the 
defaulted bond after one month to determine its remaining value.381  
 373. See JEFFREY S. TOLK, UNDERSTANDING THE RISKS IN CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 5 
(2001), available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/MoodysSyntheticCDORisks.pdf. 
 374. See TOLK, supra note 373, at 1. 
 375. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 689 n.10 (introducing British Bankers’ 
Association’s report). 
 376. See TOLK, supra note 373, at 2. 
 377. See id. at 1-2. 
 378. See id. at 4. 
 379. See id. at 5. 
 380. See id. 
 381. See id. 
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This perspective is the result of Moody’s historical studies and its belief 
that it is possible to forecast such events.382
Standard & Poor’s has not expressed an official view on the CDS.  
It is clear that S&P gives a better credit rating for the obligation that is 
supported by two reference entities, however, which are considered 
independent credit risks rather than one entity having implications for 
the other.383  If a reference entity with an A- rating is protected by a 
reference entity with an A+ rating, then the credit rating can increase to 
AA+.384
3.  Difference between ISDA and Credit Rating Agency 
There is a potential difference between a credit event and a default 
event on the level of a credit derivatives instrument transaction.  This 
difference develops when the credit event definition broadens.385  In 
particular, a credit event uses a broader concept than that of default 
defined by Moody’s.386  Moody’s reasoned as follows regarding the 
difference between ISDA’s definition on the elements of a credit event 
and its own concept of default. 
(i) Bankruptcy: There are many similarities between bankruptcy as 
defined by ISDA387 and Moody’s concept of default,388 but there are 
 
 382. See id. 
 383. See STANDARD & POOR’S, CRITERIA: REVISED FRAMEWORK FOR APPLYING 
COUNTERPARTY AND SUPPORTING PARTY CRITERIA, at 4 (May 8, 2007), available at 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/3,1,1,0,1148443971
718.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).  “For an eligible direct support counterparty to 
participate in a ‘AAA’ rated transaction, the minimum rating is a short-term rating of at 
least ‘A-1’, or a long-term rating of at least ‘A+’, if it has no short-term rating.” Id. 
 384. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 9 fig. 1.4.  A- is upper-medium grade, while 
AA+ is high-grade, high credit quality. Id. 
 385. See TOLK, supra note 373, at 5-12. 
 386. According to Moody’s Special Comment, a sovereign issuer is in default when 
one or more of the following conditions are met: 
1. There is a missed or delayed disbursement of interest and/or principal, even if the 
delayed payment is made within the grace period, if any. 
2. A distressed exchange occurs, where: (1) The issuer offers bondholders a new 
security or package of securities that amount to a diminished financial obligation such 
as new debt instruments with lower coupon or par value. (2) The exchange had the 
apparent purpose of helping the borrower avoid a “stronger” event of default (such as 
a missed interest or principal payment). 
PRAVEEN VARMA, SOVEREIGN BOND DEFAULTS, RATING TRANSITIONS, AND 
RECOVERIES (1985-2002) 4 (2003). 
 387. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.2. 
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some differences as well.  For example, included among ISDA’s 
definition of bankruptcy is when an entity “takes any action in 
furtherance of, or indicating its consent to, approval of, or acquiescence 
in any of the foregoing acts.”389  Investors might be exposed to risk 
because the definition does not explicitly mention the default, making 
this regulation on the credit event vague and difficult to interpret.390  
Moreover, there is no clear explanation of when the insolvency starts.391  
Thus, a credit event may occur even without reaching the actual state of 
bankruptcy.392
(ii) Failure to pay or deliver: Failing to pay, as defined by SDA,393 
is also the same as Mody’s definition of default.394  Both the failure to 
pay and the default uphold the materiality condition that states that the 
impaired portion of payment should exceed a specific amount. 
(iii) Restructuring: Moody’s presumes that only restructuring 
following a mandatory exchange triggers default.395  Moody’s maintains 
three conditions that constitute default following a mandatory exchange: 
the restructured obligation should result in a “diminished financial 
obligation;” restructuring should have been “involuntary for all 
investors;” and restructuring should have taken place to avoid the state 
of default that they would have faced.396  Moody’s interpreted ISDA’s 
1999 definition of a credit derivatives instrument, however, to allow a 
credit event to be triggered even when the debtor voluntarily agrees to 
restructuring.397  In other words, Moody’s definition of restructuring is 
“distressed exchange” and is broader than the scope set by ISDA.398
(iv) Repudiation/Moratorium: Moody’s questioned the need to 
include repudiation or moratorium as instances that trigger a credit event 
as was defined by ISDA,399 when the concept of the failure to pay is 
already in place.400
 388. See TOLK, supra note 373, at 5. 
 389. See id. § 4.2(i) (repealed by the 2003 ISDA Definitions). 
 390. See TOLK, supra note 373, at 6. 
 391. See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.2. 
 392. See TOLK, supra note 373, at 6. 
 393. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.5. 
 394. See TOLK, supra note 373, at 6. 
 395. See id. at 8. 
 396. See id. at 7. 
 397. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.7(a). 
 398. See TOLK, supra note 373, at 7-8. 
 399. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.6(a). 
 400. See TOLK, supra note 373, at 9. 
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(v) Obligation Acceleration: From Moody’s point of view, 
obligation acceleration itself would not be a credit event, but rather 
would constitute default only when it actually triggered the involuntary 
restructuring.401  Moody’s opposes including obligation acceleration 
within the concept of default where a specific obligation structure loses 
the benefit of the given period for repayment due to the impairment on a 
specific contract clause, and if the duty to pay back occurs for entire 
obligations by the debtor.402
B.  Publicly Available Information 
In order for an event to become a credit event, the information 
needs to be publicly available to the general investor in the 
marketplace.403  The information should be made available so that at 
least two “internationally recognized” news providers can confirm its 
existence.404  Administrative measures by governmental agencies, such 
as an act of the financial supervisory institution or a court’s binding 
decree, will not result in the occurrence of a credit event.405  Only an 
objective announcement to the general public through the news media 
constitutes an effective public announcement.  Under the parties’ 
agreement, the source of the information can be specified arbitrarily.  
Public announcement by the media, however, is an important standard 
for determining at what point a credit event has actually occurred. 
C.  Materiality 
In addition to the requirement that information be made publicly 
available, there is one other prerequisite for a credit event—the 
condition of materiality.406  In order for the conditions of the agreement 
to be triggered, regardless of whether a public announcement has been 
made, the price of the related notes must meet the specific level the 
 401. See id. at 10. 
 402. See id. at 10-11. 
 403. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 3.2(c). 
 404. Id. §§ 3.5(a)(i), 3.8; see also FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 68. 
 405. Cf. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 3.5(a)(i) (stating that the 
information must be “publicly available” and published or electronically displayed in 
“internationally recognized” news sources). 
 406. See DAS, supra note 33, at 23, 118 (stating that “materiality clauses prevent 
spurious triggering of the credit derivatives”). 
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parties agreed upon at signing.407  This is referred to as the “materiality 
clause” and it is a condition precedent set to prevent the triggering of a 
credit event by mistake. 
A general example of the materiality condition is one in which a 
reference entity’s default is necessary only if an additional condition is 
met that a set amount of money must be lost.408  It is this additional 
condition that serves as the materiality condition.409  There is a default 
condition of materiality set at $10 million in the case of an obligation 
acceleration, where there is an early arrival of the period for paying back 
due to a breach of duty.410
D.  Notice 
Notice should occur at least once, and often occurs three times 
before a credit event that triggers actual payment under the CDS.411  
Furthermore, some of the features of the notice can have a significant 
impact under the contract.  One requirement is that when a credit event 
occurs before the ending date specified on the contract, there must be a 
reasonably detailed statement showing that a credit event has 
occurred.412  At a minimum, notice should be provided no later than 
 407. See, e.g., id. at 57, 59 (introducing materiality option in the Credit Default 
Swap). 
 408.  CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 7 (“The risk that an issuer of the debt is unable 
to meet its financial obligations . . . is known as default.”).  Materiality as an optional 
condition 
allows the parties to require that in addition to the occurrence of a Credit Event there 
has been a significant drop in the price of a Reference Obligation (Price Materiality) 
or a significant widening of the spread applicable to a Reference Obligation (Spread 
Materiality).  The materiality concept protects parties . . . against nominal defaults 
that inadvertently may have caused a Credit Event. 
Daniel P. Cunningham, R. Brent Jones, & Thomas J. Werlen, ISDA Offers Standard 
Documents for Credit Swaps, 17 INTL FIN. L. REV. 21, 23 (1998).
 409. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 291-92; cf. 2001 RESTRUCTURING SUPPLEMENT, 
supra note 330, § 3.11(a) (requiring that the Credit Event Notice set forth an “amount of 
1,000,000 units of the currency in which the Floating Rate Payer Calculation Amount is 
denominated”). 
 410. See DAS, supra note 33, at 23. 
 411. FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 67. 
 412. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 3.3. 
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fourteen days after the scheduled termination date.413  The notice should 
include an objective description of the event that has occurred.414
For approval of the swap transaction, it is essential to establish 
which party has the power to give notice of a credit event.415  In some 
instances, only the protection buyer can provide notice.  In other 
instances, both protection seller and protection buyer can provide notice.  
“The Confirmation will also specify who is capable of serving the Credit 
Event Notice.”416  Recently, the trend has been toward allowing either 
the protection buyer or protection seller to provide notice.417  When the 
protection seller initiates a triggering agreement, it is then possible to 
provide the necessary help for the utilization of a settlement process of 
the market participants who have entered into diverse agreements that 
involve actual buying and selling of the protection with the reference 
asset.418
In theory, if the definition of credit event is applied broadly, it can 
be used as a management strategy whereby protection buyers may 
release the bond into the market before its value drastically decreases to 
avoid a complete default.  This is mostly theoretical and is very rare in 
the actual marketplace. 
When a credit event occurs, the party who has a duty to provide 
notice may only provide notice of the occurrence of a credit event one 
time.419  A protection buyer can then demand settlement for only the 
portion of the transaction that relates to that credit event, with the 
remaining portion of the credit risk protection terminating at that 
point.420
 413. FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 67; see also BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 292 n.6 
(“[T]he Credit Event Notice and Notice of Publicly Available Information can [both] be 
delivered up to 14 days after the maturity date of the contract.”). 
 414. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 67. 
 415. Id. 
 416. Id. 
 417. See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 3.2(e); see also FRANCIS ET AL., 
supra note 59, at 67. 
 418. FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 67-68. 
 419. See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 3.3.  While there is not a number 
of required notice specified in the ISDA Definitions the definitions provide that “[a] 
Credit Event Notice must contain a description in reasonable detail of the facts relevant 
to the determination that a Credit Event has occurred.” Id. 
 420. See 2001 RESTRUCTURING SUPPLEMENT, supra note 330, § 4 (Commentary on 
Restructuring Supplement). 
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E.  Sources 
Notice of publicly available information, along with the credit event 
notice, is required.421  This verifies the source of information for the 
occurrence of the credit event.  If the information is not such that is 
recognized by an official record or reference entity, then it is crucial for 
the coverage of the credit event to be carried out by the specified 
number (usually two)422 of internationally authorized sources of 
information.423
For clearing purposes, the “event termination date,” “if the [n]otice 
of [p]ublicly [a]vailable [i]nformation is applicable, . . . [is the date] 
when both the [c]redit [e]vent [n]otice and [n]otice of [p]ublicly 
[a]vailable [i]nformation are first effective.”424  When the agreement 
uses the physical settlement method, then notice of physical settlement 
must be served within 30 days of the event determination date.425
This notice should outline the type of obligations that are to be 
delivered by the protection buyer to the protection seller.  Physical 
settlement should occur within thirty business days from the time of 
notice of intended physical settlement.426  In this case, the protection 
buyer should transfer the appropriate obligation within five days from 
the date when the physical settlement period ends, or assume the risk 
that accompanies loss of protection.427
F.  Settlement 
Defining the scope of the obligation is critical when deciding 
whether a credit event has occurred.428  In order to decide whether a 
credit event has occurred in the reference entity, the applicable scope of 
the term is an important determinant.  ISDA’s 1999 definition of a credit 
derivatives instrument divides the scope of obligation into six 
 421. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 3.2(c). 
 422. Id. § 3.8. 
 423. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 68. 
 424. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 1.8. 
 425. FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 68. 
 426. Id. 
 427. See CREDIT DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS §§ 8.1, 9.2(c)(ii) (Int’l Swaps & 
Derivatives Ass’n 2003) [hereinafter 2003 ISDA DEFINITIONS]. 
 428. Cf. BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 289 (“[O]ne of the most important definitions in a 
credit default swap contract is that of ‘default.’”). 
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categories.429  The most frequently used obligation category is 
“borrowed money,”430 which means payment is made from the borrowed 
money.  The protection buyer discontinues periodic premium payments 
as defined by the agreement once a credit event occurs.431  The mere fact 
that the credit event occurred, however, does not mean that it is 
impossible to claim the right of the reference entity. 
When a credit event occurs, the protection seller must pay the 
protection buyer the amount agreed upon.432  Ordinarily, this type of 
payment takes the form of an exchange of the actual asset between the 
buyer and seller.  The protection buyer provides a trustworthy certificate 
of obligation for the reference entity, which is referred to as the 
“deliverable obligation,”433 and receives, in return, a cash settlement that 
is equal to the face value of the total asset.434
As a result of mergers and acquisitions or corporate restructuring, 
the rights and liabilities of the reference entity can actually be succeeded 
by the new entity.435  The CDS agreement is structured with a financial 
technique that allows a bondholder’s experience to be effectively 
reflected with the obligation of the reference entity in the cash market.  
In general, a minimum specific amount of distributed shares are paid to 
the creditor even when the company is liquidated.  After the declaration 
of a credit event, a bond’s market value decreases significantly 
compared to its face value.  A protection buyer who signed the CDS 
agreement benefits from the protection, however, despite the decrease in 
market value. 
 429. FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 64. 
 430. BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 289; see FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 64.  “Other 
more narrow Obligation Categories are Borrowed Money, Bond, Loan, Bond or Loan, 
Reference Obligations Only.” Id. 
 431. WHALEY, supra note 4, at 689. 
 432. See id. at 686, 688. 
 433. See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 2.15 (defining deliverable 
obligation).  In the CDS agreement pertaining to the physical settlement method, the 
protection buyer is guaranteed to be paid the total face value in cash in exchange for the 
right to transfer the proper obligation of the reference asset to the protection seller.  
Because the reference asset is being issued in various bonds or obligations under the 
declaration and with different market values on default, accurate information pertaining 
to deliverable obligations is critical for the calculation of the protection seller’s risk. 
 434. See Chan-Lau, supra note 151, at 5. 
 435. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 288. 
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Physical settlement is used more frequently than cash settlement in 
the CDS transaction.436  In the case of physical settlement, valuation is 
not required since the protection buyer simply transfers the total face 
value duty for the reference asset to the protection seller.  Currently, 
however, cash settlement methods are becoming more widespread in 
other types of deals such as Synthetic CDO transactions.  In these 
transactions, a one time cash payment is required as the terms pertaining 
to the decrease in market value assumed by the specific obligation of the 
reference asset are considered in advance.437
The cash settlement method is different from the physical 
settlement method in the sense that it requires actual cash payment to the 
protection seller when a credit event occurs, entitling the protection 
buyer to “the difference between the par and market values of the 
reference obligation.”438  Because physical settlement involves returning 
the original bond certificate to the protection seller, it prevents the 
protection buyer from closing the applicable transaction at the market 
price when the credit event occurred.439
V.  APPLICATION 
The most important legal issue regarding the CDS is, perhaps, the 
occurrence of a credit event that induces actual transfer of risk between 
the parties to an agreement.440  Argentina’s sovereign debt restructuring 
epitomizes a hotly debated credit event that is often cited in CDS 
 436. See WHALEY, supra note 4, at 689 n.10 (noting that the British Bankers’ 
Association in 2004 reported that 86% of credit derivates contracts had physical 
settlement). 
 437. WHALEY, supra note 4, at 688. 
 438. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 292. 
 439. Cf. Angus Duncan, Loan-only Credit Default Swaps: The March to Liquidity, 
COM. LENDING REV. (2006), at 21 (stating that delivery of the “reference obligation is 
exchanged for its par value”).  In order to “avoid the difficulty of arriving at fair and 
timely outcomes from the perspective of both sellers and buyers of protection” a 
relatively new settlement mechanism,” also known as “pay-as-you-go for CDS of ABS 
(“PAYG”),” “has been developed in the U.S.” Id. at 20-21.  Under this mechanism, the 
protection seller paid to protection buyer “floating payments” meaning that “principal 
or interest shortfall or principal write-down amounts on the reference obligation on a 
current basis.” Id. at 21. 
 440. Cf. Brief of Appellee at *1, Eternity Global Master Fund, Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. 
Trust Co., 2003 WL 24072300 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 03-7652) [hereinafter Appellee 
Brief] (putting forth before the Court of Appeals the question of whether a credit event 
had occurred under the swaps). 
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litigation.441  The purpose of restructuring as a credit event is to assist in 
the declaration of default by the creditor and debtor, and to mitigate the 
negative atmosphere that surrounds the attempt of parties to change the 
terms of their loan agreement. 
On December 24, 2001, Argentina’s interim President, Adolfo 
Rodriguez Saa, signed a moratorium decreeing the suspension of all 
external debt.442  This declaration was significant because of the legal 
dispute that ensued between the financial institutions over whether the 
restructuring up until the announcement of the moratorium constituted a 
credit event according to the CDS agreement.443
A.  Eternity Global Master Fund 
Eternity Global Master Fund (“EGMF”), managed and operated by 
HWF Capital,444signed three credit swap agreements with the Morgan 
Guaranty Trust Company of New York and JP Morgan Chase Bank (“JP 
Morgan”).445  The two parties signed a $14 million credit swap 
agreement, transferable at specific intervals with various maturity 
dates.446  While they were executed on different dates with different 
lengths of maturity, the three agreements comprising the swap were 
 441. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 64; see also Collins & Sackmann, supra 
note 19, at 20 (introducing Xerox case). 
 442. See Carina Lopez, The Argentina Crisis: A Chronology of Events After The 
Sovereign Default, STANDARD & POOR’S, Apr. 12, 2002, at *2. 
 443. Cf. J.F. Hornbeck, Argentina’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring 4 (CRS Report 
for Congress) Order Code RL32637 (Oct. 19, 2004) (citation omitted) (discussing the 
general framework for recovering defaulted sovereign debt).  With regard to such 
measures: 
When a country becomes insolvent and defaults on its debt, a general framework for 
analyzing its options points to three critical responses. First, the country must adjust 
policies.  This includes correcting fiscal and current account deficits, as well as 
structural imbalances, which in Argentina’s case involve the banking sector, utility 
regulation, and federal-provincial fiscal relations.  Second, [so called] emergency IMF 
financing is needed.  Third, debt must be restructured to achieve longer-term financial 
sustainability. 
Id. 
 444. Complaint ¶ 7, Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 
2002 WL 32150389 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02-CV-1312) [hereinafter EGMF 
Complaint]. 
 445. Id. ¶ 21. 
 446. Id. 
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essentially the same transaction.447  In the credit swap agreement, EGMF 
purchased emerging market448 bonds from JP Morgan, and specifically 
set out that a default of Argentina would constitute a credit event.449  At 
the time of the agreement, JP Morgan was an advisor to Argentina’s 
Ministry of Finance, and was the largest underwriter of Argentina’s 
dollar-denominated sovereign debt.450  In the above mentioned 
agreement, EGMF was the risk buyer (protection seller) and JP Morgan 
was the risk seller (protection buyer).  Their credit swap agreement 
incorporated the 1999 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions and the 1992 
ISDA Master Agreements.451  These two documents outlined the terms 
of payment and defined specific terms such as settlement, portfolio, and 
credit event.452
Under the definitions adopted in the agreement, settlement referred 
to “physical settlement,” while portfolio meant “deliverable 
obligation.”453  The physical settlement amount was set as the “floating 
rate payer calculation amount,”454 which is a multiplication of the 
reference price.455  The agreement required that the parties provide 
reasonable detail regarding notice of the credit event.456  The target 
credit events were divided into four categories: (i) “failure to pay,” (ii) 
“obligation acceleration,” (iii) “repudiation/moratorium,” and (iv) 
“restructuring.”457  The two parties specified that The Wall Street 
Journal, the New York Times, The Financial Times, Reuters, 
Bloomberg, and the Dow Jones News Wires would qualify as sources of 
information for publicizing the credit event.458
 447. See id. (stating the parties entered into the three agreements within a seven-day 
period and that the terms of the agreements were essentially the same). 
 448. See TAVAKOLI, supra note 72, at 172.  “Emerging markets is the term usually 
reserved for developing economies.” Id.  “The emerging markets are often classified as 
Latin America including Mexico, Eastern Europe, and most Asian countries.”  Id. 
 449. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 30. 
 450. Id. ¶ 13. 
 451. Id. ¶ 22. 
 452. Id. ¶¶ 24, 27, 30. 
 453. Id. ¶¶ 24, 27. 
 454. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 2.13 (defining the term “floating rate 
payer calculation amount”). 
 455. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 25. 
 456. Id. ¶ 28. 
 457. Id. ¶ 30. 
 458. Id. ¶ 28. 
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When Argentina’s economy collapsed, EGMF notified JP Morgan 
on three occasions that the reference entity of the credit swap agreement, 
the Republic of Argentina’s debt restructuring, constituted a credit 
event.459  JP Morgan refused the payment, however, claiming that the 
credit event had not occurred.460  EGMF subsequently initiated litigation 
as JP Morgan refused payment on the $3 million credit swap 
agreement.461
B.  Daehan Investment Trust Management 
Daehan Investment Trust Management (“DITM”) signed a CDS 
agreement in 1996 for an emerging market basket note that entailed 
paying 10.2% of the original capital of $96 million every year as a 
premium to JP Morgan Chase Bank.462  From an economic standpoint, 
DITM and JP Morgan were the parties to the agreement, but DITM used 
an off-shore Daehan Global Bond 2 Fund (“DGB2”) and JP Morgan 
used a paper company, Perana, for regulatory, legal, and financial 
purposes.463  In the CDS agreement, DITM assumed the role of 
protection seller while JP Morgan assumed the role of protection buyer.  
The emerging market basket note was the CLN,464 which granted the 
right to DITM to receive interest incurred every year and principal on 
the maturity date, based on credits from Latin American nations such as 
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.465  The agreement included a clause, 
however, whereby JP Morgan would not pay the principal or interest for 
the applicable part of the note if a credit event occurred in the related 
nations.466  If default had not occurred, the residual could have been one 
of the credit derivatives instruments under the CDS that would have 
been included in the maturity.467
On December 24, 2001, after the maturity date of the note, 
Argentina issued its debt moratorium.468  This declaration by Argentina 
 459. Id. ¶¶ 38, 40. 
 460. Id. ¶ 39. 
 461. Id. ¶¶ 63, 65. 
 462. See supra Part II.E; see also DITM Complaint, supra note 98, ¶ 9. 
 463. DITM Complaint, supra note 98, ¶¶ 4, 11. 
 464. See discussion supra Part II.D. 
 465. See DITM Complaint, supra note 98, ¶ 12. 
 466. Id. ¶ 27. 
 467. Id. ¶ 34. 
 468. EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 57. 
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constituted a credit event.  A problem emerged, however, when the 
Argentine government requested that domestic investors initiate a 
second swap, in which a $60 billion bond with an average interest rate of 
11 to 12 % would change to a 7% interest rate.469  Ostensibly, this was a 
voluntary restructuring since the investors in Argentina were not 
required to accept the new swap transaction. 
JP Morgan Chase Bank provided notification on December 7, 2001 
that it would not pay back the remaining interest and principal of $96 
million on the DGB2 fund because of the Argentine default.470  DITM 
objected to this, and brought suit in federal district court in New York in 
February 2002 for the payment of the $96 million principal and punitive 
damages of $100 million.471  The purpose of the suit was to request a 
declaratory remedy for the alleged wrongful acts of JP Morgan472 and 
for breach of contract with regard to the $96 million credit derivative 
instrument transaction473that was signed in 1996. 
1.  Background 
The swap agreements that EGMF and DITM each signed with JP 
Morgan were specific about the Argentine economic situation as it 
pertained to credit events.  Although different parties signed the 
agreements at different times, the relevant credit event remained the 
same.  The following addresses how the same credit event applies to 
these two cases, and how they were interpreted by the court. 
It is important to analyze the sovereign debt restructuring and 
development of Argentina’s crisis.  In 1992, the Argentine government 
adopted a monetary policy that pegged the peso to the United States 
dollar.474  As such, it induced almost revolutionary change in terms of 
economic policy and the financial market structure.475  “Thereafter, the 
 
 469. See Hornbeck, supra note 443, at 37. (“International bond rating agencies 
consider[ed] it an effective default.”).  The first debt swap was conducted on June 16-
17, 2001.  “The de la Rua government announces a $29.5 billion voluntary debt 
restructuring in which short-term debt is exchange[d] for new debt with longer 
maturities and higher interest rates.” Id. at 3. 
 470. See DITM Complaint, supra note 98, ¶ 35. 
 471. See id. ¶ 71. 
 472. See id. ¶¶ 67-70. 
 473. See id. ¶¶ 46-55. 
 474. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 14. 
 475. See Pham Anh et al., Argentina’s Sovereign Debts Restructuring and Creative 
Solutions 342 (on file with Princeton University). 
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international demand for Argentine investments increased dramatically 
to accommodate the Republic’s ambitious plans for economic 
development.”476  The same situation occurred in Ecuador in 1999, 
Russia in 1998, and Mexico in 1995.477  In 2001, Argentina became a 
“hot market” among sovereign debt investors wanting to reap the 
benefits of the economic situation.478  Several funds began aggressively 
investing in Argentina’s short-term sovereign debt while hedging via 
CDS transactions based on default risk.479  Contrary to Argentine hopes, 
the economy headed into a state of regression beginning in 1998.  This 
regression led to a cycle of decreases in tax revenue, peso prices edging 
downward, and drastic decreases in foreign currency reserves that 
followed a fixed FOREX exchange rate system. 
In the end, Argentina declared the need to restructure the $95 
billion in sovereign debt issued in late 2001 at high interest rates for 
relatively short maturity periods.480  During October and November of 
2001, numerous economic news sources and periodicals publicized 
Argentina’s proposed plans to re-adjust their debt.481  On November 1, 
2001, Fernando De la Rua, the President of Argentina, asked the 
creditors to extend the maturity period on the $95 billion in debt 
accompanied by lower interest rates.482  On November 6, 2001, the 
 476. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 14. 
 477. Id. ¶ 16. 
 478. Id. 
 479. Id. ¶ 18. 
 480. Id. ¶ 34. 
Sovereign debt restructurings differ from corporate debt restructurings for a host 
reasons, most of which do not stem from the absence of an international sovereign 
bankruptcy regime.  No firm issues its own currency, or indirectly backstops the 
banking system.  Sovereign debt is, typically a far more important asset in a country’s 
financial system than the debt of even a very large local firm, so a sovereign default is 
bound to be more disruptive than the default of a firm.  The magnitude of the set of 
problems that can be solved by introducing a completely new legal regime for 
sovereign debt restructuring is too small to justify imposing such a regime on 
reluctant creditors and debtors, with unknowable consequences. 
Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser, The Reform of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Process: Problems, Proposed Solutions and the Argentine Episode, 1 J. 
RESTRUCTURING FIN. 10-11 (2004) (citation omitted). 
 481. Jonathan Fuerbringer, International Business: Analysts Worry of Ripple Effect 
in Argentina’s Latest Debt Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2001, at C1; see also Kevin G. 
Hall, Argentina Seeks to Restructure All Its Debt: Nation Braces For Fallout of Asking 
For Lower Rate, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 29, 2001, at A2. 
 482. EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 33. 
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Argentine government announced the final restructuring plan.483  
According to this plan, residents of Argentina who owned an Argentine 
bond certificate were entitled to new bonds that paid 15% interest in 
exchange for longer-term securities that paid less than 7% of the 
maximum interest imposed.484  In the short run, “Argentina [had 
partially] succeeded in swapping its debt, its weight in the EMBI Global 
[Index had increased] from 1.9% to 2.7%.”485  According to the 
restructuring plan, the maturity date on these bonds extended three 
years, each en bloc.486
Argentina declared officially on November 19, 2001 that it intended 
to execute a voluntary debt exchange for domestic pension funds and for 
sovereign debt holders.487  This was a measure to extend the maturity of 
Argentina’s sovereign debt owned by domestic bondholders, as well as 
an attempt to lower the coupon rate.488  On December 1, 2001, a 
minimum of $40 billion of Argentine bonds held by domestic investors 
was repaid to the government as a guaranteed bond with a significantly 
longer maturity date and lower interest rate.489  Tax benefits were 
included as part of the restructuring plan. 
Argentina insisted that this type of debt restructuring would be 
voluntary rather than forced, and thus would not constitute a default.490  
Payment on Argentina’s public debt was suspended following Rodriguez 
Saa’s December 24, 2001 announcement.491  The financial markets 
agreed that this type of measure by the president was sufficient enough 
to trigger a credit event.  On December 7, 2001, JP Morgan notified 
Perana and DITM that default had occurred in Argentina.492  
 483. See Hornbeck, supra note 443, at 4. 
 484. See Argentina Announces Debt “Default” Plan, BBC NEWS, Nov. 2, 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1633369.stm. 
 485. Ray Hervandi, Argentina’s Debt Restructuring: The Dark Side of the Credit 
Market Revealed?, CROWDOUT, Mar. 14, 2005, http://longrun.typepad.com/crowdout/ 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2008). 
 486. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 42. 
 487. See id. ¶ 36. 
 488. See id. ¶ 34.  “Sovereign debt workouts typically involve issuing new debt for 
old, under more lenient conditions that allow a country to eventually recover its 
financial standing in the international community.” See Hornbeck, supra note 443, at 6. 
 489. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 42. 
 490. See Timeline: Argentina’s Financial Crisis, FOXNEWS.COM, Dec. 6, 2001, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,40274,00.html. 
 491. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 57. 
 492. DITM Complaint, supra note 98, ¶ 29. 
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Specifically, JP Morgan informed the companies that an event occurred 
on December 5, 2001 that was presumed to be a default based on 
Argentina’s reference portfolio.493
JP Morgan argued that, back in 1996, the term “restructuring” was 
used in a broader way when the transaction of credit derivatives 
instrument agreement was signed between the DGB2 fund and 
Perana.494  JP Morgan asserted that although the Argentine government 
averred the voluntary nature of the restructuring, it was essentially 
mandatory.495  JP Morgan further claimed that notice of the credit event 
was publicly available on the basis of five news articles from the 
Bloomberg terminal. 496 According to these allegations, the Argentine 
currency crisis should have been considered a credit event. 
Restructuring should be agreed upon by the reference entity, 
government authority, or the holders of the obligation, or, in the 
alternative, should be declared by a governmental authority in a 
mandatory form that binds the reference entity.  The 1999 ISDA 
definitions of a credit derivatives instrument do not include restructuring 
by the reference entity as a credit event if such restructuring is 
voluntary.497  Moreover, the definitions specify that only events that are 
involuntary or mandatory may constitute credit events.498  The 1999 
ISDA definitions, however, did not have a direct influence on the 
agreement that was signed by DPIM and JP Morgan.  At the time, 
Moody’s and other international credit rating agencies recognized that 
Argentina’s declaration of sovereign debt restructuring was technically a 
declaration of default.499
The 2001 terrorist attacks that worsened a recession in the United 
States served to exacerbate Argentina’s long-term economic 
 493. Id. 
 494. See id. ¶¶ 9, 11 (detailing the terms of the 1996 agreement between JP Morgan 
and Daehan). 
 495. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 37. 
 496. See DITM Complaint, supra note 98, ¶ 29. 
 497. Cf. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.9 (“‘Obligation Exchange’ 
means the mandatory transfer . . . of any securities, obligations, or assets to holders of 
Obligations in exchange for such Obligations.  When so transferred, such securities, 
obligations or assets will be deemed to be obligations.”). 
 498. See, e.g., 2003 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 427, § 4.9 (defining an 
“obligation exchange” as a “mandatory transfer of any securities, obligations or assets 
to holders of Obligations in exchange for such Obligations”). 
 499. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 44. 
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stagnation.500  The Argentine sovereign bond began to be transacted at 
below 40% of the U.S. dollar.  On October 30, 2001, S&P downgraded 
Argentina’s long-term sovereign credit rating from CCC+ to CC,501 junk 
bond status502—the same rating Ecuador received when it declared 
default in 1999.503  On October 12, 2001, S&P’s competitor, Moody’s, 
also lowered Argentina’s credit rating to Caa3.504  According to a survey 
conducted by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. targeting emerging 
market portfolio managers, 85% believed that Argentina’s declaration of 
default was inevitable.505  There was, however, an argument among the 
international credit rating agencies over whether a voluntary 
restructuring would lead to a default.506
Credit rating agencies generally set ratings for a bond once the 
terms of the agreement are satisfied.  Even though it is not clear that 
Argentina actually defaulted, it is clear that these terms do not apply in 
financial crises.  Accordingly, a logical conclusion is that Argentina was 
in a generalized state of default.  This analysis is based on the argument 
that the value of the new bond that is issued in exchange should be 
considered a default because even when the nominal value was greater 
than the current market value, the bond was impaired through 
government measures without proper compensation.507
Moody’s perspective varied little.  The argument about the timing 
of the default was merely an academic question.  Argentina’s Caa3 
rating had many characteristics of default even when it was technically 
not in a state of default, because investors knew the ramifications of a 
 500. See Jonathan Fuerbringer, Argentina May Restructure Its Debt, Risking 
Default, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2001, at C4. 
 501. See Bruno Boccara et al., Argentina Long-Term Sovereign Credit Rating 
Lowered to CC; Outlook Negative, STANDARD & POOR’S, Oct. 30, 2001, 
http://www.mecon.gov.ar/download/financiamiento/sp10-30-01i.pdf. 
 502. See generally Marie Cavanaugh, Sovereign Credit Characteristics by Rating 
Category, STANDARD & POOR’S, Nov. 19, 2003, 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/sovereigncreditcharacteristics.
pdf (noting that in bonds below the ‘B’ category there is a “clear and present danger of 
default”). 
 503. See VARMA, supra note 386, at 20 app. III. 
 504. See id. at 14 app. I. 
 505. Joshua Goodman, Now, Argentina’s Default Looks Inevitable, BUSINESSWEEK, 
Oct. 29, 2001, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_44/b37 
55149.htm. 
 506. See Fuerbringer, supra note 500. 
 507. See id. (reporting S&P’s statements on Oct. 16, 2007). 
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Caa3 rating.  Thus it can be concluded that Argentina’s Caa3 rating 
should not be considered a default, since it was a voluntary restructuring 
obligation, even though the obligation exchange was seemingly driven 
by the government and creditors were damaged from the plan. 
2.  Interpretation of Restructuring 
There are two basic approaches to interpretation of a restructuring 
that constitutes a credit event: the passive interpretation and the active 
interpretation.  There is also a modified approach that should be 
examined. 
(i)  Passive Approach 
The rationale for the passive approach is that definitions of 
agreements should not be ambiguous and should be explicit as they 
pertain to the terms of restructuring.508  Using the passive approach 
means that the interpretation of the voluntary restructuring is a legal 
issue to be decided by the courts with one literal meaning that accepts 
the contract objectively as it is defined.509  Because the Argentine 
government declared voluntary debt exchange,510 it might be mandatory 
in the economic sense, but legally it should be accepted as a voluntary 
obligation exchange in accordance with the wording of the agreement.  
This view holds that the court should not reinterpret the agreement 
among the two parties.511
“Traditionally, a heavily indebted country could either renegotiate 
with its creditors or unilaterally reschedule its debt simply by 
announcing the new terms.”512  During early December 2001, investors 
demanded that Argentina repay its $40 billion obligation; the 
government accepted all requests for repayment, eventually carrying out 
 508. This approach applied to defendant JP Morgan’s position. 
 509. Cf. Krumme v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc., 238 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Seiden Assoc. v. ANC Holdings, 959 F.2d 425, 428 (2d Cir.1992)) (discussing 
the principles of contract interpretation).
 510. EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 37. 
 511. See Grumman Allied Indus, v. Rohr Indus. Inc., 748 F.2d 729, 734 (2d Cir. 
1984) (holding that the court should not intervene in the contractual relationship of the 
two parties if the parties clearly laid out the risk in the agreement). 
 512. See Farisa Zarin, Sovereign Debt: What Happens if a Sovereign Defaults?, 
MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE, at 5 (July 2000) available at http://www.moodys.com/cus 
t/specialreport/SearchReportFSC.aspx?type=SOV [hereinafter Zarin, Sovereign Debt]. 
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a debt swap.513  Contrary to the way news agencies and credit rating 
agencies analyzed it,514 in the passive approach, Argentina’s debt swap 
was considered voluntary and did not constitute default.  Specifically, 
the declaration of default is not actually default since the government 
afforded added value by transferring tax revenues to the issued bond that 
compensated for the loss in interest. 
On November 19, 2001, the Argentine government requested the 
voluntary obligation exchange of pension fund and domestic 
bondholders, and allowed qualified bondholders to choose whether to 
demand that the government repay under the specific obligation 
terms.515  Argentina had unlimited discretion with regard to accepting or 
rejecting the demand for repayment.  Accordingly, obligation exchanges 
would have resulted only if the qualified bondholders demanded 
repayment and Argentina chose to accept the demand for repayment of 
the obligation.  This constituted voluntary restructuring since the 
obligation that was repaid was in a trust and the new bond would have 
been issued to the bondholder, regardless of who would have then made 
the demand for repayment.516
 513. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 36. 
 514. Id. ¶ 37. 
 515. Id. ¶ 36. 
 516. See HARALD FINGER ET AL., INT’L MONETARY FUND, CROSS-COUNTRY 
EXPERIENCE WITH RESTRUCTURING OF SOVEREIGN DEBT AND RESTORING DEBT 
SUSTAINABILITY 10, tbl. 3 (2006) (discussing that the restructuring was a debt for equity 
swap called a megaswap). 
Prior to the default in late 2001, two rounds of debt treatment were undertaken: [one 
is] a debt swap (megaswap) involving debt equivalent to 11% of GDP, followed by a 
restructuring of debt held mainly by domestic investors . . ., covering debt equivalent 
to 19% of GDP.  The November/December 2001 [the above] restructuring, completed 
under the imminent threat of default, did not involve any reduction in principal, but 
yielded a 32% [Net Present Value] reduction on restructured principal.  Given that the 
Phase I operation covered a larger portion of debt ($51 billion) than the megaswap 
($29.5 billion), together the two debt exchanges resulted in a net NPV reduction of 
approximately 10%. 
Id. at 15 tbl. 7 (formatting altered). 
During Phase I in December 2001, approximately $41 billion in sovereign debt and $9 
billion in provincial debt was exchanged into new government-guaranteed loans 
featuring a reduction of interest rates to 70% of the contractual level (up to a 
maximum of 7%), a 17–month grace period for interest payments, and a three-year 
extension of maturities for those original claims maturing up to 2010.  The exchange 
involved no reduction in principal. 
Id. at 48 annex II (formatting altered). 
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A scenario in which a debtor pursues restructuring through an 
obligation exchange is laid out in the 1999 ISDA restructuring credit 
event definition,517 and is clearly limited to mandatory exchanges.518  
Here, the fact that an agreement is not ambiguous means that the 
interpretation is a legal issue, and that the court should interpret it using 
its literal meaning. 
As a matter of law, the obligation exchange may satisfy the 
definition of restructuring only when a voluntary exchange is considered 
mandatory.519  Arguing whether an obligation exchange was actually 
voluntary, however, runs the risk of letting the courts decide the issue.  
This compels the tribunals to forecast whether interested parties will 
choose to participate in an obligation exchange, and to perform an 
economic analysis of the obligation exchange.  The passive approach 
stands for the belief that the explicit agreement will dictate whether a 
restructuring should be classified as mandatory or voluntary. 
If a party wanted to argue that a court’s decision should have been 
made based on questions about whether the obligation exchange is 
economically coercive or whether there is a practical alternative to debt 
swap, they would say that those questions should have been specified in 
advance by the agreement.  If the parties had intended to include clauses 
about what is a voluntary exchange and how such exchanges should be 
applied, they should do so in the agreement regardless of whether they 
were economically favorable to the creditor.  For example, it could be 
argued that the following should be included in the definition of an 
obligation exchange: “If there is a request for repayment of the bond for 
at least a certain amount with regard to the voluntary exchange, this is 
considered mandatory, and thus is within the scope of the obligation 
exchange.”  In order to be sufficiently forceful, a clearly codified 
exception clause to a voluntary obligation exchange should have been 
included for repayment of the voluntary obligation exchange due to 
economic coercion. 
Ostensibly, all obligation exchanges can appear mandatory.  
Moreover, all bondholders who are involved with the exchange of bonds 
tend to disclaim a valuable right in order to obtain a greater chance of 
recovery, even though there are lower profits because of the reference 
 517. See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, §§ 4.7(a), 4.9. 
 518. Id. § 4.9. 
 519. Id. 
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entity’s collapse.  In that case, some degree of economic pressure is 
inevitable.520
Even though “[h]istorically, investors in sovereign debt have been 
in a weak position because they were compelled to accept any new 
terms,”521 when there are no incentives, no bondholder would accept a 
lower interest rate or any of the prerequisites that are essential for the 
application under the 1999 ISDA definitions.  Accordingly, it is 
unnecessary to find a limiting meaning of the term “mandatory” that is 
used in section 4.9 of the ISDA definitions.522  During litigation, when a 
court tries to interpret this agreement, it should not let the agreed terms 
become worthless.  If the agreement between parties is re-interpreted by 
the court, the agreement itself could become unclear, further introducing 
uncertainty into the market.  Courts should dismiss the crafty intentions 
of the parties that are trying to have their contracts interpreted according 
to default definitions. 
The economic coercion test for restructuring does not apply to the 
risk seller and risk buyer who enter into a credit derivatives instrument 
transaction.  Specific clauses of the obligation exchange that were 
suggested by the Argentine government do not provide sufficient 
information that would allow for a determination of whether the 
suggestion was made to protect the buyer or coerce the protection seller.  
In fact, the question of whether economic coercion existed can be 
 520. See Farisa Zarin, Sovereign Restructurings: Putting Too Much Faith in Exit 
Consents, MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE, at 4 (2001) (citation omitted), 
http://www.moodys.com/cust/specialreport/SearchReportFSC.aspx?type=SOV 
(indicating that it is “both time-consuming and costly to argue with a sovereign).  Zarin 
states: 
If inevitable restructuring becomes hard reality, the sovereign begins the process by 
offering to exchange its old bonds for new debt which, generally speaking, have less 
favourable financial terms for the creditors.  Bondholders are “invited” to tender their 
existing bonds in exchange for new debt instruments.  Once the offer is accepted, the 
old bonds tendered and exchanged for new, the creditor in effect surrenders all of its 
rights under the original terms.  The duties and responsibilities of the sovereign 
toward the creditor, going forward, are those articulated in the new structure. . . . 
[T]he majority of bondholders are likely to participate in rescheduling. . . . But a few 
creditors will continue to hold the old bonds.  In most instances the holdouts are likely 
to be “sleepers”—creditors who inadvertently miss the exchange boat. In other more 
dubious cases, bondholders may deliberately refrain from tendering.  They instead can 
demand—and possibly extract—preferential payoffs after the close of the offer 
through legal threats. 
Id. 
 521.  Zarin, Sovereign Debt, supra note 512, at 6. 
 522. 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.9. 
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decided only by examining each specific bondholder, and individual 
situations must be factored in sufficiently.  Even when the demand for 
an obligation exchange could have been coerced regarding a bondholder, 
when one considers tax burdens and/or accounting standards, it might 
not have been coercive on other parties.  Thus, an unclear standard that 
is classified as economic coercion cannot become the standard under any 
circumstances, and applying subjective criteria under the pretext of 
objective criteria should not be tolerated. 
If a decision is made about how much economic pressure is 
sufficient to effectively transform a voluntary obligation exchange into a 
mandatory one, the conclusion will likely be different depending on who 
makes the decision.  Like EGMF and DITM, market participants who 
entered CDS agreements with the counterparty at the same time have 
come to rely upon contradictory decisions.  These types of conclusions 
may bring about more litigation and hotly contested disputes.  In fact, 
this might induce the exact scenario that the 1999 ISDA definitions 
hoped to prevent—lack of a clear idea of restructuring as it pertains to 
credit events. 
Unlike the transaction with the DITM, JP Morgan argued523 that 
although the Argentine government-conducted voluntary obligation 
exchanges, a credit event through restructuring did not take place.524  JP 
Morgan argued that the definition is limited to a mandatory obligation 
exchange as long as the restructuring, according to the 1999 ISDA 
documents, is enumerated as a form of credit event.525
Defendant JP Morgan contended that the obligation exchange in 
terms of definition can result only when this type of voluntary exchange 
is considered mandatory,526 and further argued that the plaintiff should 
not demand that the voluntary obligation exchange be redefined as 
mandatory by the courts since the actions taken by Argentina are clearly 
voluntary.527
EGMF then argued that despite the fact that the restructuring credit 
event defined in sections 4.7(a)(i), (iii), and (iv) of the 1999 ISDA 
definitions happened before December 17, 2001—the maturity date—JP 
 523. See generally Appellee Brief, supra note 440 (detailing JP Morgan’s arguments 
before the Second Circuit). 
 524. See id. at *8. 
 525. See id. 
 526. See id. at *15-16, *20-21. 
 527. See id. 
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Morgan did not make the payment that was required under the CDS 
agreement.528
(ii)  Active Approach 
The rationale of the active interpretation is that the obligation 
exchange requires swapping the obligations of the bondholders, whether 
they choose to or not, and regardless of whether the obligation exchange 
is controlled by the agreement.  The transfer of the instrument to the 
bondholders is achieved by order of the reference entity or government 
authority.  In short, this approach takes the view that these obligation 
exchanges forcibly transform the bond certificates into new notes.529
According to the 1999 ISDA definitions, restructuring includes 
unfavorable treatment such as interest or principal reduction, delay in 
payment, change of the currency for payment, and change of priority of 
obligation repayment during the liquidation or dissolution procedure.530  
These events, caused by aggravation of the reference entity’s payment 
capacity or financial condition, should not be included when this type of 
event does not take place.  In other words, despite the fact that a 
reference entity actually undergoes a mandatory obligation exchange, 
which is disguised as voluntary, it may qualify as a mandatory 
obligation exchange and be included as a credit event.  This becomes 
even clearer in light of the 2001 restructuring supplement to the 1999 
ISDA definitions.531  According to the supplement, a credit event is said 
to occur after a restructuring event if at least three holders and two-thirds 
of all holders have agreed to the restructuring.532
 528. See Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at *20, Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. 
v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 2003 WL 24072301 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 03-7652) 
[hereinafter Appellant Brief]. 
 529. See generally Appellant Brief, supra note 528 (setting forth plaintiff, EMGF’s 
position in the litigation). 
 530. See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.7(a). 
 531. See 2001 RESTRUCTURING SUPPLEMENT, supra note 330. 
 532. See id. § 4.10(b).  This section provides that: 
‘Multiple Holder Obligation’ means an Obligation that (i) at the time the Credit Event 
Notice is delivered, is held by more than three unaffiliated holders and (ii) with 
respect to which a percentage of holders (determined pursuant to the terms of the 
Obligation) at least equal to sixty-six-and–two-thirds is required to consent to the 
event which would otherwise constitute a Restructuring Credit Event. 
Id. 
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To determine whether the voluntary restructuring measures taken 
by Argentina were in fact coerced, it is essential to understand the facts 
on the ground in December 2001, when “Argentina, due to its rigid 
monetary regime and fiscal structure, slid into the largest-ever sovereign 
default at the end of 2001.”533  Since January 2001, “[A]rgentina’s 
economy [has] seemed to be teetering on the brink of collapse.”534  From 
March 2001, “investors [became] increasingly skeptical of [the 
Argentine] government’s ability to revive the economy.”535  In July 
2001, hedge fund investors began to speculate about the default that 
Argentina appeared to face.536  From July to September 2001, “there 
[were] fears that a widespread sell-off in emerging currencies could 
spark a broader financial crisis”537 and international financial news 
immediately published that the speculation into Argentine default was 
now a warning.538  On August 28, 2001, JP Morgan acknowledged the 
financial turmoil in Argentina.539  As one analyst noted, “[T]he key 
question for investors now [was] whether Argentina [would] default or 
restructure its debts.”540  On October 31, 2001, JP Morgan, in an e-mail 
message to HWF Capital, entitled “scenario in case of restructuring,” 
expressed that the possibility of restructuring had increased to “a high 
implied probability of restructuring” and that the bondholders would 
possibly recover only a part of their investment when their bonds were 
swapped into new bonds.541  On November 2, 2001, the Argentine 
government officially declared that the voluntary obligation exchange 
would be provided to domestic bondholders and pension funds, “which 
many analysts regard[ed] as a technical default.”542  Of the total amount 
 533. See David Levey, Sovereign Rating History, Moody’s Investor Service, Special 
Comment at 3 (2002). 
 534. See Argentina Switch Rattles Currencies, BBC NEWS, June 19, 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1397193.stm. 
 535. See Political Turmoil in Argentina, BBC NEWS, Mar. 4, 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1201074.stm. 
 536. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 32. 
 537.  Currency Nerves Hit Emerging Markets, BBC NEWS, July 9, 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1429957.stm. 
 538. EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 32. 
 539. Id. ¶ 33.  “Argentina initially juggled its debt dilemma by putting off private 
bondholders while negotiating with the IMF.” Hornbeck, supra note 443, at 7. 
 540. Argentina’s Economy Set to Shrink, BBC NEWS, Sept. 1, 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1520268.stm. 
 541. EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 33. 
 542. Argentina Announces Debt “Default” Plan, supra note 484. 
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of Argentina’s sovereign debt ($132 billion), this amount corresponded 
to between $40 and $50 billion.543  De la Rua implored the bondholders 
to readjust their bonds into ones with lower interest rates and longer 
maturity,544 causing many analysts to say that the coercive nature of the 
bond swap made it a default in all but name.545  The measures taken by 
Argentina, Latin America’s third largest economy, constituted the 
largest sovereign debt default since 1824.546  In fact, “[S&P] warned that 
it might downgrade Argentina’s sovereign credit rating again, depending 
on the losses bondholders suffer in the debt swap.”547
The government’s restructuring plan changed the contractual 
arrangements of the debts, which decreased the value of the investments 
of domestic bondholders.548  The news media and credit rating agencies 
implied that the voluntary obligation exchange was essentially a default, 
and that domestic creditors had no real choice but to accept the 
voluntary obligation exchange.549
Although the Argentine government purported the restructuring to 
be voluntary,550 the obligation exchange was actually economically 
coercive.  The domestic bondholders to whom the “suggestion” was 
issued had no real choice but to give in.  A news article on the emerging 
market describes the “Hobson’s choice”551 proposed to the investors as 
follows: 
Significant volume bondholders do NOT have an alternative but to 
participate in the swap.  Not doing so is to shoot themselves dead.  If 
 543. EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 36. 
 544. Id. ¶ 33. 
 545. Argentina Announces Debt “Default” Plan, supra note 484. 
 546. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 34; see also Hornbeck, supra note 
443, at 1. 
 547. Argentina Announces Debt “Default” Plan, supra note 484.  One should 
generally “note that a credit rating is not a recommendation to buy (or equally, sell) a 
particular bond, nor is it a comment on market expectations.” CHOUDHRY, supra note 
56, at 11. 
 548. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 35. 
 549. Id. 
 550. Argentina Announces Debt “Default” Plan, supra note 484 (“President de la 
Rua said the bond swap will be voluntary, but gave no details to how it would be 
achieved.”); see also Hornbeck, supra note 443, at 2 (showing that, in fact, the 
Argentine government has reasoned that the voluntary participants in restructuring 
plans are only the International Financial Institutions such as IMF, World Bank, which 
have continued to lend to republic Argentina, and those creditors). 
 551. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 50. 
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they participate they still have at least a shot of things working out . . 
. . [T]hey are given par to par without having to undergo the painful 
process of having to mark their brand new loans down.552
If individual bondholders refused the debt swap, according to one 
source, the Argentine financial authority planned to provide pressure by 
threatening an audit in the near future,553 which was bound to have 
significant damages554 as “[f]ears [were] still growing that three years of 
economic stagnation [w]ould leave the country without the funds to pay 
its [astronomical] debt.”555  The gun was pointed at the domestic 
bondholders’ heads.556  Including a “package of measures designed to 
bolster the country’s economy,” the voluntary obligation exchange 
provided by the Argentine government forced them to choose from 
“only one path.”557  The only choices they had were to accept the 
restructuring that came with payment protection, and which had a lower 
interest rate, longer maturity, and was supported with tax revenue, or to 
retain the bonds and face severe loss due to the revision of Argentine 
law.558  Regardless of whether rational standards or common sense was 
applied, this was mandatory and in line with the purpose as described 
under the ISDA definitions, so accepting the terms was an economic 
necessity.559  If the terms were denied, then creditors who were already 
saddled with loss would have ended up in economic destruction.560  
Moreover, contrary to JP Morgan’s statement, the so-called “debt swap” 
did not include cancelling the bond obligation.561  Bonds were included 
in a trust used to protect the performance of the government in the form 
of modified bonds.562  Payment of the bonds changed so that the bonds 
could be returned in case of Argentina’s default.563  Thus, investors felt 
 552. Id. 
 553. See id. ¶ 51. 
 554. See id. 
 555. Argentina Minister Appeals for Calm, BBC NEWS, July 13, 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1436129.stm. 
 556. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 51. 
 557. See id. ¶ 52; see also Argentina Debt Sparks Foreign Fears, BBC NEWS, July 
12, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1434592.stm. 
 558. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 52. 
 559. Id. 
 560. Id. 
 561. Id. ¶ 53. 
 562. Id. 
 563. See id. 
786 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XIII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
that this government-driven “restructuring” plan was a default in all but 
name. 
EGMF sent a third notice of default on December 12, 2001, but JP 
Morgan once again denied that a credit event had occurred, but did so 
without any back-up or rational explanation.564  JP Morgan provided the 
following to EGMF on December 27, 2001: 
This letter is our Credit Event Notice to you that a 
“Repudiation/Moratorium” Credit Event occurred with respect to the 
Reference Entity [Argentina] on or about December 24, 2001 when 
the Reference Entity declared a moratorium, whether de facto or de 
jure, with respect to one or more Obligations in an aggregate amount 
of not less than the Default Requirement.  This letter also comprises 
our Notice of Publicly Available Information with respect to this 
Credit Event.565
On December 24, 2001, Argentina’s interim President Rodriguez 
Saa declared in his inaugural speech that the time allowed for payment 
of interest and principal on Argentina’s foreign obligations would be 
extended.566  In detail, the Argentine government declared that it would 
immediately delay payment of the principal and interest on all foreign 
debts, and that “devaluation and dollarization were not under 
consideration.”567  Both President De la Rua and Domingo Cavalo, 
Argentina’s Minister of Economy, were dishonorably discharged in 
December 2001, and the Argentine economy subsequently collapsed.568
The Argentine government “defaulted on billions of dollars in 
public obligations,” and gave up the fixed FOREX exchange rate system 
that was linked to the U.S. dollar.569  This, in turn, led to the devaluation 
of Argentina’s peso.  Stringent restrictions on withdrawal of bank 
deposits led the new president, Eduardo Duhalde, to refer to the situation 
as a bloodbath.570  All of these events were the by-product of the 
economic crisis that swept the nation in 2001, causing Argentina to 
 564. See id. ¶ 54. 
 565. Id. ¶ 56. 
 566. See id. ¶ 57. 
 567. See Lopez, supra note 442, at 2. 
 568. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 60. 
 569. See id. ¶ 60. 
 570. Id. 
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restructure its billions of U.S. dollars in public debts during November 
and early December 2001.571
A claimant, who demanded active interpretation of the 
restructuring, argued that numerous credit rating agencies concluded that 
Argentina’s obligation exchange amounted to a default on the bond and 
that the restructuring took place due to government threats.572  Although 
exchanged obligation is protected by Argentina’s tax revenue, it meant 
that these bonds were placed on an inferior level compared to all other 
bonds of the same class.573  Based on this claimant’s argument, 
Argentina’s restructuring satisfied the conditions of the credit event 
occurrence. 
In response to EGMF’s notification to JP Morgan that a credit event 
had occurred, JP Morgan stated that the Obligation Exchange declared 
by Argentina did not actually constitute a credit event because “[t]he 
Domestic Exchange was not mandatory, it was not, as a matter of law, 
an Obligation Exchange.”574  Therefore, under JP Morgan’s theory, the 
parties were not bound to any duty under the payment clause in the 
agreement. 
In their second notice to JP Morgan, EGMF argued that Argentina 
undertook a restructuring, and thus a credit event occurred according to 
the 1999 ISDA Definition sections 4.7 and 4.9.575  EGMF provided the 
following as proof: 
(i) numerous debt rating agencies had concluded that Argentina’s 
‘debt exchange’ constituted a default on the Republic’s dollar-
denominated bonds; (ii) the restructuring was conducted under 
threats by the Argentine government, and (iii) the amended or 
‘exchanged,’ obligations were now secured by Argentine tax 
deposits, thereby effectively subordinating all remaining obligations 
of the same class.576
JP Morgan again refused payment of the premium under the swap 
agreement clause.  Instead, in a letter dated December 3, 2001, JP 
Morgan insisted that, under restructuring, as it is defined by the ISDA, 
the situation in Argentina was never voluntary and thus fell outside the 
 571. See id. ¶ 61. 
 572. See id. ¶ 40. 
 573. See id. 
 574. Appellee Brief, supra note 440, at *16. 
 575. See EGMF Complaint, supra note 444, ¶ 40. 
 576. Id. 
788 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XIII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
scope of a credit event.577  JP Morgan argued that protection of the 
securing bond of the same class as a result of the obligation exchange 
merely turned the remaining bonds into a lower priority, but did not 
change their priority upon payment.578  EGMF, however, responded that 
these types of arguments neglected the clear realities of Argentina’s 
restructuring.579
(iii)  Modified Approach 
Ignoring the market participant’s arguments, ISDA continues to 
employ its modified version of the Credit Derivatives Definitions, which 
preserves the definition of a restructuring credit event by discarding a 
few sections and both modifying and inserting words. 
Prior to creating its 1999 definitions, ISDA declared that 
restructuring (“old-R”) is a credit event580 that triggers existing swap-
contract termination where it makes “the terms of the reference 
obligation ‘materially less favorable’ to the creditor (or protection seller) 
from an economic perspective.”581  “The original 1999 ISDA 
[definitions] defined restructuring [“origin-R”] among the standard 
credit events582 without containing the direct materiality clause and the 
five specified conditions included in the definitions.”583  This definition 
aimed to remove vagueness, but was still open to more than one 
interpretation, and created fierce arguments when courts aimed to 
determine whether a credit event had occurred.584  Thus, in order to 
 577. Id. ¶ 41. 
 578. Id. 
 579. Id. 
 580. See Conrad G. Bahlke & Paul N. Watterson, Jr., Credit Derivatives 2000: 
Legal and Regulatory Update, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Apr. 2000, at 7, 
available at http://www.srz.com/publications/publicationsDetail.aspx?publicationId=13 
89 (introducing “Confirmation of OTC Credit Swap Transaction Single Reference 
Entity – Non-Sovereign” a/k/s 1998 ISDA Long Form Confirmation); see also Taking 
Stock of Derivatives: Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC Face Uncertain Futures 
FAS 133 Arrives in Y2k, CAPITAL STROOCK MARKETS (Stroock & Stroock & Lavan 
LLP, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 2000, at 7, http://www.stroock.com/SiteFiles/Pub87.pdf. 
 581. CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 47. 
 582. Id. at 48. 
 583. See id. at 47-48; supra note 360 and accompanying text. 
 584. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 48. 
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reduce disputes, ISDA promulgated the Restructuring Supplement 
(“Modified Restructuring” “Mod-R”).585
The Mod-R definitions stipulated more precise conditions than the 
prior version.  Included within the definition was any action that brought 
a “reduction in the amount of principal”586 and “limited the term to 
maturity of deliverable obligations” in the portfolio.587  The Mod-R was 
intended to reduce the conflict between the parties to the agreement.  
Unfortunately, however, when the reference obligation in the credit 
derivatives swap agreement was sovereign debts, the Mod-R clause was 
not usually included.  Furthermore, “[i]t is now viewed as a risk that all 
forms of the Restructuring Credit Event could create a conflict of 
interest for bank lenders who are also [taking] long protection 
[positions].”588  For this reason, even well-developed U.S. derivatives 
markets have strongly supported erasing the Restructuring Credit Event 
completely from the definitions.589
Nevertheless, the Mod-R, which has now been consolidated into the 
2003 ISDA definitions (“Mod-Mod-R”), has been used widely in U.S. 
derivatives markets.590  In fact, subsequent to the introduction of the 
Mod-R, a divergent derivatives business was transacted, subject to these 
clauses.591
When incorporated by ISDA, Mod-R contains several restructuring-
related supplemental clauses, including section 4.10(b) of the Multiple 
Holder Obligation (“MHO”).592  This section requires that “the 
Restructuring Credit Event can occur only with respect to an obligation . 
. . [when it is] held by more than three holders that are not Affiliates of 
each other, at the time the Credit Event Notice is delivered.”593  It 
further stipulates that “with respect to [the] percentage of holders 
(determined pursuant to the terms of the Obligation) at least equal to 
 585. FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 70. 
 586. See CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 47-48. 
 587. Id. at 48 (“[I]n practice this has placed a maturity limit on deliverable 
obligations of 30 months.”). 
 588.  FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 72. 
 589. Id.; see BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 295 (“[M]ost market participants point to the 
Conseco case . . . as a major catalyst of the debate that culminated with the adoption of 
a new set of provisions regarding restructuring in CDS contracts.”). 
 590. FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 70. 
 591. See id. 
 592. See, e.g., 2001 RESTRUCTURING SUPPLEMENT, supra note 330, § 4.10(b). 
 593. Id. § 4.10(b)(i). 
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sixty-six–and–two-thirds is required to consent to the event which would 
otherwise constitute a Restructuring Credit Event.”594
Mod-R extends its scope of application into all types of 
restructuring in the Mod-Mod-R Definitions595 and amends the prior 
restructuring definitions to remove any reference to Obligation 
Exchange.596
The 2003 [ISDA] Definitions offer parties four choices relating to 
Restructuring: (i) trade without Restructuring [“no-R”]; (ii) trade 
with “full” Restructuring [“origin-R”], with no modification to the 
Deliverable Obligations aspect; (iii) trade with “Modified 
Restructuring” [“Mod-R”], as has been market practice in North 
America since the publication of the Restructuring Supplement in 
May 2001; or (iv) trade with “Modified Modified Restructuring” 
[“Mod-Mod-R”], which is a new provision, generally aimed to 
address issues raised in the European market.597
Under the origin-R definitions, the obligation exchange caused 
restructurings and the obligation’s underlying terms did not actually 
change, but protection sellers were subject to a “mandatory” exchange 
into other bonds that treated the bonds less favorably regarding both 
maturity and interest rate.598
The 2003 ISDA definitions provided further clarification by 
replacing opaque language, stating that “the restructuring credit event 
had to be binding on ‘all’ holders of the restructured debt.”599  
Furthermore, the Mod-Mod-R definitions repealed both the concept of 
obligation exchange and the mandatory requirement of the exchange.600  
Instead, restructuring only applies when the following conditions are 
met: 
With respect to one or more Obligation, and in relation to aggregate 
amount of not less than the Default Requirement, any one or more of 
 594. Id. § 4.10(b)(ii). 
 595. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 70. 
 596. Id. at 63. 
 597. Press Release, ISDA, ISDA Publishes 2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives 
Definitions (Feb. 11, 2003), http://www.isda/org/press/index.html. 
 598. See FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 69. 
 599. CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 49; 2003 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 427, § 
4.7(a) (emphasis added). 
 600. See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.9 (defining obligation 
exchange). 
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the following events occurs, (i) is agreed between the Reference 
Entity or a Governmental Authority and a sufficient number of 
holders of such Obligation to bind all holders of the Obligation or (ii) 
is announced (or otherwise decreed) by a Reference Entity or a 
Governmental Authority in a form that is binding upon all the 
holders of such Obligation, and (iii) such event is not expressly 
provided for under the terms of such Obligation in effect as of the 
later of the Trade Date and the date as of which such Obligation is 
issued or incurred:601
The Mod-Mod-R did not provide a substitute to “voluntary” 
sovereign debt restructurings, however, and without a multiple action 
clause in its definitions, a restructuring credit event cannot be triggered 
on a reluctant minority of creditors.602  Thus, under this section, “a 
voluntary [obligation] exchange would not trigger a restructuring credit 
event unless and until all [bond]holders tendered their obligations.”603  
One possible interpretation of this analysis is that if all bondholders 
individually agree to the restructuring plans without coercion and accept 
the given conditions by tendering their bonds regardless of damages, it 
might trigger a credit event.604  This situation is unlikely, however, 
given that it is impossible for every bondholder to participate in a debt 
exchange.605
For these reasons, the Mod-Mod-R definitions are similar to the 
origin-R definitions under the de facto test.606  Therefore, the voluntary 
debt exchange will not trigger a credit event even under up-to-date 
definitions.607  Many swap market participants learned that it is difficult 
to objectively distinguish between voluntary and mandatory obligation 
exchanges, as evidenced in EGMF.608  Reflecting such understanding, 
voluntary obligation exchanges were excluded from the origin-R 
definition. 
Additionally, market participants prefer to exclude voluntary 
restructurings because if such definitions were included as part of the 
 601. 2003 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 427, § 4.7(a). 
 602. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Credit Derivatives and the Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Process 71 (Apr. 27, 2004)  (Harvard Law School Int’l Fin. Seminar) (on 
file with author), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pifs/pdfs/pierre_verdier.pdf. 
 603. Id. 
 604. See id. 
 605. See id. 
 606. See id. 
 607. Id. 
 608. See id. 
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credit events list, protection buyers would be reluctant to enter into 
derivatives transactions due to the attendant uncertainty.609  
Furthermore, after successful restructuring, protection sellers would 
change their investment strategy because of the significantly 
downgraded obligations.  On the other hand, since restructuring plans 
are usually carried out by bondholders at large, most unsecured 
bondholders are reluctant to accede to the given terms.  In fact, this 
problematic scenario might not arise because of the small number of 
secured bondholders who would free-ride on the government or 
institutions-driven debt restructuring schemes.  Consequently, “even as 
the sovereign credit derivatives market gradually migrates to the 2003 
ISDA definitions, the distortion in restructuring incentives created by 
these instruments will endure.”610 Ultimately, a credit event would be 
triggered by a prior default even under the Mod-Mod-R definitions in a 
sovereign pre-default restructuring context.  The real question that needs 
to be asked, therefore, is: If the protection buyer and protection seller 
use the multiple holder obligation clause on their credit derivatives 
transaction, would the voluntary sovereign debt restructuring effectively 
trigger a credit event? 
It is generally understood that “[t]he changes in [contractual] terms 
adopted as part of a restructuring normally fit one or more of the events 
listed in the restructuring definition.”611  Therefore, under either the 
origin-R612 or Mod-Mod-R613 definitions, “[MHO] restructurings . . . 
[clauses] are prima facie covered by the restructuring definition.”614  It is 
important to note, however, both definitions may be excluded if the 
 609. See id. at 71-72. 
 610. Id. at 72. 
 611. Id. 
 612. See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.7(a).  “The origin-R 
Definitions cover events that are agreed [upon] between the Reference Entity . . . and 
the holder or holders of such Obligation.” Id. 
 613. See 2003 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 427, § 4.7(a).  The Mod-Mod-R 
Definitions more clearly define that if the terms “are agreed between the Reference 
Entity . . . and a sufficient number of holders of such Obligation to bind all holders of 
the Obligation” and it constitute restructuring credit event. Id. 
 614. Verdier, supra note 602, at 73. 
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parties did not expressly include this in their agreement.615  Based on 
this approach, “no restructuring credit event would be triggered.”616
Even with such an interpretation, there are different arguments as to 
why this approach ought to be dismissed.617  One commentator, who 
analyzed the drafters’ intentions, stated that the drafters clearly did not 
intend to exclude the collective action clause and the origin-R does not 
expressly describe collective action clauses.618  The true reason is that 
derivatives market practices vary slightly between the United States and 
Europe.619  Considering the drafters’ knowledge of this fact, one can 
conclude that the absence of MHO clauses in the definitions can trigger 
the restructuring if their application was intentionally excluded.620  This 
outcome is even clearer under the Mod-R and Mod-Mod-R definitions.  
As seen above, “voluntary [obligation] exchanges do not trigger the 
clause.”621  Therefore, it can only be assumed that “the drafters must 
have been incorporating the use” of MHO clauses.622
By adopting MHO clauses,623 the drafters presumably intended to 
erase the holdout creditor problem and solve the restructuring problem 
in a collective manner that “otherwise makes restructurings difficult or 
impossible.”624  It has been said that “[t]he adoption [of MOH clauses in 
the Mod-R and Mod-Mod-R definitions] is seen as a market-based 
alternative to a more elaborate international bankruptcy regime,”625 
where the sovereign has no bankruptcy proceedings.  It is not surprising, 
 615. See 1999 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 16, § 4.7(a) (1999).  Note that the 
2003 Definitions contain a substantially identical clause, but use the adverb “expressly.” 
See 2003 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 427, § 4.7(a). 
 616. See Verdier, supra note 602, at 73. 
 617. See id. 
 618. See id. 
 619. See id. at 73-74 (arguing that regardless of ISDA Definitions, “[b]onds issued 
in London, both corporate and sovereign, routinely include collective action clauses, 
and these provisions are frequently used to implement restructurings”). 
 620. See id. at 74. 
 621. Id. 
 622. See id. 
 623. See id. (indicating that these clauses allow a supermajority of holders to bind 
the minority to the financial terms of a restructuring). 
 624. See id. 
 625. Id. at 73; see, e.g., John B. Taylor, Under Sec’y of Treasury for Int’l Affairs, 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S. Perspective, Speech at the Conference 
“Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards” (Apr. 2, 2002) (Inst. for Int’l Econ., 
Washington, D.C.), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/print.cfm?doc= 
pub&ResearchID=455. 
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however, that if MHO clauses control the credit derivatives agreement, 
“the protection buyer’s argument that the [obligation] exchange is in fact 
involuntary is stronger, because the [debt] restructuring can be enforced 
against him even if he votes against it.”626  Indeed, “even if a protection 
buyer votes for a restructuring, some coercion still occurs, as the 
[restructuring] negotiations are conducted under the shadow of the . . . 
[MHO clause’s] potential utilization.”627
Thus far, no data or reports indicate that MHO clauses have been 
used in actual restructurings in the marketplace.  Excluding such clauses 
from credit event definitions would “dilute their effect,”628 however, 
with the desire that the restructuring will fail and the reference entity 
“will default, thus triggering the credit event.”629  Obviously, the current 
argument about restructuring would be somewhat alleviated by the 75% 
or 85% super-majority voting prong under MHO clauses, as an 
alternative to the de facto prong voluntary debt exchange.630
3.  Suggested Approach 
The concepts of default and credit event occurrence are not 
considered the same.  As the case of Conseco shows, a credit event is a 
priority concept that includes default.631  Even when default does not 
 
 626. Verdier, supra note 602, at 75. 
 627. Id. 
 628. See id. 
 629. Id. 
 630. See id. 
 631. See BOMFIM, supra note 1, at 294 (summarizing the consequences of the 
Conseco case).  A brief history of the restructuring of Conseco Inc. is as follows: 
In October 2000, [in order to overcome a deteriorating financial outlook], the 
company and its [lending] bankers agreed to a restructuring of its [outstanding] loans, 
which included an extension of maturity [under the higher interest rate charge and add 
extra collateralization].  In the bank loan market [arena] this was not seen particularly 
as a credit negative as it headed off a potential liquidity crisis.  [Because such a 
restructuring helps Conseco’s currently impending liquidity crunch].  However, some 
bankers who had bought protection on Conseco gave notice of restructuring and then 
delivered long-dated bonds, which were trading significantly lower than the 
restructured bank loans.  This outcome was viewed negatively by protection Sellers 
who were not expecting to suffer an economic loss on a “soft” Credit Event that was a 
result of credit deterioration but fell short of a full default or bankruptcy. 
FRANCIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 70.  “Under the modified restructuring definition, 
where the triggering event is restructuring, the delivered obligation cannot have a 
maturity that is longer than the original maturity date of the credit derivative contract, or 
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actually take place, a credit event may occur when the conditions for 
payment on the CDS agreement are satisfied.632
On November 6, 2001, S&P and Pitch lowered the credit rating of 
the Argentine bonds, stating that Argentina’s domestic restructuring plan 
constituted a partial default.633  At the time, S&P announced publicly 
that it would lower the rating on the investments made on Argentina’s 
existing obligations to the default level.634  In other words, credit rating 
agencies defined this event as a de facto default. 
The 1999 ISDA definitions were intended to classify what 
constitutes a credit event because certainty and objectivity are extremely 
important factors when laying out the parameters of what constitutes a 
credit event.635  When the scope of the credit event is divided, it is 
necessary that it be interpreted narrowly using the literal meaning; it also 
means staying away from analogical interpretation after the fact.  In the 
past, the credit event occurred automatically, even without default, 
because a credit event is a broader concept than restructuring.  As time 
passed, however, it was interpreted more narrowly.636
Further review is required to determine whether the voluntary 
restructuring that occurred in Argentina in 2001 should be perceived as a 
de facto state of default, which would result in conditions for payment in 
accordance with the credit agencies’ interpretation.  To determine 
whether de facto events of default took place in Argentina, it is 
important to understand what kind of default the parties had in mind at 
the time of the agreement. 
When DITM signed the agreement with JP Morgan in 1996, they 
used an earlier ISDA definition regarding what restructuring would 
constitute a credit event.  After defining credit event in 1999, ISDA 
more than 30 months after the original maturity date.” CHOUDHRY, supra note 56, at 48 
n.9. 
 632. See supra note 362 and accompanying text. 
 633. See Kathryn M.E. Dominguez & Linda L. Tesar, International Borrowing and 
Macroeconomic Performance in Argentina 25, Univ. of Mich. and NBER (Nov. 30, 
2004; revised Feb. 14, 2005), http://www-personal.umich.edu/~ltesar/pdf/NBER2005.p 
df. 
 634. See Geert Bekaert & Campbell R. Harvey’s Chronology of Economic, Political 
and Financial Events in Emerging Markets, http://www.duke.edu/~charvey/Country_ris 
k/chronology/argentina.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). 
 635. See Pollack, supra note 337, at 45. 
 636. See 2003 ISDA DEFINITIONS, supra note 427, § 4.9 (indicating evidence that 
ISDA repealed the original section 4.9 definitions and transplanted a different, narrower 
standard). 
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continued to focus on narrowing the scope of application of the credit 
event.  Accordingly, based on the 1999 ISDA definition of a credit 
event, CDS agreements that were signed by United States hedge funds 
like EGMF and JP Morgan should be interpreted narrowly and passively 
in accordance with the Master Agreement when determining the scope 
of application for the credit event.  In the meantime, the definition of 
restructuring related to the DGB2 fund that existed prior to the ISDA 
definitions should be used in a more comprehensive manner.637  
Although the credit event referred to by the agreement between hedge 
funds and DGB2 funds leads to the same crisis because of Argentina’s 
restructuring, it could be construed differently.  Although JP Morgan 
insists that a credit event did not occur under the agreement, a credit 
event would have occurred under the agreement if it were a DGB2 fund. 
C.  Aon Financial Products 
1.  Background 
Ursa Minor Ltd. (“Ursa”) is a Cayman Islands company, while 
Bankers Trustee Company Ltd. (“Bankers”) and Bear Stearns 
International Ltd. (“BSIL”) are both English businesses.638
On February 4, 1999, BSIL signed an agreement for a loan in the 
amount of $9,307,000, with Ecobel Land, Inc. (“Ecobel”), a Philippines 
company that sought to construct a high rise condominium.639  As a 
requirement of this agreement, Ecobel had to procure a surety bond 
protected by the government, and the Philippine government had to 
guarantee payment to the creditor, BSIL.640
 
 637. Cf. Pollack, supra note 337, at 45. 
Even if the Restructuring definition was revised to only capture distressed exchanges . 
. . such an objective definition will still create areas of unmatched risk hedging.  For 
example, protection sellers may manipulate the termination of a credit default swap by 
prematurely triggering at a time when such a result maximizes their financial gain.  
Therefore, regardless of whether the Restructuring definition is redefined to eliminate 
more subjective restructurings, the definition will still lead to less than complete credit 
protection. 
Id. 
 638. Complaint ¶¶ 6-7 Aon Fin. Prods., Inc. v. Societe Generale, 2000 WL 
34015582 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) Nos. 00CIV. 5863, 00CIV 2474. 
 639. Id. ¶ 9. 
 640. See id. ¶ 10. 
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On February 4, 1999, BSIL and Aon Financial Products (“AFP”) 
signed a CDS agreement.641  A little over a month later, on March 8, 
1999, AFP and Societe Generale signed a second CDS agreement as 
additional security for AFP’s undertakings with BSIL.642  The 
agreement enumerated what constituted a credit agreement.643
According to the agreement, AFP agreed to pay BSIL when a credit 
event occurred, in this instance meaning if the loan was not paid by the 
Philippine government.644  Detailed information about the credit event 
under the agreement is as follows: (i) lack of authority or capacity 
regarding the loan agreement or surety bond, (ii) the inability to 
perform, illegality, or a void of the loan agreement or surety bond, and 
(iii) default as a result of an applicable law, order, regulation, decree, or 
notice.645
On March 26, 1999, AFP, BSIL, Ursa and Bankers signed the 
assignment and assumption agreement.646  In this agreement, BSIL 
transferred all rights dictated under the credit swap agreement to Ursa, 
with the other parties agreeing.647  Ursa designated Bankers as trustee, 
and assigned all rights under the agreement to Bankers.648
On March 11, 1998, GSIS issued a surety bond with the Philippine 
Veterans Bank as creditor, naming Ecobel as the principal debtor.649  
The surety bond was to be transferred to BSIL on February 10, 1999.650  
The surety bond was never issued to BSIL, however, and was not 
assigned or transferred to the Philippine Veterans Bank.651
Ecobel, the principal debtor, intended to default on or about March 
1, 2000.652  Thus, Bankers notified Ecobel by facsimile on March 7, 
2000 of the failure to pay.653  They also notified GSIS to provide 
payment according to the loan agreement.654  On the same day, Bankers 
 641. Id. ¶ 11. 
 642. See id. ¶ 12. 
 643. See id. ¶ 14. 
 644. Id. ¶ 13. 
 645. Id. ¶ 14. 
 646. Id. ¶ 16. 
 647. Id. ¶ 17. 
 648. Id. 
 649. Id. ¶ 19. 
 650. Id. ¶ 20. 
 651. Id. ¶ 21. 
 652. See id. ¶ 24. 
 653. Id. ¶ 25. 
 654. Id. ¶ 26. 
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notified AFP of this event, and advised that they intended to pursue a 
claim following the credit swap agreement.655  This notice said that 
Bankers would not get any repayment from GSIS or Ecobel, and that 
GSIS did not duly authorize the issuance of a surety bond, and none was 
transferred.656
BSIL subsequently requested that AFP make payment as originally 
agreed under the credit swap agreement.657  On March 10, 2000, Aon 
replied that there was no failure to pay because it was yet to be 
determined whether this was, in fact, a credit event.658
On March 15, 2000, GSIS notified BSIL and Ecobel that the surety 
bond issued for the Philippine Veterans Bank had been cancelled.659  
Accordingly, because the obligee had not joined this event, no 
assignment occurred, and a reference obligation did not exist under the 
credit swap agreement.660  At the same time, it induced a dispute about 
whether a credit event occurred.661
A week later, on March 22, 2000, AFP brought a declaratory 
judgment suit against BSIL and Ursa asserting that AFP was obligated 
to the surety bond in accordance with the credit swap agreement.662  If 
AFP was to lose the litigation, Societe Generale would have to provide 
reimbursement.663  On the same day, Aon notified Societe Generale of 
the credit event and requested immediate payment.664
On March 31, 2000, Ursa, with Bankers and BSIL as co-plaintiffs, 
initiated a separate suit against AFP and Aon alleging that each 
company’s obligations under the CDS agreement were violated.665  In 
this suit, the court recognized that a credit event took place in March 
2000, and the court entered summary judgment in favor of the 
plaintiffs.666
 655. Id. ¶ 27. 
 656. Id. ¶ 28. 
 657. Id. ¶ 29. 
 658. See id. ¶ 30. 
 659. Id. ¶ 31. 
 660. See id. ¶ 31. 
 661. See id. ¶ 32. 
 662. Id. ¶ 33. 
 663. See id. ¶ 34. 
 664. See id. ¶ 33. 
 665. See id. ¶ 35. 
 666. See id. ¶ 36. 
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2.  Issue 
Among other things, the issue in this scenario is whether the 
guarantor’s (GSIS) refusal of repayment constitutes a credit event.  In 
general, a suretyship obligation refers to the debt that needs to be 
performed, in all or in part, or payment of an undertaking, if the 
principal obligation is defaulted.667  A suretyship obligation assumes the 
same duty, nature, and scope as the principal debt, and functions in a 
way that secures the principal obligation.668  In general, a suretyship 
obligation is established by an agreement between the creditor and 
guarantor.669  This agreement is not independent, but rather is signed 
within the document in order to secure the debt between the creditor and 
principal debtor.670
In the end, the conditions for establishment of a suretyship 
obligation are the existence of a surety agreement between the guarantor 
and the creditor and the existence of a principal obligation.  The 
specifics of the suretyship obligation are decided by the surety 
agreement and the principal obligation.  For one obligation or payment, 
each of the two debtors assumes independent obligations. 
Suretyship obligations have inherent legal characteristics such as 
independence,671 appendant nature, accompaniment, complementariness, 
 
 667. See Berkley, supra note 29, at 354. 
 668. See id.  Strictly speaking, surety and guaranty have different meanings: The 
former means “an agreement to be jointly and severally liable for the payment or 
performance  obligation without necessity for first exhausting rights and remedies 
against borrower,” while the latter means “technically an agreement to pay or perform 
an obligation only if primary obligor fails to do so.” Id. at 354; see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 1 cmt. m (1996) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
But see Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 920. 
The reality is that, as a practical matter, surety and guaranty have lost their 
distinctions in the modern world.  After endless hours of discussion, much research 
and nearly as much frustration, the authors have concluded that although some 
differences might exist, it simply isn’t useful to proceed on the premise that the 
differences between surety agreements and guaranties are meaningful outside of the 
context of insurance. 
Id. 
 669. See RESTATEMENT § 1 cmt. m, supra note 668, at 7 (stating that “[t]he 
[guarantor] may undertake its obligation as a result of direct dealings with the obligee 
without the consent or knowledge of the principal obligor”). 
 670. See RESTATEMENT § 1 cmt. a, supra note 668. Thus, two contracts are made in 
the general suretyship: “one between the secondary obligor and the principal obligor, 
the other between the secondary obligor and the obligee.” Id. 
 671. Some commentators state that: 
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and homogeneity.  The suretyship obligation assumes the same content, 
scope and quantity as the principal obligation.  A suretyship obligation, 
however, includes interest penalties on the principal obligation, 
compensation for damages, and other obligations within the principal 
obligation.672
A suretyship obligation is separate, or independent from, the 
principal obligation and “need not be identical to the underlying 
obligation.”673  These obligations form a subordinate relationship with 
the principal obligation, however, in the sense that its purpose is to 
secure performance of the principal obligation.  Suretyship obligations 
have the characteristic of becoming a subordinate of the principal 
obligation.  Thus, when a principal obligation is voided,674 cancelled, 
The relationship between the guarantor and creditor a guaranty creates is contractual 
in nature and is generally subject to the laws of contract. . . . a guarantor is not 
primarily liable on the underlying debt but instead has a secondary liability that will 
be required to be paid only when the underlying obligor has defaulted in its obligation 
to pay the underlying debt.  A corollary of this distinction is that a guarantor is 
generally not liable to pay the creditor on the underlying debt unless the underlying 
obligor is liable to pay such debt to the creditor.  Put differently, the independence 
principle does not exist in the law of guaranties. 
Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 912 (citation omitted). 
 672. See E. Quincy Servs. Dist. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
694 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2001). 
[O]nce a surety assumes the contract of its principal, it stands in the same position to 
the contract as the principal, including all liabilities; [and] a surety is thus liable for all 
liquidated damages accruing before it assumed the contract, and is no longer limited 
to its bond in completing the contract thereafter. 
Id. at 697; see also In re Conservatorship of Huerta, 41 P.3d 814 (Kan. 2002). 
In the case of debt on [a surety bond] for the payment of money only, . . . interest may 
be recovered after default, even though it exceeds the penalty, and whether the action 
be against principal or surety. 
. . . . 
The penalty of the bond covers the misconduct of the principal; but the interest 
allowed on the penalty is for the misconduct of the sureties for the delay in payment.  
If the damages were paid when due, they would have earned interest. 
Id. at 818 (citations omitted); see also Edmonds v. W. Sur. Co., 962 P.2d 323, 326 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (“When a [surety] bond is legally mandated, the obligation does 
not include any penalties imposed on the principal obligor beyond actual losses suffered 
by the obligee for failure of the principal to fulfill the underlying obligation, unless the 
secondary obligation so provides.”). 
 673. See RESTATEMENT § 1 cmt. k, supra note 668 (noting that a secondary 
obligation does not have to be identical to the original obligation). 
 674. See Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 913 (stating that “[A]s a general rule, if the 
underlying debt is void, the guaranty is not enforceable either”). 
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modified,675 or terminated, the suretyship obligation’s fate is the 
same.676  When the bond on the principal obligation is transferred, the 
suretyship obligation is also transferred.  On the contrary, if there is a 
change in the principal debtor as an assumption, the suretyship 
obligation is terminated under the doctrine of collapsed fidelity.677
Because a suretyship obligation is formed by the surety agreement 
between creditor and guarantor, the guarantor’s mistake as to an 
essential part of the contract will not become void even when the grantor 
was deceived by the principal debtor’s inducement.678  Originally, upon 
arrival of the suretyship obligation’s due date, the creditor may require 
its performance pursuant to their agreement that the guarantor be liable 
in the event of default of the principal debtor.679  When a specific credit 
event takes place as it did here, a creditor may require performance by 
the guarantor even before maturity, since the conditions on the 
agreement are fulfilled.680
3.  Argument 
As mentioned above, there is no question that the debtor’s failure to 
pay constitutes a credit event.  There is a dispute regarding whether the 
guarantor’s refusal for repayment applies to the credit event, because the 
guarantor has peremptory notice and inquiry rights.  In other words, the 
guarantor may demand that the creditor make a claim to the principal 
 
 675. See id. “[I]f the terms of the underlying debt are altered materially without the 
consent of the guarantor, the guaranty may be unenforceable.” Id. 
 676. See Aicher et al., supra note 81, at 913. 
 677. See, e.g., Bier Pension Plan Trust v. Estate of Schneierson, 74 N.Y.2d 312, 315 
(1st Dept. 1989) (“Under general contract rules, an obligation may not be altered 
without the consent of the party who assumed the obligation.”); see also Midland Steel 
Warehouse Corp. v. Godinger Silver Art Ltd., 276 A.D.2d 341, 343 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2000). 
 678. See Bier Pension Plan Trust, 74 N.Y.2d at 315. 
Although parties are generally bound by the terms of the agreement they sign, it is a 
well-settled rule of law, that a contract of guaranty cannot be enforced by the 
guarantee, where the guarantor has been induced to enter into the contract by 
fraudulent misrepresentations or concealment on the part of the guarantee.”) (citation 
and emphasis omitted). 
Id. 
 679. See RESTATEMENT § 1, supra note 668. 
 680. See Phillips Factors Corp. v. Harbor Lane of Pensacola, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 
1580, 1583 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (“[D]efault of one primarily liable triggers guarantor’s 
duty of performance on the obligation.”). 
802 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XIII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
debtor first since they have the ability and capacity to repay.  Under this 
scenario, the creditor claims first to the principal debtor, and may only 
make a claim to the guarantor if the principal debtor cannot repay.  
Because of the time lapse between these two events, the relationship 
between the parties could have changed significantly. 
In this case, it is unclear whether GSIS exercised the “peremptory 
notice and inquiry rights.”  If this right was exercised, then the judgment 
might differ because the guarantor can exercise the refusal of 
performance by right due to the nature of the suretyship obligation and, 
as such, it would be necessary to interpret what constitutes a credit 
event. 
GSIS denied the formation of a suretyship obligation and the courts 
recognized it as a credit event.681  Still, it is necessary to separate the 
non-existence of a suretyship obligation, which cannot constitute a credit 
event, from the guarantor’s refusal to repay.  Only the latter should be 
recognized as a credit event, because if suretyship does not exist 
between a creditor and guarantor, for whatever reason, logically, a credit 
event could not occur.  The trial court’s finding that a credit event 
occurred is questionable.682
On appeal, however, the Second Circuit court stated that: 
[n]either the default, which constituted a Failure to Pay under the 
BSIL/Aon CDS contract, nor the Republic [of the Philippines’] 
failure to honor its alleged statutory obligation, constituted a Failure 
to Pay under the Aon/SG CDS contract.  For the same reasons, 
neither event constituted a “Repudiation.”  They similarly do not 
satisfy the other definitions of Credit Event enumerated in the 
Aon/SG CDS contract.683
Note, however, that this holding was based on the analysis of 
whether the credit event notice was sent before the termination date, not 
on a direct analysis of whether the enumerated credit events occurred.684  
The true meaning of the court’s holding is that there was a credit event, 
but it simply had late notice.  This reasoning is not satisfactory and has 
not solved any of the confusion in this area of the law. 
 681. See Aon Fin. Prods. v. Société Générale, No. 00 Civ. 5863GBD, 2005 WL 
427535, at *1, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2005). 
 682. See id. at *6.
 683. Aon Fin. Prods. v. Société Générale, 476 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007).
 684. See id. at 102-03. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article explored the development of credit derivatives and 
examined swap products, which are now important market tools.  It also 
introduced the legal characteristics of a credit derivatives swap and 
examined various issues related to credit events that trigger changes in 
the relationship of rights in credit derivatives agreements.  Further, 
lawsuits between EGMF and JP Morgan, and DITM and JP Morgan, 
were examined to scrutinize the legal issues pertaining to Argentina’s 
declaration of moratorium in the context of credit derivative instruments 
and the occurrence of a credit event.  Failure to pay was examined in 
relation to the interpretation of the credit event, which was an issue 
between Aon and Societe Generale. 
As Moody’s declared, the investor’s main risk in credit derivatives 
type transactions stems from the moral hazard of intermediary financial 
institutions.685  Due to the characteristics of the credit derivatives 
instrument whereby intermediary financial institutions decide whether a 
credit event occurred or not and make decisions on the scope of the loss, 
a dispute might be inevitable.686  The brokerage financial firms will 
surely want to interpret the terms credit event and boundary of loss as 
broadly as they possible. 
As the Aon example shows, financial institutions that transact credit 
derivative instruments want to interpret the term “credit event” as 
broadly as possible.  This argument is not convincing, however, when 
principles such as materiality, objectivity, and certainty are factored into 
the credit event.  “[R]esolution of the debate over the [r]estructuring 
[c]redit [e]vent is far from near.”687  One critic further remarked that 
“[i]t seems highly implausible that there will ever be a definition of 
[r]estructuring that satisfies all market participants.”688  The need for a 
definition of restructuring, however, is undeniable.  “There is a valid 
concern expressed by market participants who favor inclusion of 
[r]estructuring that its exclusion will create mismatches in credit risk 
 685. See e.g., TOLK, supra note 373, at 13.  “Some other models do not rely on 
moral hazard to explain financial crises . . . .” Id.; see STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 
37, at 28. 
 686. See TOLK, supra note 373, at 2. 
 687. Pollack, supra note 337, at 44. 
 688. Id. 
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hedging.”689  Only when the definition of a credit event is interpreted 
narrowly, as it is under the ISDA, is it possible to avoid confusion.
 689. Id. 
